

TOWARD A DYNAMIC THEORY OF THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

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While social theorists have focused on the state as a chief agent of development since at least the 1950s, state-centered views of development have rapidly proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s.¹⁾ At the same time, the concepts of civil society has regained prominence among scholars and policymakers—especially since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.²⁾ While some theorists have dichotomized society into state and non-state sectors for analytical purposes,³⁾ no one has focused on the state-civil society dichotomy to explain the process of development.

This paper addresses this conceptual gap in the development literature. After reviewing competing development paradigms with respect to how each views the state, civil society, and development itself it proposes a theory of development. The central argument is that development is a dynamic, non-continuous process of state-civil society interaction. The paper then proceeds to explain the theory through historical analysis, and concludes by outlining the planning and policy implications.

Let us begin by defining the state in Weberian terms: an institution wielding a monopoly of violence over a clearly delineated national territory. Civil society is an autonomous and organized sphere that mediates the state's relationship with its citizens while regulating the behavior of citizens and setting limits on state intervention. Development is here conceptualized as a sustained increase in per capita wealth and income combined with structural economic change, coupled with an overall increase in the living standards of the majority of the population.

These regularities in the process of development apply to socialist(or formerly socialist) and capitalist societies.⁴⁾ However, the proposed theory is developing or recently developed countries. Moreover, while a balance of power between the state and civil

pursue nor development is a society's
nace and industry and industry and their

State, Civil Society, and Development

ere are two major views regarding the
or the public sector in the economic
first view stems from liberal democratic
ssical economics. This view underpins the
According to the LP, the state should
in the economic sphere. Except for such
nt of contracts, the maintenance of civil
ivate property, and the safeguarding of
should leave major economic decision

iented variant of the LP advocates limited
the economy.⁶ For example, governments
id fiscal policy in an effort to combat
Yet even this Keynesian variant does not
micromanagement of the economy. The
e involvement in the economy will lead to
th the public and private spheres), waste,
. In short, the LP views extensive state
ny as incompatible with high levels of
nsition to sustained development.
late's role in economic development stems
olitical economy and the development
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the
^{a.}⁷ This is the "radical paradigm(RP)."
h nationalization and economic planning
ading role in economic development. At
should retain control of basic industry,
; term investment for short-term profit,
ent-seeking behavior. The RP maintains

civil society, which, for our purposes are the to
actors and institutions.⁸ The LP views civil society
this as the engine of growth. Here, civil society is
individual freedoms and liberties. Liberal economy
the market(the mainstay of civil society) as
regulating. Civil society's free and unfettered fund
economic development and the maximization
Conversely, its stifling will lead to economic
dictatorship.


The RP views civil society differently. Taki
Hegel(who defined civil society as the sphere of
radical theorists find no mechanism in civil society(or an "invisible hand") that automatically leads to s
the maximization of social welfare. Rather, the I
divisive, conflict-prone nature of civil society w
logic replaces the LP's emphasis on the market
organizing principle of social theory. While radic
Marx) view civil society as the engine of growth
they also point out that its unfettered functioning
and uneven development. The RP contrasts the pl
allocation of resources under socialism with th
anarchic qualities of production in the market.

In addition to harboring divergent views of
society, the two paradigms also view develop
Whereas the LP views economic development lar
terms(as capital formation and economic growth
development as a qualitative change in economic i
There are, of course, a variety of positions within th
example, the "growth with equity" approach temf
emphasis on growth with some redistribution
Marxists have at times advocated "growth for the
under Stalin).⁹

This paper argues that both the LP and RP
civil society, and development are incomplete, fir
for the experiences of those societies that have
consider for examining the state's role in econom

a, but also the United States, France, Germany,

Fig. 1



I, the failure of the Eastern bloc countries to h casts doubt on the prescriptions of the RP lition transformed an essentially agrarian and y into one of the world's leading industrial what Rostow calls the stage of high mass usive.¹⁰ Soviet planners found it impossible to economy producing over ten million goods love quotes the former director of the s Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences ordinated plan for just one year's time would, rs, take about 30,000 years to prepare.¹¹

utive Conceptual Framework

rm both the "free market" LP and the "state-sense of change over time, a dynamic and development. Economic development is not a lly progressing, and incremental process of or revolutionary change in social relations. It us process in which quantitative growth and social relations are *unequally* important in ods. The failure of the two paradigms to oted in a misunderstanding of the historical te and civil society as a society develops.

ain thesis: in order to develop, a society must a relatively weak civil society during the early Let us call this the period of state-led growth. Civil society must become more powerful with certain stage in the development process, the will come into conflict. This is the period of state or civil society emerges from the contest the development process will be paralyzed.

