TOWARD A DYNAMIC THEORY OF THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

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While social theorists have focused on the state as a chief agent of development since at least the 1950s, state-centered views of development have rapidly proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s. At the same time, the concepts of civil society has regained prominence among scholars and policymakers—especially since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. While some theorists have dichotomized society into state and non-state sectors for analytical purposes, no one has focused on the state-civil society dichotomy to explain the process of development.

This paper addresses this conceptual gap in the development literature. After reviewing competing development paradigms with respect to how each views the state, civil society, and development itself it proposes a theory of development. The central argument is that development is a dynamic, non-continuous process of state-civil society interaction. The paper then proceeds to explain the theory through historical analysis, and concludes by outlining the planning and policy implications.

Let us begin by defining the state in Weberian terms: an institution wielding a monopoly of violence over a clearly delineated national territory. Civil society is an autonomous and organized sphere that mediates the state's relationship with its citizens while regulating the behavior of citizens and setting limits on state intervention. Development is here conceptualized as a sustained increase in per capita wealth and income combined with structural economic change, coupled with an overall increase in the living standards of the majority of the population.

These regularities in the process of development apply to socialist(or formerly socialist) and capitalist societies. However, the proposed theory is developing or recently developed countries. Moreover, while a balance of power between the state and civil
State, Civil Society, and Development

tre are two major views regarding the role of the public sector in the economic sphere. The first view stems from liberal democratic classical economics. This view underpins the concept of a limited role for the state in economic affairs. According to the LP, the state should leave major economic decisions to the market, which optimizes resource allocation and maximizes efficiency. Civil society, which for our purposes are the to actors and institutions, plays a crucial role in the economy.

Civil society, which, for our purposes are the to actors and institutions, is the engine of growth. Here, civil society is viewed as the mainstay of civil society as the mainstay of the market (the mainstay of civil society) as the mainstay of the market, and its stifling will lead to economic stagnation. Conversely, its free and unfettered functioning will lead to economic growth.

The RP views civil society differently. Taki Hegel, who defined civil society as the sphere of radical theorists find no mechanism in civil society (or an “invisible hand”) that automatically leads to the maximization of social welfare. Rather, the RP views civil society as the sphere of conflict-prone nature of civil society. While radical Marxists view civil society as the engine of growth, they also point out that its unfettered functioning will lead to economic stagnation. The RP contrasts the planned nature of resources under socialism with the anarchic qualities of production in the market.

In addition to harboring divergent views of the state’s role in economic development, the two paradigms also view economic development in different terms. Whereas the LP views economic development in terms (as capital formation and economic growth) as capital formation and economic growth, the RP views economic development as a qualitative change in economic structure. There are, of course, a variety of positions within this paradigm. For example, the “growth with equity” approach tempers the focus on growth with some redistribution of resources under socialism. Marxists have at times advocated “growth for the poor under Stalin.”

This paper argues that both the LP and RP paradigms have limitations. For example, the state’s role in economic development is incomplete, and for the experiences of those societies that have attempted to implement these paradigms. Consider, for example, the state’s role in economic development. The LP views the state as a passive observer, while the RP views the state as an active participant in economic development. The state’s role in economic development is incomplete, and the experiences of those societies that have attempted to implement these paradigms are mixed. In some cases, the state’s involvement in economic development has been successful, while in other cases, it has led to economic stagnation.
a, but also the United States, France, Germany, a
l, the failure of the Eastern bloc counties to h casts doubt on the prescriptions of the RP pole in development. Although the economic Union transformed an essentially agrarian and y into one of the world’s leading industrial s what Rostow calls the stage of high mass 
Soviet planers found it impossible to economy producing over ten million goods love quotes the former director of the s Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences ordinated plan for just one year’s time would, rs, take about 30,000 years to perpare. 11

Conceptual Framework

t also both the “free market” LP and the “state-
e to of change over time, a dynamic and developement. Economic development is not a fully progressing, and incremental process of or revolutionary change in social relations. Its process in which quantitative growth and social relations are unequally important in odds. The failure of the two paradigms to voted in a misunderstanding of the historical te and civil society as a society develops.

tain thesis: in order to develop, a society must a relatively weak civil society during the early Let us call this the period of state-led growth. vil society must become more powerful with a certain stage in the development process, the will come into conflict. This is the period of state or civil society emerges from the contest the development process will be paralyzed.

