The state and territorial social justice in postrevolutionary Iran*

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The Iranian revolution of 1979, which toppled the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's 38-year old regime and ended nearly 2500 years of monarchy in Iran, had three generally acknowledged objectives: democracy, national independence and social justice. The first of these objectives was directed against the Shah's dictatorship, the second against external dependency, and the third against the uneven development of capitalism in Iran. The Islamic leadership of the revolution convinced the people that their demands would best be realized in an Islamic government. Of the three objectives, only social justice is of interest here and that only to the extent that it relates to territorial social justice (TSJ).

The term 'territory' is used interchangeably with province (Ostan) and refers to an administrative subdivision, used, primarily, as a tool for nominal geographic distribution of state power, political control and economic management. There are 24 such subdivisions in Iran. TSJ is defined to include economic, social, political, cultural and ideological relations within and among territories of a given nation. It encompasses territorial provision of basic needs, balanced interterritorial development and resource allocation on the basis of need and potential, territorial balance of political power and decentralization of development policies, popular participation in local administration and decision-making, and respect for cultural diversity and autonomy. The TSJ concept is, therefore, an obvious improvement over conceptions such as 'balance', 'convergence', and 'equity' being propagated in the literature on regional questions.

Specifically, this paper examines the major influences on and changes in provincial development in the Islamic republic of Iran and evaluates the state's efforts to realize TSJ. A case-study approach has been adopted and the largely empirical data and information are analysed and presented using the political economy perspective. Impacts of the Iran-Iraq war, disruption of the state machinery as a result of the revolution, and changes in legal, administrative and policy/planning structures are emphasized. Interprovincial disparity has somewhat declined, but TSJ remains largely unrealized. In the absence of political will

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and consensus and a coherent development strategy, the enormous potentials created by the revolution were largely neutralized by powerful domestic and international constraints.

I Provincial disparity: impact of the war and disruption of the state machinery

1 Disparity as of 1976

The extreme nature of interprovincial disparity has been documented in a number of independent and official studies (see e.g. Plan and Budget Organization, 1983a; Amirahmadi, 1986a; Amirahmadi and Atash, 1987; Kamiar, 1985; Imam-Jomeh, 1985; Nattagh, 1984; Nourbakhsh, 1977; Battelle, 1972). According to a World Bank publication, the disparity was among the most extreme in the third world, indeed, second only to Brazil in 1975 (Renaud, 1982). The same study noted that the ratio for per capita gross regional product (including oil) between the poorest, Sistan/Baluchestan, and the richest, Markazi, provinces was in the order of 1 to 10 (US $313 and $3132 respectively).

Figure 1 locates three categories of provinces on the Iranian map (see Amirahmadi and Atash, 1987, for details of the classification). With 67% of their population living in urban areas in 1976, the relatively developed provinces (RDPs) were almost twice as urbanized as the intermediate provinces (IPs) and about three times as the least developed provinces (LDPs). Density in the RDPs was also twice as high as in the LDPs.

Economic indicators also point to a significant provincial disparity. Rural consumption expenditure in the LDPs was only one-third of the expenditure in the RDPs, and about two-thirds of the figure for the IPs. The LDPs also had lower employment in secondary activities and much lower rate of productivity in large industries. The productivity gap was particularly high, with the LDPs lagging behind the RDPs by about 42%.

Disparities in social variables were even more pronounced. Literacy rate in the RDPs was over 60% higher than the LDPs and 24% higher than the IPs. The gap was much wider for health services. The RDPs had 2.6 times as many physicians per 100,000 people as the LDPs and twice as many as the IPs. The figures for hospital beds were even more divergent, with the RDPs having 3.9 times more beds than the LDPs. The situation was no better with respect to housing availability and quality, and public administrative services. Only 23% of houses in the LDPs had electricity, while the corresponding figure for the RDPs was 64%. Similarly, for every 1000 people in the LDPs there were only 28 public employees compared to 35 employees for the IPs and 54 for the RDPs.

The majority of population in the RDPs and the IPs are Persians, while most of the ethnic minorities, including Azaris, Kurds and Baluchis, reside in the LDPs. The ethnic basis of the interprovincial disparity made it an even more politically charged issue since the revolution. Significantly, demand for local
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Figure 1 Three categories of Iranian Provinces, 1976
autonomy and participation dominated territorial politics in most ethnic provinces.

2 **Impact of the war**

On 22 September 1980, the Iraqi army invaded Iran along a front of 1352 km, penetrating at certain places as deep as 80 km into Iran. In less than a few weeks, over 14000 km sq of the country were occupied in the five southern and southwestern provinces of Khuzestan, Bakhtaran, Ilam, Kurdestan and West Azarbaijan (Figure 1). Parts of the last two provinces have also been involved in the fights between the central government and the Kurdish people who are demanding regional autonomy. Damage to Khuzestan, which was among the few well-developed provinces of Iran as the oil capital of the country, has been extensive and its impact goes well beyond the provincial borders with drastic consequences for the national economy. These provinces are densely populated and most of the population are minorities (Azaris, Kurds and Arabs). The neighbouring provinces and certain cities in various parts of the country have also suffered in varying degrees.

The most recent official estimates to September 1985 put the total damage to various sectors at 24 730 424 million rials (current prices) which is equivalent to US $309.13 billion (at US $1 = 80 rials) (Amirahmadi. 1987a). The figure excludes damage to armed forces, the civilian population and military expenditures. Considering that the average annual foreign exchange earnings of the government from oil in 1979–84 were $16.75 billion, the amount of loss is equivalent to 18.5 years of Iranian oil export earnings.

The share of the urban sector is reported at 482 222.0 million rials (US $6 027.8 million). This does not include damage to commercial, cultural, historical, religious, educational and health-related buildings, industrial establishments and infrastructure of various types in the cities. Damage to these facilities has been equally extensive. For example, over 60% of the country’s port facilities were not functioning in 1986 (Amirahmadi. 1987a: 135; Plan and Budget. 1986: 165–74: 278–313). A total of 51 cities and towns have been damaged to varying degrees. The cities of Hoveizeh (in Khuzestan), Musian (in Ilam), and Baneh (in Kurdestan) among others, have received ‘wide-ranging damage’ (The Imposed War. 1985: 9).

In addition, 3891 villages were damaged by September 1985, many beyond repair. This amounts to 30% of villages in the five war provinces. The total damage amounts to 560 215.1 million rials (US $7002.7), which is larger than the corresponding figure for the urban sector. Thus, the total damage to human settlements amounts to the staggering figure of US $13 030.5 million.

The war has affected the settlement systems in other ways. Preliminary reports of the 1986 National Census of Housing and Population (see e.g. Gozideh-e Maaleh-e Amari. 1987) indicate that the population of Iran increased to 49 764 874 in 1986 from the 1976 figure of 33 708 744. an average annual growth
rate of over 3.6%. The populations of all provinces have increased, but those in the war zones, except for Ilam, have experienced slower growth than the nation as a whole. Khuzestan, in particular, has grown at an average annual rate of only 1.77%, less than 50% of the national average. In sharp contrast, the comparable figures for Tehran province (excluding the City of Tehran) and Bushehr, a province adjoining Khuzestan, were 8.7 and 5.5% respectively.