To theorize the interplay of state and development process, it is first necessary to d types of state: the obstructionist state, the e development state. We must also produce a t that corresponds to the three state types: the equivocal state, and the development state. On at different development trajectories and periodization. In this framework, developmen interaction between a developmental state and society and that successful development result of the two are eventually balanced.

2.1 Typology of States

The state, as an institution that has a n includes government ministries. All le bureaucracy, the military, political partie enterprises. The state may be either centra capitalist or socialist. While the state has num the state's role in the economic development the state's role in relation to civil society). The obstructionist state, as its name i achively hinders economic development. Accc

failure to sustainably empower an industrialist class of his traditional base of support led to the collapse in the late 1970s.

The third type of state is the developmental state. The developmental state is well documented, most of Japan, the newly industrializing societies of East Asia, and Latin America.¹⁴⁾ Developmental legitimacy from overseeing a process of rising sections of the population. State legitimacy, necessarily a democratic consensus on the part of citizens, we would consider "developmental" – in Japan to the military dictatorship of General Park in the Kuomintang state on Taiwan – have hardly representative democracy.¹⁵⁾ Rather, in the developmental state, Legitimacy refers to the state high rates of economic growth and rising living standards to fulfill its project of fundamentally altering the society.¹⁶⁾

The developmental state – similar to the other chiefly characterized by the relation it bears to civil society, the obstructionist state prevents the growing bourgeoisie while allying itself with merchant capital and landowners. The result is often rampant corruption of the apparatus and civil society, a factor that serves to economic and social development.

In contrast, a strong developmental state oversees a process of successful industrial procedures designed to maximize the long-term performance of the economy. These include subsidies to key industry standards, and conversely, the removal of industry fails to meet the performance developmental state also prevents labor union other groups from making demands that jeopardize the process.¹⁷⁾

Another characteristic of the developmental

a good example. The British colonial state of the British East Company and later as eliminated all opposition to its rule while turning base, turning the country into a for the British Empire. British policy an industrial bourgeoisie, facilitating non-development landlord class(the merchant capitalists).

a good example if a non-colonial nominally independent, the Qajar state aristocracy. Merchant capitalists, and Islam. The Qajars actively opposed the bourgeoisie, resisted structural reforms and led Iran to economic stagnation, torship.¹⁸⁾

s a strong, interventionist state that equivocal state implements policies to foster industrial growth, thereby bourgeoisie. However, the equivocal state its power diminish vis-a-vis civil society in particular. In many is an absolutist state that pursues policies country's industrial development. But it pment policies, hence equivocation and

an is a good example of the equivocal in the early 1960's, the Shah carried out a began privatizing public enterprises. His form a predominantly feudal ruling class industrial bourgeoisie.¹⁹⁾ The Shah's project, "in the 1960s, represented a move towards the development of industrial Shah's feudal state and the feudal ruling into a bourgeois state dominated by the

mai and taoist groups) to impose their will. Still, the relation between the state and civil state will be developmental(disciplining, non-extent that economic investment leads to e will tend to be obstructionist to the degree of lead to development. Thus, a developmental generis, but is the product of specific historical Both the Taiwanese and South Korean states ng corrupt, and obstructionist in the 1950s, yet states had transformed themselves into This transformation is inexplicable without ing relation between state and civil society in

developmental state is a necessary condition for npowers developmental civil society while volution forces. The specific ideology such a portant as noted above, developmental states ist. The significance of the developmental state o gradually relinquish power to the non-state

societies
board definition of civil society. In addition to nals and businesses(Hegel's "die burgerliche necessary to include trade unions, labor organizations, human rights groups, women's ssociations, producer groups, and other non- tions(NGOs). Of course, this definition of civil icable to those societies that lack profit-seeking sses, namely socialist(and formerly socialist) society in socialist countries refer to labor managers, intellectuals, students, peasants,

development elements. While part of civil backward looking, and unlikely to support regimes, its other part is liberal, progressive political reform. The equivocal civil society is by a balance of power between competing economic capital and real estate interests bourgeoisie are clearly dominant. For a development of economic ambivalence leads to serious consequences of state policy, and the support for progress is likely to emerge.