To theorize the interplay of state and development process, it is first necessary to define types of state: the obstructionist state, the expropriation state. We must also produce a typology of states that corresponds to the three state types: the equivocal state, and the development state. One at different development trajectories and periodization. In this framework, development interaction between a developmental state and society and that successful development results of the two are eventually balanced.

2.1 Typology of States

The state, as an institution that has a meaningful role in the economic development includes government ministries. All le bureaucracies, the military, political parties, enterprises. The state may be either central capitalist or socialist. While the state has numerals the state’s role in the economic development the state’s role in relation to civil society).

The obstructionist state, as its name actively hinders economic development. Acco
failure to sustainably empower an industrialist class of his traditional base of support led to the collapse of the state in the late 1970s.

The third type of state is the developmental state well documented, most of Japan, the newly industrializing societies of East Asian countries in Latin America. Developmental legitimacy from overseeing a process of rising resections of the population. State legitimacy, necessarily a democratic consensus on the part of most states we would consider “developmental” —in Japan to the military dictatorship of General Park in the Kuomintang state on Taiwan—have hardly representative democracy. Rather, in the developmental state. Legitimacy refers to the state’s ability to fulfill its project of fundamentally altering the economic and social development.

The developmental state—similar to the other chief characteristics by the relation it bears to civil society, the obstructionist state prevents the growing bourgeoisie while allying itself with merchant capitalists and landowners. The result is often rampant corruption and civil society, a factor that serves to undermine economic and social development.

In contrast, a strong developmental state oversee a process of successful industrial development state “disciplines” civil society with procedures designed to maximize the long-term growth of the economy. These include subsidies to key industries, performance standards, and conversely, the removal of industry failure to meet the performance standards. This prevents labor union and other groups from making demands that jeopardize developmental state.
velopmental state is a necessary condition for empowering developmental civil society while development forces. The specific ideology such as not development states. The significance of the developmental state is to gradually relinquish power to the non-state societies.

board definition of civil society. In addition to labor and businesses (Hegel’s “die burgerliche organization, human rights groups, women’s associations, producer groups, and other non-profits (NGOs). Of course, this definition of civil society is dominated by merchant capital, with trade and real estate ventures crowding economic investment leads to will tend to be obstructionist to the degree of lead to development. Thus, a developmental generis, but is the product of specific historical Both the Taiwanese and South Korean states, corrupt, and obstructionist in the 1950s, yet states had transformed themselves into. This transformation is inexplicable without relation between state and civil society in development.

developmental civil society is dominated by reform-minded, progressive elements. While merchant capital, and landowning classes remain development civil society, they follow the bourgeoisie. In addition, this type of civil society, the obstructionist civil society,20 and ideological educational system and the mass media—are part of the development state.

It is worth emphasizing that a development is necessary for successful economic development state.21 Dominated by industrieminded, progressive elements, this type of rational, scientific worldview. It also gives legitimacy to the whole. Moreover, the developmental civil society the developmental state economic policy. As the society develops, the strength of civil society grows, this type of civil society accepts state legitimacy, although more as a product that dictates policy.

2.3 Development and Periodization

As noted above, development is a sustained gross domestic product (GDP) combined with change and an overall increase in living standa
Development has both a temporal and spatial dimension that takes place in a specific space or territory. Two crucial components of any development are, therefore, the specific space and time involved. As for the former, this paper has the spatial unit of analysis. Although this choice is also problematic, our central focus on the state and civil society—as well as our territorial analysis—logically follows this choice. The choice is also consistent with modernization theory and traditional Marxism, which views the basic unit of analysis; it is the nation-state that is a distinct mode of production. A multitude of states at different levels of social development forms the basis for theories of uneven development and developmental models to which developed societies might aspire.

At times, this paper has adopted a triadic model of a growth period, a transitional period, and an era period. We have identified these three critical stages in which the relation between the state and civil society is qualitatively distinct. Our adoption of a triadic and historical development is not without objections. But objections to periodization are specific and limited in nature. 

Society typologies—along with the conception discussed above—lay the groundwork for an analysis of how society interacts dynamically in the economic domain. Table 1, which we present graphically, depicts all the possible combinations of state and civil society at a given time. As a detailed analysis is not possible here, let us focus on the state's developmental civil society as the one to result in successful development. Since the process involving the state and civil society, or other in different historical periods, it is possible to measure the relative strength of the state sector to control the development process. This is the case of the state. State strength can be either legitimately or through force—economic—executives, ownership of economic resources or through policy—ideological—exercised through the state or through the media. Thus, a state is strong to the extent of political repression, and the degree of censorship of the press.