The lower population growth rate in the war zones may be attributed to a number of causes including death, destruction and migration. This latter factor has been particularly critical in population redistribution within the war-damaged areas and between them and the rest of Iran. Intraprovincial migration in the war zones has been characterized with the movement of population from the village areas and smaller towns and cities to refugee camps and larger urban centres, particularly the provincial capitals where people have been better protected.

While there is no information on the magnitude of the intraprovincial migration, an estimated 2.5 million have fled their province of residence in the war zones for settlement in large cities and refugee camps in the war-free areas (Amirahmadi, 1987a: 135). Clearly, the rapid growth of cities such as Karaj, Qum, Arak, Shiraz, Khorramabad and Zanjan cannot all be explained by migration from the war areas. Nevertheless, the location of these cities in the central parts of the country (the first three) and in provinces adjoining the war zones (the last three) did contribute to their phenomenal growth. Despite such differential impacts, the war does not seem to have changed the prerevolutionary rank-size distribution of large Iranian cities in any significant way, except for Qum which now ranks among the top five cities and the war-damaged Abadan and Khorramshahr which are no longer reported as among the large cities (with a population of a 100,000 or more) (Salnameh-e Amari, 1984: 59).

Impact of the war on provinces has also been varied. According to a study by Amirahmadi and Atash (1987), Khuzestan, Bakhtaran and West Azarbaijan in the war areas experienced deterioration in their relative development position in 1984 as compared to 1976, while Kurdestan and Ilam improved their position. Positively impacted were also the provinces adjoining the war zones. While the war destroyed a good portion of socioeconomic activities in the war zones, it led to concentration of significant war-supporting activities and expenditures in the neighbouring provinces. Increased war-related imports also promoted development in the southern coastal provinces with port facilities. The improved development position of Kurdestan and Ilam in the war zones may be explained by the same factors that were responsible for the improved relative development position of other LDPs, namely policies of the government in support of LDPs, agriculture and rural areas, and the decline of Iranian industries. Consequently, such RDPs as Markazi, Semnan and Yazd, Kurdestan also received added attention from the central government which had wished to improve its image with the Kurdish people as part of its campaign against the autonomy-seeking opposition there. Thus, on balance, the war seems to have a levelling effect on provincial disparity, although the exact degree of such an impact cannot be determined for lack of data.
3 Impact of disruption of the state machinery

By the end of the 1970s, the dependent Pahlevi capitalist state had grown into a massive superstructure of centralized bureaucracies, including various repressive apparatuses of control such as the notorious SAVAK. The superstructure of control collapsed in the face of a popular revolution which began in late 1977 and was characterized by mass demonstrations, general strikes and a week-long 'civil war' in its culminating days in February 1979. The bulk of the participants were among the middle classes whose intellectuals, including the charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini, played the key role in leading the revolution (Amirahmadi, 1988; Abrahamian 1982: 530-37).

The nature of the Pahlevi state, the composition of the opposition, and the tactics/leadership of the revolution were among the major factors that would subsequently influence postrevolutionary changes in provincial development and relations between the central government and local administrations. Other factors included subordination of national interests to those of imperialism and the uneven development of Iranian dependent capitalism. Specifically, absence of a democratic tradition led to an extremist politics of monopolization of power; imbalanced territorial distribution of power generated demands for autonomy and separatism among the national minorities; lack of national sovereignty gave rise to nationalistic antiimperialism. Extreme inequalities led to demands for social justice: the mass mobilization tactics created multiple power centres; and the religious leadership tended to theocratize the state and the society.

The Shah's apparatuses of control collapsed in late February 1979, but it was not until late June 1981 (when the first president of the new Islamic republic, the liberal-minded Aboul Hasan Banisadr, was forced out of office) that the political revolution was completed. Subsequently, state power was transferred to and was monopolized by a religious middle-class leadership that had become organized into a number of Islamic parties including the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) and many grass-root organizations headed by the Revolutionary Council which had been appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini before the victory of the revolution. While subsequent developments have been conflicting, they are distinguished by further institutionalization of the Islamic state and continuous attempts to resolve the social question of the revolution including national sovereignty: the land/rural question; wages and working conditions; basic socioeconomic needs, particularly housing; wealth and income redistribution; democracy, decentralization and public participation; local autonomy for ethnic minorities; and a national development strategy. In the present section I shall focus on the impact of the disruption of the state machinery on TSJ over the period from February 1979 to June 1981. The disruption led to two interrelated episodes, dual sovereignty and intensified conflicts over the social question, both of which weakened the central government's control over provincial politics and resource management. While it is impossible to measure the impact in quantitative terms, the episodes did lead to de facto decentralization and increased local initiatives, and sharpened the public/state focus on the question of TSJ.
A dual sovereignty: Shortly after his return to Iran after a 15-year long exile in Iraq and Paris on 1 February 1979 (two weeks after the Shah’s departure from Iran), Ayatollah Khomeini appointed a Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) headed by Mehdi Bazargan, the leader of the Freedom Movement (a liberal/Islamic organization), to take over the state from Shahpour Bakhtiar, the last prime minister of the Shah’s regime. It was hoped that the transition would be smooth since negotiations with the US government and the army had successfully gained their support for the PRG. The revolution, however, took a different track. The pretext for the civil war that had been brewing for months was provided by the fighting that broke out between air force cadets supporting the revolution and royalist imperial guards on 9 February. Soon the marxist and Islamic armed guerrillas and the masses, organized into many committees, joined the fighting. Although the Chief of Staff had already announced the army’s neutrality, the armed civilians continued to attack army barracks, prisons and SAVAK hideouts, and occupy various government offices. As early as 12 February many of the state apparatuses had fallen into the hands of revolutionary forces all over the country and many thousands of guns had been expropriated.

The civil war put an end to the dual sovereignty of the PRG and the Bakhtiar government but led to proliferation of many centres of power. It also sharpened conflicts between different classes, nationalities, ideologies and political groupings which had remained hidden throughout the unity phase of the popular revolution. In retrospect, the most crucial conflicts took place within the ‘power bloc’ (Poulantzas, 1978: 141), between the largely liberal/bourgeois PRG and its rival, the essentially traditional middle-class based religious Revolutionary Council (RC). The PRG was considered the ‘legal’ government and controlled the remnants of the Shah’s apparatuses, while the RC was an ‘extralegal’ organization which headed revolutionary committees, revolutionary guards and revolutionary courts (Bashiriye, 1986: 133–35). These grass-root organizations were formed in government departments, production units, bazaars, universities, schools, urban neighbourhoods and villages. They were largely headed by the lower-to-middle rank mullahs and young devotees of Ayatollah Khomeini and functioned as zealous alternatives to legal police, army and civil courts respectively. Originally, the PRG had the upper hand in the power bloc but it soon lost its hegemonic role to the RC as class struggle deepened.