In contrast to the obstructionist and equi-developmental civil society is dominated by reform-minded, progressive elements. While merchant capital, and landowning classes remain developmental civil society, they follow the bourgeoisie. In addition, this type of civil society the obstructionist civil society,²⁰⁾ and ideological educational system and the mass media – are F It is worth emphasizing that a development necessary for successful economic development state.²¹⁾ Dominated by industrieminded, progressive elements, this type of rational, scientific worldview. It also gives legitimacy a whole. Moreover, the developmental civil political legitimacy of the developmental state of industrial development, the developmental state economic policy. As the society develops strength of civil society grows, this type of civil accept state legitimacy, although more as a policy that dictates policy.

2.3 Development and Periodization

As noted above, development is a sustainable gross domestic product(GDP) combined with change and an overall increase in living standa

Iran(less successful developers).

Development has both a temporal and spatial dimension. It takes place in a specific space or territory and of time. Two crucial components of any society are, therefore, the specific space and time intended to hold. As for the former, this paper has chosen the spatial unit of analysis. Although this is the central focus on the theoretical problems,²³⁾ our central focus on the state and civil society – as well as our territorial focus logically to this choice. The choice is also modernization theory and traditional Marxism the basic unit of analysis; it is the nation-state is a distinct mode of production. A multitude of different levels of social development provides the basis for theories of uneven development models with developmental models to which "developed" societies might aspire.

At this time, this paper has adopted a triadic model of a growth period, a transitional period, and a development period. We have identified these three critical stages in which the relation between the two is qualitatively distinct. Our adoption of a model and historical development is not without either.²⁴⁾ But objections to periodization are specific and limited nature of our inquiry.

Society typologies – along with the conception above – lay the groundwork for an analysis of society interact dynamically in the economic Table 1 graphically depicts all the possible and civil society at a given time. As a detailed nation is not possible here, let us focus on the and the developmental civil society as the key to result in successful development. Since the process involving the state and civil society, other in different historical periods, it is time a way to measure the relative strength of

	Obstructionist civil society(OCS)	Developmental civil society(OCs)
Obstructionist state(OS)	OS/OCS	OS/DC
Developmental state(DS)	DS/OCS	DS/DC
Equivocal state(ES)	ES/OCS	ES/DC


Let us define strength as the ability of either state sector to control the development process.²⁵⁾ in the case of the state. State strength can be either legitimately or through force –, economic – exercise of ownership of economic resources or through policy –, or ideological – exercised through the media. Thus, a state is strong to the extent these factors in pursuing its own development state strength then becomes a matter of index degree of public ownership in the economy, the revenue and expenditure as a percentage of extent of political repression, and the degree of censorship of the press.²⁶⁾

Measuring the relative strength of civil society straightforward as that of the state because civil such a broad range of competing social forces. the relative strength of the private sector is indicated by the number of members in a particular industry, transport and communication), information, the media, and so forth. The strength indicated by the number of members in a particular level of funding, and certain non-quantifiable "goodwill" a given organization generates in the It is more difficult to measure the relative and civil society in the case of the socialist countries. One reason has to do with the extent

ual difficulty in distinguishing the state from such as the former Soviet Union(FSU) and the China(PRC). Indeed, a common Western term bloc countries(and command economies) does everything – that a non-state sector the decentralization of economic decision- (and) economies is fairly extensive and a exist. Whether or not political or ideological complete state centralization of economic s of mathematics clearly work against such a n the last analysis ownership of land and the the FSU were in the hands of the state, the and omnipresent societal entity.

society assume varying degrees of strength her over time. The difference in strength vil society at any given time is the "power n in a successful development process, the society and the power gap tends to be large. vil society grows in strength relative to the narrows. When a society is fully developed, exists an the state and civil society are more e power gap is the difference in strength vil society, then a successfully developing stage where the power gap is close to zero e the power gap is quite large (and positive). ap in an underdeveloped (or unsuccessfully initially be quite small (or even negative) and may grow large – exactly the opposite of fully developing country.

cept may be used to periodize a country's process. During the initial growth period, the urge (and positive) with a relatively strong ty. The transitional period is characterized ver gap. As the power gap begins to close, e power of the state, often leading to a clash evelopment process is to be successful. the



and an averaging out of the power gap to zero zero to account for periodic increases in strength civil society).