Measuring the relative strength of civil society is straightforward as that of the state because civil society has such a broad range of competing social forces. The relative strength of the private sector is indicated by the GDP, its control of commanding heights industry (so-called industry, transport and communication), information, the media, and so forth. The strength indicated by the number of members in a particular sector, levels of funding, and certain non-quantifiable "goodwill" a given organization generates in the community.

It is more difficult to measure the relative strength of the state sector and civil society in the case of the socialist countries. One reason has to do with the extent...
eral difficulty in distinguishing the state from such as the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the China (PRC). Indeed, a common Western bloc countries (and command economies ite does everything—that a non-state sector the decentralization of economic decision- mand) economies is fairly extensive and a exist. Whether or not political or ideological complete state centralization of economic s of mathematics clearly work against such a the last analysis ownership of land and the the FSU were in the hands of the state, the and omnipresent societal entity.

society assume varying degrees of strength her over time. The difference in strength civil society at any given time is the “power power in a successful development process, the society and the power gap tends to be large. civil society grows in strength relative to the narrows. When a society is fully developed, exists an the state and civil society are more e power gap is the difference in strength civil society, then a successfully developing stage where the power gap is close to zero the power gap is quite large (and positive). gap in an underdeveloped (or unsuccessfully initially be quite small (or even negative) and may grow large—exactly the opposite of fully developing country.

cept may be used to periodize a country’s rocess. During the initial growth period, the large (and positive) with a relatively strong ety. The transitional period is characterized gap. As the power gap begins to close, e power of the state, often leading to a clash development process is to be successful, the and an averaging out of the power gap to zero zero to account for periodic increases in strength civil society).

2.4 Period of State-Led Growth

With the idea of periodization in place, it is analysis of how the state and civil society interact begin with, why must the power gap be large( initial growth period? In other words, why is a in the early stages of development a necessary co development? First, it is not any strong state that period. It is the developmental state. Recall fr typology that the developmental state is non-corr and committed to furthering economic develop mental state legitimizes itself by creating the con economic growth. This is an important point be gap is not always an indication that the so developing. A large power gap may also be obstructionist or equivocal state.

Second, the developmental state will emp civil society that we have termed development those groups that do not contribute to economic the state will empower the developmental pri industrial bourgeoisie, subsidize heavy industri enterprises in those industries that do not attra make them viable private sector undertakings.
The developmental state will restrain those that are either anti-development or opposed to trade, real estate speculation, and the state will also ensure that what non-exist will remain firmly under its control. The developmental state will take an active role in the economic surplus to those who promote sustainable economic development. It accomplishes this by designing appropriate fiscal policies, and establishing technology diffusion benefits of FDI.

The transitional period—the period when civil society's goals for development are achieved—is one in which growth and transition are often at odds. The form of revolution, agitation for a more open society, unrest, or similar measures. Exactly how this unfolds depends upon social, structural, and situational factors. A positive developmental period, however, is crucial to the eventual democratization of a developing society.

2.6 The Period of Sustained Development

The third period is the period of sustained development, which differs from the growth period in a number of ways. While the growth period is representative of a development period that has been characterized by sustained development, the period of sustained development is represented by a more closely related society. Second, the state in the growth period, but not the state in the third period of sustained development, is characterized by state-led growth, the state often independent that it loses as it becomes the bridge between the state and civil society.

Lastly, democratic political forms are more the period of sustained development. This is because the empowerment of civil society is successful. Representative democracy may thus be seen as the balance of power between the state and civil society. Viewing a more open political culture as the demands upon a relatively weaker, but absolute more likely for democracy to develop in the third period, and conversely, it is less likely to develop. But this is a period of growth and transition. But this is a period of growth and transition. But this is a period of growth and transition. But this is a period of growth and transition. But this is a period of growth and transition. But this is a period of growth and transition. But this is a period of growth and transition.
esses historical examples of the processes we are ceeding analysis. It begins with the period of the period of transition and finally, to development. Although it will not provide an unsuccessful developers, it will provide of societies that have not followed the path above. The ways in which these societies civil society relational pattern with which we development, can shed further light on the

ed Growth

on the idea that late industrializers require to overcome their relative backwardness historical development of European and US work serves to dispel the (neo-classical) myth of the difficulty of the analysis of minimal state intervention in the historical development of European and US industrialization, at the time a rapid, capital-intensive process that increase of both capital and an according to Gerschenkron, the state in a work to ensure that impediments to removed (such as serfdom), that key (s) are in place, and that requisite financial the effort to “catch up” often means that the needed to command greater resources than its ced country. Thus, Germany and Russia intervention in their industrialization processes European country to industrialize. In France, “the industrial development under tributed to that determined effort to untie the uk governments and strong vested interests