The PRG sought to maintain the status quo by demobilizing the masses and preserving the apparatuses inherited from the Shah. In sharp contrast, the RC, along with the growing Islamic parties (and left organizations), encouraged grass-root movements, stepped up mass mobilization, demanded dissolution of the inherited institutions and engaged in radical and nationalistic politics. As part of this new politics, the extralegal government supported the takeover of the American Embassy on 4 November 1979 and used mass demonstrations against US imperialism to strengthen its position among the radical Islamic students. The RC also supported the speedy execution of top-ranking officials of the old regime despite the PRG’s opposition. In the meantime, the Islamic government
dominate the Constitutional Council which subsequently drew up a largely theocratic constitution incorporating the now famous principle of velavat-e faghih (rule of the theologian) in accordance with the teaching of Ayatollah Khomeini. As set forth in Articles 5 and 107 of the constitution, in the Islamic republic all laws and regulations should be based upon Islamic precepts and the leadership of the affairs and guidance of the people is the responsibility of a just and pious jurisprudence, or a Leadership Council in case no single theologian is acceptable to the majority of the people. Faced with a growing opposition demanding resolution of the social question of the revolution and unable to resolve the dual sovereignty problem, the PRG first agreed to govern jointly with the RC but soon resigned in favour of its powerful rival. The RC functioned as an interim government until the election of the first president of the republic in January 1980.

But the dual sovereignty problem was not resolved with the election of Banisadr as president although he had the support of Ayatollah Khomeini and was popularly elected. The Islamic Republic Party (IRP), failing to get its candidate elected, stepped up its campaigns for the upcoming parliamentary election and was able to gain majority in parliament. The party also managed to get its candidate appointed to the premiership despite Banisadr’s opposition. Although the new president was an Islamic intellectual, his election promises to decentralize public administration and support democracy were hardly welcomed by the centralist IRP. The party also considered Banisadr’s election a victory for the Islamic Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (a rival of the IRP) and the moderates (including members of the PRG) with whom he was somewhat identified. Realizing the problem of dual sovereignty, Banisadr sought to curb the power of the revolutionary committees, guards and courts. But the party already controlled most of the mass media and had its supporters appointed in various key positions in national offices and in provinces where it was particularly strong (Bakhash. 1984: 135: 159).

The conflict between the IRP and Banisadr reached a climax when the party accused him of publishing antigovernment propaganda in his newspaper Enghelab-e Islami (Islamic revolution) and convinced the IRP-dominated judiciary system to suspend its publication. Verbal reaction from Banisadr and his followers was sharp: the President went on to call for ‘resistance against the dictatorship’. This led Ayatollah Khomeini to remove Banisadr from his position as High Commander of the army. (This position is reserved for the Velavat-e Faghih in the constitution but Ayatollah Khomeini had delegated it to Banisadr to boost his standing with the armed forces fighting Iraq.) Soon after the IRP-dominated parliament proclaimed Banisadr incompetent, he went into hiding and then fled to France. With the liberals out of the way and ‘Mujahedin challenge’ subsequently averted by means of terror and mass executions, the IRP’s monopoly of power became almost total (Hiro. 1986: 186; Bakhash. 1984: 217–27). A council of three IRP members assumed the presidency until election was held in October 1981. Hojjat al-Islam Ali Khamene’i, First Secretary of the IRP.
became President and was reelected four years later in October 1985. The party struggled with the war and the social question of the revolution till mid-1987 when it was dissolved, with the consent of Ayatollah Khomeini. The growing factional politics within the party’s leadership and among its ranks was cited by Hoviat al-Islam Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the Parliament and among the most powerful leaders of IRP, as the main reason for the decision.

b The social question: Conflict within the power bloc and the resulting dual sovereignty weakened the ability of the central government to act in a centralized manner and led to de facto territorial and functional decentralization and at times even to anarchy. Coupled with the unresolved social question of the revolution and delegitimization of the PRG/Banisadr administrations as incompetent and non-revolutionary, this situation led to radical grass-root activities by the popular forces particularly in major cities, rural areas and ethnic provinces. Such activities were supported by the RC/IRP as well as the left, and may be divided into four categories: the industrial workers versus the capitalists/government; the urban poor versus the urban landlords; the landless peasants versus the rural landlords; and the ethnic nationalities versus the central government. The first two were closely related as were the last two: a significant number of workers were among the homeless and land concentration was the highest in the ethnic provinces.

Disputes between workers and capitalists/government occurred over a large number of socioeconomic and political issues, but the most significant one concerned the workers’ demand for official recognition of factory councils (shuras) and their inclusion in all levels of management and decision-making. Many such councils had been organized (some out of the strike committees formed during the revolution) and had joined to form larger industry-wide councils (Bayat, 1986; Azad, 1980). An example was the Council of Railway Workers representing over 35,000 workers. This demand was made central to others such as legalisation of strikes, higher wages, a share in profits, an unemployment fund, a 40-hour working week, affordable housing, job security and a daily meal. There were at least three reasons for the centrality of the struggle for councils. First, reopening of the industries, which had been shut down as a result of the revolution (most owners had fled the country) and had come under state control, created fresh opportunity for reorganization of labour-management relations and working conditions on a new basis. Similar changes also had to be introduced in other nationalized industries and those still operating under the previous owners/managers. Secondly, workers believed that unless councils were preserved in some form, their other demands would not be met to their satisfaction. Finally, the factory councils were also considered as a means of institutionalizing democracy in the workplace (Bayat, 1986).

However, this politically charged demand was unacceptable to the government for most such councils were dominated by the left. The workers, nevertheless, went on to reopen some factories, take control of management functions and expel managers/owners who resisted their demands. On at least one occasion, an
They used the foundation as a platform to agitate for the seizure and distribution of private land and dwellings (Bakhash, 1984: 186). The poor in south Tehran were, for example, encouraged to occupy empty houses in the wealthy northern part of the city, luxury hotels which had been closed as a result of the revolution and unoccupied government buildings. The movement soon spread to other major provincial cities. Additional measures included promotion of self-help housing by way of loans, provision of materials and technical assistance. This latter policy was also favoured by the Reconstruction Crusade active in rural areas.

Khosrowshahi continued his revolutionary tactics, with the backing of the IRP, despite the PRG’s constant objections to his activities. The RC, however, attempted to limit the excesses of the Housing Foundation by nationalizing all inavat (undeveloped) and bayer (vacant waste) lands in urban areas and by creating supportive offices to implement policies and regulate housing markets. Among such offices were the Urban Land Development Organization and the Office for the Purchase and Transfer of Empty Dwellings. In the meantime, pressure from the private sector on the government and on the RC was mounting for termination of the foundation’s revolutionary activities. With the monopolization of the state power by the IRP towards the end of 1981, Ayatollah Khosrowshahi was made ambassador to Italy and the Housing Foundation was transferred to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. Thereafter, the Islamic government used revolutionary guards to prevent further forced occupation of private houses but continued to introduce legal and policy measures in the hope of mitigating the housing problem of the poor, a goal that remains
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unrealized today.