2.4 Period of State-Led Growth

With the idea of periodization in place, it is] analysis of how the state and civil society intera begin with, why must the power gap be large(initial growth period? In other words, why is a r in the early stages of development a necessary co development? First, it is not any strong state that typology that the developmental state is non-cori and committed to furthering economic develop mental state legitimizes itself by creating the con economic growth. This is an important point be gap is not always an indication that the so developing. A large power gap may also be obstructionist or equivocal state.

Second, the developmental state will empo civil society that we have termed development those groups that do not contribute to economic the state will empower the developmental pr industrial bourgeoisie, subsidize heavy indust enterprises in those industries that do not attr make them viable private sector undertakings.

The developmental state will restrain those who are either anti-development or opposed to it. These include merchant capital, the real estate groups.²⁶⁾ While these groups will grow with pro-development groups, they do not allow them to grow at the expense of the development groups. One way the developmental state can restrain industrial activities more is in trade, real estate speculation, and the state will also ensure that what non-state does exist will remain firmly under its

control. The developmental state will take an active role in the rough fiscal and monetary policy, price discipline both labor and capital, a strong discipline to redirect the economic surplus to those likely to promote sustainable economic development. The developmental state regulates and guides FDI in a manner well suited to the national economy. It accomplishes this through technologies, designing appropriate fiscal measures, and establishing technology diffusion benefits of FDI.²⁷⁾

On the transitional period – is the period when civil society are roughly equal. During the period, society mounts a challenge to state power. In the form of revolution, agitation for a more unrest, or similar measures. Exactly how this depends upon social, structural, and cultural factors. A positive response to the country in question. A positive period, however, is crucial to the eventual democratization of a developing

with examples of countries that have either failed that have industrialized in an unsustainable and Our historical analysis will point to numerous examples that have not attained the crucial balance of power and civil society, which as suggested, is the sine qua non of development. In these societies, the power gap has but has widened – either positively or negatively.

2.6 The Period of Sustained Development

The third period is the period of sustained development from the growth period in a number while the growth period is representative of a developed society.²⁸⁾ Second, the state in the growth period than the state in the third period of sustained development period that Marxist critiques of the state are first period of state-led growth, the state often independence that it loses as the society becomes the bridges between the state and civil society begins.

Lastly, democratic political forms are more the period of sustained development.²⁹⁾ This is the empowerment of civil society that successful about. Representative democracy may thus be seen as the balance of power between the state and civil society viewing a more open political culture as the demands upon a relatively weaker, but absolute more likely for democracy to develop in the third development, and conversely, it is less likely to do so of growth and transition. But this is the development and the state/civil society balance necessary condition of democracy. A democratic country like India would disprove any such argument that democracy is more likely to take place with the balar society. For reasons having to do with the balar

as historical examples of the processes we are proceeding analysis. It begins with the period of development to the period of transition and finally, to development. Although it will not provide an unsuccessful developers,³²⁾ it will provide us of societies that have not followed the model above. The ways in which these societies civil society relational pattern with which we development, can shed further light on the

ed Growth

rons' insight that late industrializers require historical development of European and US work serves to dispel the(neo-classical) myth that is largely a function of laissez-faire theory of minimal state intervention in the analysis on European industrialization, that extensive state intervention is necessary for a rapid, capital-intensive process that typically lacking both capital and an according to Gerschenkron, the state in a d work to ensure that impediments to removed(such as serfdom), that key ds) are in place, and that requisite financial The effort to "catch up" often means that the ion will command greater resources than its ed country. Thus, Germany and Russia intervention in their industrialization processes European country to industrialize. In France, on, "the industrial development under tributed to that determined effort to untie the

expenditure accounted for nearly 25 percent of n the state playing a major role in redistributing manufacturing and mercantile classes.³³⁾ Accor "[British] government and its military activities systemic rivalries, raised and sustained output structure(with disproportionate growth in the m industries), and flattened the fluctuations that wo a market-led pattern of growth."³⁴⁾ Clearly, Eng was the result of massive and sustained governr the economy. The historical record shows that it had gained a comparative advantage in industria it advocated a free-trade policy with a relativi government.