expenditure accounted for nearly 25 percent of the state playing a major role in redistribution manufacturing and mercantile classes. Accor “[British] government and its military activit systemic rivalries, raised and sustained outp structure (with disproportionate growth in the m industries), and flattened the fluctuations that wo a market-led pattern of growth.” Clearly, Eng was the result of massive and sustained govern the economy. The historical record shows that it had gained a comparative advantage in industri it advocated a free-trade policy with a relative government.

A similar pattern is observable in the Un
dent century. At both the state and
government’s de facto economic policy was anytl Shapiro and Taylor point out that while “state lemmal government “targeted railroads and far always (millions of acres to the railway companies, farm families who avoided speculation), and was until after World War II.” And just as in the case was only after the United States achieved uncha

t the international economic system that it began policies and the importance of a “level playing fi

The newly-industrialized countries (NICs), Korea, Taiwan, etc.) provide additional exampl intervention in the development process. Although paragons of free-market capitalism, these states interventionist, erecting high tariff barriers, fu select industries, and providing overall direct through such organizations as Japan’s Ministry and Investment (MITI). Alice Amsden argues success of the East Asian countries was not the prices right,” which neo-classical economists qua non of successful development. Rather it
Society

A similar scenario presents itself in the history of Taiwan. Traditional Taiwanese civil society was shaped by the Kuomintang (KMT) forces in the aftermath of the mainland in 1949. The KMT state was thus largely militaristic and developmental agenda unimpeded. Retaking the mainland grew dimmer during the 1970s, and the KMT began to reorient itself away from militarism towards developmentalism. Even more than in the case of the mainland, the Taiwanese state was heavily involved in the regulatory and as an active participant in the economic development. This case study highlights the importance of a strong, interventionist state in fostering economic development and civil society.
devices as exchange controls, subsidies, and the same way as South Korea, the state was instrumental in creating and maintaining the oversupply of labor and the consequent freeing up of labor in those industries the state was promoting. Demonstration that over time, the very success of developmental agenda resulted in the growth in the power of the state to challenge the state’s power.

The foregoing that successful development will be dominated by an obstructionist state at civil society. We have already pointed to the obstructionist state par excellence. British instance, was largely based upon a strong that empowered such non-developmental actors of colonial rule had left India one of the world (in per capita terms).

provides another example of impediments. Early 1950s to late 1970s Iran experienced growth. The country industrialized rapidly as it sector and infrastructure. Meanwhile, a pessimistic outlook on its entity added fuel to the yearning for democratic middle class was expanding. the state was dismantled the Iranian state at the hands of civil the new state regrouped to suppress civil social development process came to a sudden halt. Sust requires that state and civil society meet each other.

3.3 The Transition

Engels once remarked that when “the industrial country stands in opposition to its economic in the way through.” This paper has attempted to always the case and, where it is the case, the has not always “forced its way through” in a manner successful development as defined above.

Indeed, of the three state types—obstructive developmental—only the rise of the developmental stages of the development process will development. The developmental state favors increases due to the likelihood of a challenge the rise of a society. In the case of Taiwan, when civil so martial law government in the 1980s, the state suppressed or challenge the power of civil society. In the case of South Korea. A violent clash between society is therefore less likely in a society development state than in one dominated by equivocal state.

In Iran, the Pahlavi state failed to transcend to further growth of a pro-development privatized time, the Shah alienated the state from the trend absolutism in Iran, the feudal aristocracy and more the clash between the state and civil society came late 1970s (culminating in the collapse of the Pahlavi development civil society proved unable to counter and the economy was dominated by merchant declining in power relative to civil society, the revolutionary period actually increased in strength.
a developmental civil society, the rise of an ty (merchant capital), and the collapse of state round for a crisis.

tral planning in the FSU has left relatively economies they no longer control. The result pre-existing monopolies (known in the FSU as minates”) and the growth of lateral exchanges of central planning agencies at the national (Gosplan). In the FSU, the changing relations tribution superimposed on an unchanged guided fertile ground for the rise of merchant erminology this paper has employed, the onary cum developmental state and the ant capital (rather than industrial capital) has capital: investment, hyper-inflation, and a , in a word, maldevelopment. The FSU and Europe (with the exception of East Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic) have f a dominant state apparatus and the relative obstructionist civil society. A power gap in the powerful entities in the FSU are Civic Union (a lobbying group for the ant capital, and organized crime. The the FSU in August 1991 may thus be seen as the part of the old state apparatus (the last antinary cum developmental state).

ned Development

The FSU, Iran, South Korea and Taiwan as possible outcomes once the transition from a begins. First, an obstructionist or equivocal rely limit the growth of a developmental civil powerful state during the early states of the a recurrent feature of all historical processes situation where the commanding heights of an nationalized and the further growth of an indust curtailed by a resurgent state.