The most violent struggles, however, took place over the land question in the rural areas of almost every province, particularly where large mechanized farms existed or the 1963 Land Reform had not been fully implemented. These included Kurdestan, West Azarbaijan, Baluchestan, Khorasan, Fars and Gorgan and Gonbad in the north (Turkoman Sahra in particular). Such struggles were also frequent in territories where the Land Reform had been successfully implemented. In this latter case, the landlords expropriated the small peasants reasoning that the Shah’s reforms were un-Islamic and illegal. In provinces with large mechanized farms and undivided agricultural lands, the landless peasants expropriated the landlords, citing Islam’s concern for social justice as justification. To the government, both groups were wrong and their activities equally unlawful and criminal.

To ward off the landlords’ threat, the peasants, with the help of the left, organized themselves into peasant councils and unions particularly in Kurdestan and Turkoman Sahra. The landlords also formed their own unions and actively cooperated across the provinces (Bashiriyeh, 1986: 140–43). The government was inevitably involved but its responses hardly followed a unique pattern. In most cases, however, it sided with the landlords and used its repressive machinery to suppress the peasantry. The RC/IRP’s reactions also differed from place to place, but on balance they supported the peasants except in territories demanding regional autonomy (Bakhash, 1986: 199–200). In any case, the government brought the land seizures under control by a mixture of force and promises for reform, promises that still remain to be delivered.

The land question was ultimately tied to the demand for regional autonomy because of the extreme inequality in distribution of agricultural land in the ethnic provinces. To suppress autonomy movements, the central government cultivated the big landlords and armed their retainers. The landlords were, however, more interested in controlling the landless peasants than suppressing the autonomy movements. This naturally strengthened the ethnic political organizations as they became increasingly successful in recruiting a large part of the disenchanted peasantry. The autonomy movements in Kurdestan and Turkoman Sahra particularly benefited from the support of the landless peasants. The autonomy movements in Iran were also rooted in other subjective and objective factors including ethnic nationalism and a deep sense of being unequally treated by a Persian-dominated central government (Amirahmadi, 1987b). For example, in Kurdestan, where the autonomy movement proved quite resilient, the most important demands included unification of all Kurdish-speaking territories in one autonomous region, recognition of Kurdish as the main language in the new Kurdestan, allocation of a higher budget to the region for rectification of its underdevelopment and establishment of a local government (including a parliament and a judiciary system). What, however, most encouraged the ethnic political organizations to take arms against the central government in postrevolutionary Iran was the collapse of the societal structure of domination and the
consequent weakening of the national state (Amirahmadi, 1987b).

Clashes broke out between the proautonomy and antiautonomy forces after it became clear that the central government did not plan to change the old administrative structure of the country to any significant degree. The political system would remain centralized with little local participation in governance or in decision-making and economic management would continue to remain dominated by sectoral interests with insignificant concerns for territorial equality or development. In short, the new central government, weak as it was, did not intend to further the cause of territorial social justice (TSJ). In Kurdistan, pishmargahs were organized by the Maoist Kumala from among the landless peasants and by the Kurdish Democratic Party from among the urban middle class. In Turkoman Sahra, the Central Peasant Council was the main political force behind the demand for a 'limited autonomy' and had the logistic support of the Marxist-Leninist Feda'ian Organization. In Azarbajian, the liberal Moslem People's Republican Party used the autonomy demand to align the urban middle class behind the struggle against the IRP. In Kuzestan, the separatist movement was composed of Arab workers and urban middle class and was influenced by Iraqi propaganda for an independent 'Arabistan' (i.e., Khuzestan). Finally, in Baluchestan, the movement was peasant-based and remained the weakest of the autonomy movement with no significant support from any recognized political organization. The government used the army, the local police, the revolutionary guards, the committees and the gendarmerie to suppress the movements. Except for the struggle in Kurdestan, which still continues on a limited scale, all the others were crushed but not before they had made a significant impact on central-local government relations as reflected in the constitution (see below).

The impact of these struggles on territorial social justice (TSJ) has been largely indirect, but qualitatively significant. The movements radicalized the working people, increased their social and territorial consciousness, taught them the value of organized and united action and led to propagation of the idea that grass-root organizations are indispensable for democracy. The episodes also strengthened the bond among the working people across territories and functions, led to de facto decentralization, increased local initiatives and improved participation in societal affairs. However, nowhere was the impact more pronounced than in the constitution, where important articles are included concerning TSJ, and in subsequent legislation and state policies for provincial development.

II The state's instruments for realization of TSJ

In this part I will analyse the many legal, administrative planning and policy measures developed by the Islamic republic towards the realization of TSJ during the period since the monopolization of the state power by the IRP in June 1981.
1  TSJ in the Islamic Constitution

The extent of regional grievances and the political nature of the social question became evident immediately following the revolution. People all over the country, and particularly in the least developed provinces, began demanding constitutional measures guaranteeing equal political treatment and balanced distribution of public funds, economic activities and social services. Many demands were subsequently codified as articles in the Islamic Constitution. Thus, Article 2 of the Constitution obligates the Islamic republic to establish 'justice' while Articles 3, 7, 100 and 104 accept public 'participation' in societal affairs through various sectoral and territorial (spatial) councils. A subsequent law concerning organization of councils also allows their intervention in all stages of economic planning and implementation (Ministry of Justice, 1982). The most recent Law of Islamic Councils mandates that councils have to be Islamic in direction and emphasizes their consultative function. Territorial councils would be formed at block, district, city, village, county and provincial levels and sectoral councils within the economic, social and service sectors. People only elect the members of the councils at the bottom of the council hierarchy. Members of the higher level councils are then chosen from among the members of the lower level ones.

A Supreme Council of Provinces, composed of one representative from each provincial council, oversees activities of all subordinate councils and is itself responsible to the National Assembly Council. The Constitution makes the role of the Supreme Council of Provinces particularly important in balanced regional development. Thus, the council is empowered, in Article 101, 'to prevent discrimination and to gain cooperation in planning development and welfare programs for the provinces and to supervise their coordination'. The council is also given the right, in Article 102, 'to make plans within the limits of its duties and submit proposals to the National Assembly'. Most importantly, according to Article 103, 'the governors, commanders, district chiefs and other authorities that are appointed by the government are obligated to obey the council's decisions as long as they fall within the limits of the council's powers' (Ministry of Justice, 1982: 734–35).

Concern for TSJ is also pronounced in Articles 15, 19 and 48. Article 15, which declares Persian as the official language of the country, allows for 'the use of local and national minorities languages in the press and mass media', as well as in teaching of their literature in their schools. Article 19 declares that 'the people of Iran, regardless of ethnic and tribal origins, enjoy equal rights' and emphasizes that 'colour, race, language and the like will not be cause for privilege'. Finally, Article 48 mandates that:

there should be no discrimination with regard to benefits to be gained from the use of natural resources, the utilization of public funds on the provincial level, and the distribution of economic activities among the provinces and various regions of the country. This is so that every region will have within its reach capital and opportunity to fulfil its needs and develop its skills.
The Constitution, however, falls short of acknowledging the right of nationalities to self-management. Indeed, the councils are subordinated to the central administration (Article 100) and the centralization of the government budget is made mandatory (Article 53). Nonetheless, if implemented, the Constitution would provide planners with the ingredients needed to institute a fairly progressive, decentralized and participatory regional planning. Councils would act as the cornerstone of this new approach. Just as any state in transition, however, the IRI has also been characterized by lack of unity between its ideological commitments and its practice. Seven years later, many aspects of the Constitution remain to be fulfilled.