A similar pattern is observable in the Uni nineteenth century. At both the state and government's de facto economic policy was anytl Shapiro and Taylor point out that while "state k exports and granted monopoly power to publ federal government "targeted railroads and far always(millions of acres to the railway companie farm families who avoided speculation), and wa until after World War II."³⁵⁾ And just as in the ca was only after the United States achieved unchal the international economic system that it began t policies and the importance of a "level playing fie

The newly-industrialized countries(NICs) Korea, Taiwan, etc.) provide additional exampl intervention in the development process. Althou paragons of free-market capitalism, these state interventionist, erecting high tariff barriers, fu select industries, and providing overall direct through such organizations as Japan's Ministry c and Investment(MITI).⁴⁰⁾ Alice Amsden argues success of the East Asian countries was not the prices right," which neo-classical economists w qua non of successful development. Rather it

ndards that took place in the PSU (and other remarkable – even though this fact tends to be he slowdown in productivity growth and the at under the Brezhnev regime) and that o way alters the fact that the FSU was ed from a largely agricultural and one of the world's leading industrial powers. SU is crisis today is not because the state was stages of industrialization but because the empowerment of the class it ostensibly ariat in particular, and civil society more ice of the People's Republic of China and e point to the relative success of state-led n. In both capitalist and socialist societies, of successful development, a common factor le of the state during the early stages of the process.

n that every society with an interventionist develop. The Third World is rife with examples st state that have led their societies into is. The prospects for successful development specific manner of state intervention and the ed, the relative autonomy of the state with t represents, and upon the position of the e international political and economic order. amic (and dialectical) nature of successful es more than simply a strong, interventionist ages of development. The key to successful e relation such a strong state bears to civil s, a strong state is not a sufficient but a ssary condition for successful economic

society begins to close. Industrialization empow social groups who then mount a challenge to crucial element in any successful development p the social groups that lead this challenge against sustainable development requires the er developmental civil society.

In a society organized along capitalist bourgeoisie becomes a crucial factor in sustain processes set in motion by strong development provides a good example. After the overthrow 1960 and General Park's coup d'état in 1961, th embarked upon a large-scale industrialization first in labor-intensive manufactures and the Government policies were designed in such efficient, well managed firms and to "punish" inefficiently run or did not meet produc requirements, and so on. The state was able to discipline over civil society because of its grea large power gap) and also because the South relatively speaking non-corruptible. Yet the industrial capital and its cultivation of conglomerates (chaebols) served to strengthen private sector relative to the state. In other word South Korean developmental state was able to i of its relative strength served, in dialectical relative strength of the state and narrow the pow A similar scenario presents itself in the his Taiwan. Traditional Taiwanese civil society w Kuomintang (KMT) forces in the aftermath of mainland in 1949. The KMT state was thus lar militaristic and developmental agenda unimpes retaking the mainland grew dimmer during the began to reorient itself away from mili developmentalism. Even more than in the cas Taiwanese state was heavily involved in the regulator and as an active participant (in the

devices as exchange controls, subsidies, and the same way as South Korea, the state was rialization of the society through cultivating te sector and through disciplining individual youth Korea, the very success of the state's government of civil society and a narrowing of cation of this in the case of Taiwan is that by of GDP accounted for by public sector han 20 percent. Even so, the Taiwanese state nding heights industries such as steel, heavy ductors.

Taiwan are two recent examples of successful lines proposed here: in both cases a strong instrumental in creating and maintaining the try for sustained capital accumulation. These or of labor and the consequent freeing up of in those industries the state was promoting demonstrate that over time, the very success development agenda resulted in the growth gingly able to challenge the state's power. foregoing that successful development will y is dominated by an obstructionist state ental civil society. We have already pointed to e obstructionist state par excellence. British instance, was largely based upon a strong that empowered such non-development as absentee landlords and merchant capital. rs of colonial rule had left India one of the world(in per capita terms).

provides another example of impede early 1950s to late 1970s Iran experienced growth. The country industrialized rapidly as it sector and infrastructure. Meanwhile, s emerged with an optimistic outlook on its tity added fuel to the yearning for democratic middle class was expanding, the state was

dismantled the Iranian state at the hands of civil the new state regrouped to suppress civil soci development process came to a sudden halt. Sust requires that state and civil society meet each othe

3.3 The Transition

Engels once remarked that when "the inter country stands in opposition to its economic inexorably and without exception, the economic its way through."⁴⁰ This paper has attempted to always the case and, where it is the case, the "has not always "forced its way through" in a mai successful development as defined above.