A second possible outcome of the transition to society where a developmental civil society Develop, is the collapse of the state and the rise civil society. This is what has occurred in the empowerment of the conglomerates and marketing rapid decline of state power led to a crisis that is along a path of successful development.

The third possible outcome of the transition to social order is the development of a balance of state and civil society—and especially the development. As maintained throughout this paper, this is the all societies that have successfully developed, the countries as otherwise diverse as South Korea and Taiwan and Great Britain. In these societies an created the conditions amenable to continued based its legitimacy on economic power to a na civil society or (in a capitalist society) the industri


This paper has presented a theory of develop state and civil society as primary units of an against static theories of development—the paradigms—that assume unchanging roles for bu society proposing a dynamic model: rather development requires minimal (or maximal) stat economy and society, it is the relative strength society will change over the course of the deve early stages of development are characterized a state and weak civil society. Over time, how developing society will exhibit an increasingly p At some point the state and civil society powerful civil society from emerging then t
state that lays the groundwork for the rise of society. The developmental state pursues policies-productive economic activities such as real investment in trade, and attempts to maximize productive activities. This will serve to increase opmental civil society and industrial capital inization takes root in the society, progressively in power and eventually mount a dge. The state meets this challenge through aiation. The end result is a continuing process of higher levels of prosperity for the society as developing countries must recognize that state over time. During the early stages of should pursue policies that circumscribe those interests and merchant capital, but also to tionist forces more generally. The state should ratus to discipline labor and capital an work to nulation, redirecting resources to productive

In developmental state remains a strong state, it to share power with civil society—i need to more advanced stages. The challenge to society, therefore, should be met by the state and increased opportunity for non-state public policy. In this way development will free of state-civil society conflict that thwarts

NOTES

4); Atkinson(1992); Bratton(1989); Chazan(1992); sch(1993); Hirst(1991); de Janvry, Sadoulet and ts(1990); Keane(1988); Rau(1991); Shils(1991);
A mind, however, is that a developmental state is "mental" if it does not allow for the growth of civil society, a challenge to state power in Eastern Europe and, arguably, by these groups in concert with certain "its own nature." Hong Kong and Taiwan took the form of that, it took the form of trade and primary much of Latin America. Society may also lead to successful economic interaction with a developmental state; however, and particularly the industrial bourgeoisie—must which case the equivocal civil society is developmental civil society sustainability (or what Marx called "expanded oneselfs development" from "growth." Our use of the could not be confused with environmentally. We are attempting to explain development as it could. Thus, our definition of development centers on countries have actually achieved in terms of output of production, and so on. To argue that this kind environmentally sustainable (while probably true) is more.

As with other forms of social conflict, state-civil society remains latent. Hence the difficulty in predicting state-civil society conflict will ensue. For a discussion relation to ethnic conflicts, see Amirahmadi(1994).

By definition, the power gap in a developed society is large and positive in a (successfully) developing country. This is a "bourgeois democracy" of the type found in Western Europe.

See Fig. 2 for an exhaustive list of all state/civil society will result in maldevelopment.

Gerschenkron(1962), List(1966) made of the same century.


Gerschenkron(1962); Shapiro and Taylor(1990).

Deane(1975).

Harris(1987).

Shapiro and Taylor(1990, 866).

The U. S. State remains highly interventionist, a third of the country's GDP.


Amsden(1985, 93).

One difference between Taiwan and South Korea lies in the degree to which large industrial conglomerate Samsung, the KMT state cultivated small-to medium enterprises.


As witnessed, for example, by a rising share of state and public sector enterprises.

Although significant differences exist between the communist Eastern European countries, e.g., described here is broadly representative of the with the collapse of centrally planned economies.

Burawoy and Krotov(1993). Our theory parallels their that the productive forces of society will eventually explaining the collapse of the Eastern Bloc countries.

To borrow a term from Samir Amin.

This is based on the premise that a society dominated by the civil society will not successfully develop.
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