2 Planning for TSJ

The Constitution made regional planning, basically through territorial councils, a major tool of balanced national development. In practice, however, territorial planning became subordinated to sectoral planning, as in the past, and received little attention. The conflict between sector and space after the revolution was part of a larger debate over efficiency and equity goals and was already evident in the limited emergency planning of the PRG in 1979. Despite growing pressure from the provinces and for TSJ, the government concentrated its efforts on stimulating economic growth. Not until 1981, when preparations for formulation of the First Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan of the Islamic Republic (1982-87) got underway, did the conflict turn into a serious ideological struggle within the Plan and Budget Organization (PBO). Initially, the struggle included many tendencies but the conflicting forces gradually became organized into two groups, namely the proponents of regional planning, referred to here as regionalists, and the opponents, or sectoralists.

The sectoralists favoured a planning procedure whereby a national sectoral plan would be prepared first and then disaggregated into regional sectoral plans. In arriving at such a plan, argued the sectoralists, the objectives would flow from the national to regional level, while project proposals would run in the opposite direction (personal communication, 1986). This procedure differed from the old practice: it allowed for regional participation in formulation of projects but, like the past approach, it did not provide for regional participation in decision-making concerning development objectives. In response to criticisms from the regionalists, the sectoralists maintained that because project proposals come from the regional levels, the national plan is already regional in essence and that the approach produces regional plans anyhow. In defending the sectoral approach, this group was motivated by its growth orientation to development and by its concern for the rising regionalism and the autonomy movements.

The regionalists, on the other hand, argued for a planning approach whereby comprehensive regional plans are produced first and then aggregated to create the national plan (personal communication, 1986). Their arguments went as follows: the project proposals received from the province for formulation of the
First Plan were not based on any spatial analysis or strategy and could not, therefore, replace regional plans. For the proposals to become meaningful they must be placed within the framework of a National Spatial Strategy Plan (or *Amayesh-e Sarzamin*). First, a unified national strategy must emerge from which spatial deductions should be made for arriving at the basic design of *Amayesh-e Sarzamin*. Then, within this latter framework, regional plans are prepared on the basis of well-identified regional potentials, limitations and responsibilities. The plans are then aggregated to arrive at the national plan (personal communication, 1986). This procedure, according to regionalists, is needed because any kind of national plan requires a specific type of regional plan.

The turning point in the struggle between the sectoralists and the regionalists came in December 1981 when the government closed the Office of Regional Planning (ORP), citing lack of adequate technical staff as reason. The ORP staff and facilities were later placed at the disposal of the New Planning System (NPS) designed for preparation of the First Plan (Amirahmadi, 1986a). In the original design, the NPS incorporated spatial councils and regional planning. In practice, however, the new system became modified in the direction of sectoral planning. Thus, during the preparation of the First Plan, no district or village councils were established and the few county councils which were formed did not participate actively in the plan-making processes. Moreover, the Supreme Council of Provinces was not established and the formation of the Council of Provincial Planning (or Provincial Planning Committee as it has become known) did not follow the procedures stipulated in the law of councils. Instead of its members coming from county councils, they were elected from among provincial heads of sectoral offices with the provincial governor as chair and the director of the provincial planning office as secretary.

The dominance of sectoral considerations in the preparation of the First Plan is also demonstrated in its procedures. Provinces did not participate in setting major goals or policies, even when they directly concerned local problems and development: these decisions were made by the Economic Council (composed of major cabinet ministers). The provinces were responsible for the preparation of preliminary reports and the formulation/implementation of sectoral projects, based on nationally prescribed objectives and policies. The situation changed in the fall of 1982, when following two important conferences in May and July of that year on the First Plan and the NPS, Prime Minister Mir Hosain Musavi became convinced of the need for a spatial approach to national planning. He asked Dr Taghi Banki, then PBO chief, to prepare a new spatial planning system: thus Spatial Strategy Planning, a methodology first developed in Iran by Setiran (a French planning firm) in 1976, was revived.

Spatial Strategy Planning offers a 'system of comprehensive development planning in which sectoral and spatial (physical) planning are reasonably integrated' (Fouladi, 1986: 2) and calls for comprehensiveness through rearticulation of space, time and matter. The methodology also helps determine development objectives and policies and should, therefore, serve as the basis for
comprehensive national development planning. In particular, it assists planners and policy-makers to: (1) extend development spaces by delineating areas to be developed commensurate with their resources and potentialities, or because of non-economic urgencies; (2) promote work and settlement spaces for balanced development of productive capacities, infrastructures, social services and population; (3) decrease regional disparities through faster development of underdeveloped regions and balanced distribution of population and productive/social activities and services; (4) form an integrated system of human settlement through the creation of spatial hierarchy and specialization; and (5) preserve environment through its planned utilization and legal protection.

Amayesh-e Sarzamin comprises three stages. In the first stage, three major documents are produced. The Basic Conceptual Framework provides the main policy orientation toward national development. The relationships between growth and development: exogenous and endogenous resources: and tradition and modernity are evaluated. The Overall National Development Strategy translates the conceptual framework into policies for social, economic and spatial aspects of development. It determines the place and functions of the main economic sectors in national development, a general framework for technology adoption, criteria for foreign and domestic marketing, supply of investment funds and workforce, level of centralization of decision-making, and ways of decreasing regional disparities. The Basic Plan of Amayesh-e Sarzamin reflects the long-term spatial organization of development. The document specifies resource allocation patterns, the sectoral distribution of population and employment, settlement patterns in urban and rural areas, the place and functions of each region in development and interregional relationships.

In the second stage, two documents are produced: Detailed Plan of Amayesh-e Sarzamin and Macro Framework for the Medium-term Socioeconomic Development Plan. The latter sets the medium-term (5-year) targets for socioeconomic sectors, while the former gives a comprehensive image of the long-term spatial organization in the country. Determined at this stage are also the major functions and comparative advantages of regions, the scale and functions of urban and rural settlements, and the scale, characteristics and geographic distribution of productive activities, social services and infrastructural networks.

Finally, in the third stage, the contents of the Medium-term Socioeconomic Development Plan of the Regions and the Medium-term National Sectoral Socioeconomic Development Plan are detailed. The regional plans are prepared on the basis of the projects included in the region's Amayesh plan and with regard to the regional resources (indigenous or obtainable from outside). The sectoral plans are then formulated on the basis of the regional plans and are coordinated in terms of their input and output requirements at the national level.