Indeed, of the three state types – obstructi developmental – only the rise of the developmen stages of the development process will development. The developmental state favors inc therefore less likely to challenge the rise of a society. In the case of Taiwan, when civil so martial law government in the 1980s, the state] suppress or challenge the power of civil society. in the case of South Korea. A violent clash betw society is therefore less likely in a societ development state than in one dominated by "equivocal state.

In Iran, the Pahlavi state failed to transcend to further growth of a pro-development privat time, the Shah alienated the state from the trac absolutism in Iran, the feudal aristocracy and m the clash between the state and civil society can late 1970s(culminating in the collapse of the Pi development civil society proved unable to co and the economy was dominated by merchan declining in power relative to civil society, t revolutionary period actually increased in streng

a developmental civil society, the rise of an industry(merchant capital), and the collapse of state round for a crisis.

entral planning in the FSU has left relatively economies they no longer control. The result re-existing monopolies(known in the FSU as "oligates") and the growth of lateral exchanges u of central planning agencies at the national Gosplan). In the FSU, the changing relations tribution superimposed on an unchanged ided fertile ground for the rise of merchant

terminology: this paper has employed, the onary cum developmental state and the ant capital(rather than industrial capital) has capital investment, hyper-inflation, and a in a word, maldevelopment.⁴⁹⁾ The FSU and Europe(with the exception of East Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic) have f a dominant state apparatus and the relative obstructionist civil society. A power gap pt now the powerful entities in the FSU are Civic Union(a lobbying group for the ant capital, and organized crime. The the FSU in August 1991 may thus be seen as he part of the old state apparatus(the last nary cum developmental state).

ned Development

le FSU, Iran, South Korea and Taiwan as e possible outcomes once the transition from a begins.⁴⁹⁾ First, an obstructionist or equivocal ly limit the growth of a developmental civil erful state during the early states of the a recurrent feature of all historical processes

nationalized and the further growth of an industry by a resurgent state.

A second possible outcome of the transition society where a developmental civil society develop, is the collapse of the state and the rise civil society. This is what has occurred in the empowerment of the conglomerates and merch rapid decline of state power led to a crisis that is along a path of successful development.

The third possible outcome of the transition social order is the development of a balance of state and civil society – and especially the develop As maintained throughout this paper, this is the all societies that have successfully developed, th countries as otherwise diverse as South Korea and Taiwan and Great Britain. In these societies an created the conditions amenable to continued based its legitimacy on economic power to a na civil society or(in a capitalist society) the industria

4. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

This paper has presented a theory of development and civil society as primary units of analysis against static theories of development—the paradigm—that assume unchanging roles for both society proposing a dynamic model: rather development requires minimal(or maximal) stat economy and society, it is the relative strength society will change over the course of the deve early stages of development are characterized by state and weak civil society. Over time, how developing society will exhibit an increasingly powerful state during the early states of the At some point the state and civil society p

state may be grounded in a developmental state. The developmental state pursues policies -productive economic activities such as real investment in trade, and attempts to maximize productive activities. This will serve to increase developmental civil society and industrial capital in the society, progressive increase in power and eventually mount a revolution. The state meets this challenge through a continuing process of higher levels of prosperity for the society as

developing countries must recognize that state over time. During the early stages of should pursue policies that circumscribe those interests and merchant capital, but also to tionist forces more generally. The state should ratus to discipline labor and capital an work to rulation, redirecting resources to productive

development state remains a strong state, it to share power with civil society – if ed to more advanced stages. The challenge to society, therefore, should be met by the state on and increased opportunity for non-state blic policy. In this way development will free of state-civil society conflict that thwarts

we conceive of the state and civil society in functional the historical data fits: both societies are composed societies, as we have defined them here.

⁵⁾ The social contract theorists are perhaps the earliest (See, e. g., Hobbes(1983, 1985), Hume(1994a, 1994b), social theorists who claimed the state should minim the economic sphere include Smith(1976), Bentham(and Pigou(1978, 1994). Twentieth century proponents of the liberal paradigm include von Mises(1962, 1994), and Friedman(1962). This paradigm has also basis for Thatcherism in the United Kingdom and Revolution in the United States. It also informs International Monetary Fund policies in the Third World.

⁶⁾ See, e. g., Keynes(1936), Beveridge(1936), Kalecki(1971 and Galbraith(1962a, 1962b, 1973). This variant of the continues to inform) the defacto state economic pattern industrial countries, despite the free market revolution Thatcherism and Reaganism.