Only the first stage has been completed in the Islamic republic. The results are non-binding except for two documents: the Macro Long-term National Goals and Strategies, including the goals and strategies for the first phase of development (called the preparation phase), approved by parliament in October 1985; and the
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National Spatial Strategy Plan (NSSP), which passed parliament in October 1986. The policy contents of NSSP emphasize regional development, promotion of the national culture along with a balanced modernization, full utilization of national resources, adaptation of resources that must be imported, and a conception of development that includes growth along with redistribution and provision of basic needs.

Several observations may be made concerning the debates over the role of regional planning in balanced national development and the proposed alternative procedures. First, both the sectoralists and the regionalists favour a centralized planning system which allows little local participation in decision-making. Indeed, both groups equally fail to address the critical role of territorial and sectoral councils in setting development objectives for their constituencies. The need for such a participatory controlled decentralization policy is dictated not simply by popular desire but also by the country's large size, diverse ethnic composition and regional cultures, uneven regional development and resource distribution, and the differential needs and impacts of various development projects. The 'advisory' position given to the provinces by the regionalists' approach seems inadequate to the extent that advice is sought in matters of plan preparation and local land uses rather than in decision-making for setting objectives and policies and for budgeting and resource allocation (personal communication, 1986).

Secondly, both groups have so far focused on the form rather than the content of planning. While it is critically important that a country finds the right procedure for formulation of its development plan, attempts in this direction may prove fruitless if they do not correspond to attempts to comprehensively analyse the reality to be transformed and to define development and its major components, including national goals and the means to implement them. To the best of my knowledge, the only guide for aforementioned procedures was the Islamic Constitution: at times even laws or specific policies that had already passed the parliament were ignored. The Constitution was hardly enough: the goals, as well as the tasks, outlined in the Constitution are too abstract and broad or equivocal to serve as anything but a guide for such a specific task as planning for sectoral or regional development. For example, according to Article 44, 'the economic system of the Islamic republic consists of three sectors: government, cooperative, and private with systematic and sound planning'. Yet in Article 43, the Islamic economic system is defined as one which 'prevents profiteering from the labour of others'. The two principles are contradictory: the private sector cannot exist without making profit which comes from the labour it employs (Amir Rahmani, 1986a).

Thirdly, both sides neglected the important issue of implementation. The proposed plan was at times confused with the implemented plan and mechanisms to account for changes and problems with projections were hardly incorporated in the plan-making procedures. There was no mechanism to allow for continuous adjustment of the proposed plan, and a detailed discussion on national resources and on such policy instruments as control, incentive, taxation, credit and service
did not take place. Finally, while regionalization should have been made a prerequisite for making image plans, it received little attention.

3 Territorial organization for TSJ

A Territorial distribution of power: The Shah's regime was based on a unitary system of government, was organized socioeconomically on sectoral lines and politically into provincial administrations. The state in the provinces was, thus, represented by two main forces: the governors and the heads of sectoral offices. Both forces acted as agents of the central government, shared its functional burdens and had no autonomy. While the provincial administration had the appearance of a local government, it was hardly more than a functional branch of the central government. The organization made provinces also subordinate to the socioeconomic sectors on matters of development, and vertical hierarchies running from the president to local offices dominated even the horizontal relations between various spatial units. Participatory decision-making and management and administrative decentralization remained totally absent.

The country was divided into 23 provinces, each headed by a governor, in most cases a non-native politician. The governor's office oversaw the province as a whole and was, in theory, responsible for implementing/coordinating the central government's policies, fostering private accumulation, legitimizing the Shah's regime and controlling the local opposition. In practice, however, the governor's office was largely unable to carry out most tasks. Many of the high-level officials were corrupt, heads of sectoral offices were only responsible to their ministers in Tehran and the sectoral ministers were independent of the Interior Minister to whom the governor reported, and resistance from the centralist/sectoralist forces did not allow for the development of genuine concern for regionalism (Amirahmadi, 1986a).

While many of these structures, relations and functions are maintained and reproduced under the Islamic republic, others have been altered, by the government or as a result of the revolution. Changes in the sectoral structure of the state have been quantitative and qualitative. A few offices have been closed (e.g. the Women's Organization), while new ones have been created including the suprasectoral Reconstruction Crusade (RC), headquarters for Reconstruction and Renovation of the War-Damaged Areas and many specialized foundations concerning the poor, housing and war refugees. These and other new offices have territorial divisions, are active in urban and rural areas, and most have grown enormously. The RC is already one of the biggest ministries, while the Foundation of the Oppressed is the second economic power in the country after the government. Qualitative changes have been equally significant. Certain offices have experienced decline in efficiency particularly those sensitive to rapid population growth such as education, health care, and physical training. Tourism has also suffered as a result of the revolution. In sharp contrast, offices concerned
with agriculture, industries and infrastructure have been reorganized and strengthened in terms of authority, scope and technical experts. The strength or weakness of different offices has also depended on the power of the minister and his connections with the religious leadership. Significant changes have also occurred within sectoral offices. For example, high-ranking officials, including ministers, wield less power today than the Shah's time largely because of the increased consultative form of decision-making within offices – through administrative councils. Yet, such officials have more autonomy vis-à-vis their immediate bosses than at any time before. Interoffice relations have also changed, some have become more cooperative while others continue to remain competitive if not antagonistic. Interoffice high councils (e.g. the Economic Council) have been instrumental in increasing mutual understanding among various otherwise hostile offices. The sources of contradictions vary from power struggles to ideological and factional disputes.

The territorial organization of the state has further changed as a result of changes in the number and boundaries of spatial administrative units and in their relationships with each other and with the central government. The number of provinces has increased to 24 (by the addition of Tehran province) and many new municipalities have been created. The old leaders have been replaced by new ones, some of whom (in non-minority areas) are appointed from among the local people. The power of the governor seems to have increased significantly, as has the interplay between various sectoral offices and the office of the governor. Under the new administrative arrangements, heads of sectoral, as well as suprasectoral, offices have also to report to the governor, who has become more than a mere politician. He is expected to be involved in all aspects of socioeconomic development in the province from decision-making to implementation, supervision and evaluation.

The increased power of the governor and expanded interplay among provincial offices seems to have been largely made possible through creation of a powerful Provincial Planning Committee (Ettela'aat Newspaper, 1984). The governor heads the committee and the director of the provincial planning office is its secretary. A representative from the religious community is also included in the committee. He has no veto power but can influence decisions in favour or against the governor's position. Twice a month the committee brings together heads of sectoral and suprasectoral offices and district governors, under the supervision of the governor, to discuss matters of policies and priorities sent down from Tehran. Distribution of provincial budget, proposals for the next year's budget, and the reports and views received from the representatives of the province in the parliament. Additionally, the committee receives detailed reports from the implementing agencies concerning the quality and quantity of their operations and is charged with coordination of their activities. The governor reports the committee's work plan and minutes of its meetings to the representative(s) of the province in parliament and receives their comments for presentation to the committee.
The new law of Islamic councils demarcates functional divisions of labour between central and local government in all matters of strategy determination, implementation, supervision and evaluation. National projects have been distinguished from provincial projects. Provincial committees can only propose national projects while they are allowed to plan and implement provincial projects which do not require resources beyond local capabilities. The national budget remains centralized but local government may collect and retain certain taxes. Distribution of power across postrevolutionary Iran is, however, quite uneven. The governors of certain border provinces are even allowed to enter into trade/security schemes with the adjoining provinces in the neighbouring countries. In sharp contrast, locally significant projects may not be initiated in certain areas without the prior permission of the central government. Despite the significantly increased size of the public sector and the war with Iraq, however, postrevolutionary Iran remains less centralized than the Shah’s time. This has been due to the disruption of state machinery, conflicts over the social question of the revolution, strength of the extralegal government, and the weakening of territorial and functional links between the central administrations and their branches in provinces.