⁷⁾ See Amirahmadi(1987).

⁸⁾ The notion of civil society dates back to seventeenth Hobbes and Locke, for example, conceive of civil society opposite of the state of nature. More generally, theorists view civil society as a private sphere product of an historical "social contract." Hegel comes similar terms, but with one important exception: Smith (and their nineteenth and twentieth century views civil society as lacking any kind of mechanism Hegel, civil society is irrational and it is only the universal Absolute Spirit manifests itself. See also Al Rostow(1968).

⁹⁾ On the "growth with equity" approach, see Fei, Ranier Nove(1992, 40).

¹⁰⁾ See Amirahmadi(1990).

¹¹⁾ The feudal landowners were expropriated by compensation, thus enabling them to purchase operate industrial enterprises heavily subsidized by See, e. g., Amsen(1985, 1989), Deyo(1987), and Johns According to General Park, "the democracy we air that meets social and political reality and not

NOTES

- 985, 1989, 1992; Chaudhry(1993); Gereffi and Taylor(1990).
- 14); Atkinson(1992); Bratton(1989); Chazan(1992); sch(1993); Hirst(1991); de Janvry, Sadoulet and is(1990); Keane(1988); Rau(1991); Sklansky(1991);

“¹⁸ However, to what extent does

“cultural” if it does not allow for the growth of civil
challenge to state power in Eastern Europe and
largely by these groups in concert with certain
itself.

Hong Kong and Taiwan took the form of
it, it took the form of trade and primary
much of Latin America.
society may also lead to successful economic
with a developmental state; however,
d particularly the industrial bourgeoisie—must
which case the equivocal civil society is
mental civil society.

sustainability(or what Marx called “expanded
ies “development” from “growth.” Our use of the
ould not be confused with environmentally
We are attempting to explain development as it
ld. Thus, our definition of development centers
d” countries have actually achieved in terms of
of production, and so on. To argue that this kind
environmentally sustainable(while probably true) is
er.

exists within the Marxist literature on whether
transnational world system should constitute the
init of analysis. See, e. g., Frank(1967, 1969);
1974); Brenner(1977).

ctors constrain state power and thereby limit state
ra-state competition and an inability to deploy its
ie state.

eal estate interests are not necessarily anti-
ome so, however, in the absence of industrial
ce of other conditions, e. g., colonialism and
especially with respect to disciplining labor and
bility of the state to redirect surplus is a common
lustrialization from England to the Soviet Union.

¹⁷ As with other forms of social conflict, state-civil
remains latent. Hence the difficulty in predicting
state-civil society conflict will ensue. For a dis-
relation to ethnic conflicts, see Amirahmadi(1994).

³⁰) By definition, the power gap in a developed so-
large(and positive) in a(successfully) developing co-
³¹) This is a “bourgeois” democracy of the type found
Western Europe.

³²) See Fig. 2 for an exhaustive list of all state/civil s-
will result in maldevelopment.

³³) Gerschenkron(1962). List(1966) made of the same
century.

³⁴) See Paul Streeten(1992).

³⁵) Gerschenkron(1962); Shapiro and Taylor(1990).

³⁶) Deane(1975).

³⁷) Harris(1987).

³⁸) Shapiro and Taylor(1990, 866).

³⁹) The U. S. State remains highly interventionist, c-
third of the country’s GDP.

⁴⁰) Shapiro and Taylor(1990).

⁴¹) Amsden(1985).

⁴²) Amsden(1985, 93).

⁴³) One difference between Taiwan and South Korea
regime cultivated large industrial conglomerate:
Samsung, the KMT state cultivated small-to mediu-
mer.

⁴⁴) Engels(1966).

⁴⁵) As witnessed, for example, by a rising share of C-
state and public sector enterprises.

⁴⁶) Although significant differences exist between th-
communist Eastern European countries(e. g.,
described here is broadly representative of the
with the collapse of centrally planned economies.

⁴⁷) Burawoy and Krotov(1993). Our theory parallels th-
that the productive forces of society will eventual-
and legal superstructure, leading to social rev-
explaining the collapse of the Eastern Bloc countrie

⁴⁸) To borrow a term from Samir Amin.

⁴⁹) This is based on the premise that a society domi-
civil society will not successfully develop.

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