Planning administration: Significant changes have also been made in planning administration. An early attempt came in December 1983 (Azar. 1362) when the government created 10 planning regions by juxtaposing two to three contiguous provinces with a similar culture or level of development into one region. Access (transport links) was also considered. The larger or the most influential provincial capital was then made the regional centre from where a regional planner oversaw the planning affairs of the whole region. A similar regionalization scheme had been attempted in 1972, and like its predecessor, the new scheme was soon abolished largely because of the opposition from sectoral forces, but also because of interprovincial cultural and political conflicts and the inability of the regional centres, together with the central administration in Tehran, to provide effective leadership and technical services.

Termination of the regionalization scheme was followed by a new design for territorial planning administration, which itself followed a major change in the structure of the Plan and Budget Organization. Originally, PBO was a consultative body, part of the prime minister’s office, and was administered by a managing director with the rank of a minister without portfolio. This organizational arrangement gave PBO considerable power over other sectoral ministries which had to implement plans made by the staff of PBO. The managing director was assisted by two powerful deputies for planning, and budgeting and supervision, each of which, in turn, had their respective offices.

Following the revolution, PBO lost its monopoly over planning as ministries and provinces began planning their respective affairs. The First Plan was made by the participation of over 6000 individuals and many institutions. PBO’s contribution was hardly significant. Attempts to recentralize planning under the
PBO were defeated by the tendency to decentralize which had been encouraged by the disruption of the Pahlavi state machinery. Thus, about two years after the revolution, PBO was made a ministry with an interdisciplinary portfolio, moved from the prime minister's office and totally reorganized. Under the new organization PBO lost much of its power, but it became more autonomous and gained the status of a think-tank. The new administration replaced the previous two deputies with nine new deputies each having their own planning and budgeting/supervision offices. Among the newly created posts was the Deputy for Regional Affairs (DRA), the largest in the organization. The various planning administrations under the DRA include 24 Provincial Plan and Budget Organizations (PPBO), with over 200 staff members, and the Office of Regional Planning (ORP), which is located in PBO and is charged with the Amayesh-e-Sarzamin. While the ORP is a reality, with a tight structure and an active agenda, the PPBOs exist largely on paper except for a small core of regional planners in a few large provinces.

While significant, the territorial/sectoral reorganizations, even if fully implemented, would not be sufficient for realization of TSJ. Specifically, boundaries of certain provinces have to be redelineated to correct for extreme disparities in size, revenue basis and resources — problems that have greatly weakened comprehensive/effective territorial planning and implementation. Territorial and sectoral councils have to be fully institutionalized and operationalized before a centrally controlled decentralized regional government and a participatory planning system can emerge. Equally important for making government actions more appropriate at the local level is the formation of an articulate body of regional technical staff.

The state can strengthen provincial administrations by delegating more power to provincial governors and to consultative councils in matters of local administration, planning and implementation. It is important that sectoral offices be required to report to the governor. Centralized monitoring of such decentralized actions is, however, necessary to provide a balanced national perspective and to see that regional plans can best serve this purpose. Controlled decentralization also requires that local government moves closer to the people by incorporating them in all its activities. But effective participation requires institutionalization of the people's involvement in all aspects of their affairs, including the use of resources and access to information about issues and available means. Only then is democratization of state-society relations possible and the state becomes more accountable and responsive to society.

A balanced power relationship between sectors and territories could be created by expanding horizontal links between them and by simultaneously weakening the vertical hierarchies of the sectoral organizations. One way to do this is to move away from unitarism towards an associative system of territorial governments in which common interests and purposes are the primary integrating forces, and where regionalism is subordinate to nationalism but not to sectoralism. The function of sectoral ministries could also be redefined to emphasize management.
research and evaluation. An interministerial body could then be organized to coordinate implementation activities of the member ministries and work in close relation with PBO as the main planning agency of the nation. This would resolve the imbalance between the implementing capabilities of ministries and the comprehensive spatial planning attempted in PBO.

4 Regional policies for TSJ

Prior to the revolution, the Iranian government had tried a number of approaches to regional development. These included the concentration of investments in underdeveloped but resource-rich regions with great potential for rapid growth (the TVA model), agglomeration of single-sector projects in largely urbanized areas (growth pole strategy), and regional disaggregation of sectoral plans on the basis of best-location criteria (disaggregation approach). Limited experiments were also made with comprehensive regional planning (aggregation approach), but sectoral interests did not allow this to become established (Amirahmadi, 1986a). Throughout, the primary concern of the government remained national growth. Regional planning was to serve this objective by emphasizing comparative advantage as the basis for allocation of resources and funds for regional development. Relief programmes were also introduced but only when and where regional grievances had become explosive.

Theoretically, these policies have remained largely unchanged in the Islamic republic. Policy debates have tended to focus more on the conception of using regional development as a tool for national needs and growth. Spatial Strategy Planning is an example of the new trend. Consistent with this approach, the central government would determine the role and functions of each province. Comparative advantage would become even a more rigid criterion for allocation of development funds and resources to provinces, and the disaggregation approach would be favoured over its rival, the aggregation method. These policies will remain unchanged throughout the 'first stage of development' in the Islamic republic (Amirahmadi, 1986b). In the 'second stage', however, the government plans to redirect its development efforts toward helping underdeveloped areas and the appropriate policies would be developed at a later date (personal communication, 1986).

In practice, however, the Islamic government has followed a path less consistent and rigorous than its theories implied. The PRG tried to remain loyal to its theoretical perspective and showed only limited interest in TSJ: facing an economy in crisis, it focused on the promotion of growth in productive sectors and tried to repair the damaged old structures. Changes were introduced only when and where they were inevitable. Examples include nationalization of banks, insurance companies and large industries whose owners had either fled the country or were insolvent. About mid-1982, however, the Islamic republic's territorial policies began to diverge from its stated theoretical perspective as several measures more favourable to the poorer provinces were introduced.
These planned measures include both explicit and implicit territorial policies (Lim, 1986) such as a more even interprovincial distribution of the development budget, creation of several suprasectoral organizations with major territorial concerns, introduction of specific sectoral policies with major territorial impacts, defence policies, rural development and policies specifically designed to benefit the less fortunate provinces. The policies have only partially been implemented and in most recent years concern for efficiency has undermined policies for balanced development.

Under the Islamic republic, the shares of the LDPs in the development budget have increased relative to the figures for the RDPs. and in comparison with the LDPs’ share in the prerevolutionary years. For example, over the 1982–85 period, the LDPs received, on average, 33% of the nation’s regional development budget, while the figure for the RDPs was below 30% although the latter’s population was more than twice as large as the former’s. The corresponding budget figures for the LDPs and the RDPs over the 1973–77 prerevolutionary period were 28.4 and 32% (Salnameh-e Amari, 1362 and 1984). The IPs, on the other hand, have experienced only a slight improvement in their budget shares.

Certain sectoral policies also benefited the LDPs. The policy of making agriculture an axis of development has been of significant help to the agricultural LDPs. Price support programmes, cheap and easy credit arrangements, services provision and low-level technical assistance have been among the major components of the policy. Most economic and social service sectors have also transferred part of their operations to the LDPs.

Among the most important territorial policies of the Islamic republic designed to benefit the LDPs are Articles 3 and 16. Note 66. of the 1986 Budget Law. Article 16 allows the Council of Provincial Planning to retain provincial occupational taxes for investment in provincial development projects. The council identifies various projects, for each of which a trustee and a bank account is established. The projects and the accounts are then announced in local newspapers and mosques. Taxpayers are free to choose among the projects and deposit their tax dues to the corresponding accounts. This policy benefits the LDPs but is of little help to the poor as provincial wealth-holders, including the landlords and the capitalists, choose projects directly benefiting their own investments and activities. Article 3, on the other hand, allows the government to use banking system to support private local initiatives with no or little startup capital. Such initiatives have to be feasible, needed and organized into cooperatives. The law does not apply to individual applicants.

Another explicit territorial policy encourages provincial export production by allowing the government to provide the producers and exporters with various production, financial and marketing services. A further policy mandates that a predetermined number of entrants to the country’s universities each year must be applicants from LDPs. These students, most of whom receive government scholarships, must, in turn, undertake to work in their native province for a specified period after graduation. Service in the deprived areas for a limited
period, usually a year, has also become obligatory for most government employees and certain professions including medicine, dentistry and higher education. Moreover, the prerevolutionary policy of differential wage rates for the government employees serving in different regions continues to be in force. In a few LDPs the wage rates are three times as high as in Tehran. Finally, certain locales and provinces have benefited from political and military decisions. The autonomy movement in Kurdistan, for example, forced the central government to improve conditions in the province while the war with Iraq triggered a development programme in the strategic Persian Gulf islands.

These policies were, however, hardly coordinated or put into a broader development perspective. They remained isolated, were only locally significant, and have had very little socioeconomic impact. Incentives were given for provincial development but with no specific targeted objectives. In the absence of meaningful eligibility criteria (such as desirability, feasibility, replicability and affordability on a national scale, and impact on efficiency and equity objectives), many of the proposed projects were funded for no apparent reason. Locational requirements remained also largely unspecified. The policies were not given proper legal protection and their implementation could not be reinforced. They were also not provided with adequate managing organizations. Supporting policies were equally lacking and many major provincial problems were not covered by any explicit policies. For example, concern for increasing the overconcentration of Tehran was hardly translated into any significant policy, and incentives were not extended to include project- or locale-specific grants. Control instruments (concerning migration or activity location) and territorial development agencies were not established. Finally, most policies took a ‘place prosperity’ approach ignoring the social dimensions of territorial issues.

III Conclusions

This paper has examined the major influences on and changes in provincial development in postrevolutionary Iran and has assessed the state’s measures for realization of TSJ. It is shown that TSJ has been impacted by three types of forces, namely government-induced measures, spontaneous/popular movements and incidental factors. Among the government-induced measures I have detailed the most significant constitutional, administrative, planning and policy changes. However, most of these top-down initiatives could not be implemented.

The spontaneous/popular movements, on the other hand, resulted from the collapse of the state’s repressive apparatuses. Struggles over the social question of the revolution including land, councils, housing and autonomy were the most dramatic. Although they were largely defeated, the movements raised the national consciousness of the need for such democratic values as social reforms, organized and united actions, local initiative and popular participation. They also produced significant and effective pressure for introduction of popular policies by
the state. Finally, incidental factors included political episodes such as the collapse of the old state apparatuses and military events such as the war with Iraq. While destructive for the national economy, these factors produced conditions partially favourable to the goal of TSJ. The struggle over state power within the power bloc, for example, increased the opportunities for the popular forces to take autonomous action and made them capable of imposing important demands on the government. The war had a similar impact, but it also had a levelling effect on interprovincial disparity as it positively impacted development of the LDPs neighbouring the war zones.

As a result of the combined impact of these forces, the interprovincial development gap has slightly decreased. This is indicated in the recent study by Amirahmadi and Atash (1987). In particular, of the seven socioeconomic and demographic variables examined, provincial disparity increased only for one – the number of physicians per 100,000 population – while it declined in all other cases. The study also found that, during the 1976–84 period, most of the IPs and the LDPs improved their relative position within the provincial hierarchy. However, for most the improvement was not enough to let them cross over to the next higher level of the hierarchy.

To realize TSJ the state has to do more. The aforementioned forces have to be better managed and coordinated. Radical changes need to be introduced in various structures and relations within and among provinces. Restructuring territorial socioeconomic systems, sectoral administrations and sector/territory interactions are of paramount importance. New policies must also include a territorially balanced distribution of power and development resources including basic needs, decentralization of policy-making for development, popular participation in local affairs and respect for cultural diversity and autonomy. It was not only the Islamic republic’s inability to introduce these and other measures that paralyzed the revolutionary potentials for realization of TSJ. International and domestic constraints were even more damaging. As I have elsewhere argued (Amirahmadi, 1988), middle-class revolutions in the third world are violently opposed by the right for introducing reforms, are dismissed by the left as reformist, and are unacceptable to imperialism for demanding national independence and equality in international relations. The combined opposition of these forces along with the sectoralist/centralist nature of the state, the need for economic growth and efficiency, resource shortages, and the middle class’ inability to come up with an alternative for the postrevolutionary transformations produce powerful constraints which tend to paralyze the enormous potentials that the revolution and its consequences produce.

IV References

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This paper examines the major influences on and changes in territorial development in Iran since the revolution of 1979, and evaluates the state's efforts to realize territorial social justice (TSJ). TSJ includes major socioeconomic, political, ideological and cultural relations within and among territories of a nation. A case-study approach has been adapted and the largely empirical data and information are analysed and presented using the political economy perspective. The Iran-Iraq war has levelled the extreme interprovincial disparity, but its impact on the urban hierarchy has been less significant, despite massive internal migration. Disruption of the state machinery weakened the central government and led to a de facto administrative decentralization, an upsurge of local initiatives, and active public participation in local affairs. However, the increasing centralization of the state has eroded the positive effects of these trends. While the state-induced constitutional, administrative, planning and policy measures are designed to realize TSJ, their real effect remains limited due to problems in implementation. Inhibiting factors have included the state's inability to advance a coherent development strategy, enormous domestic and international constraints, imbalance between idealistic aspirations and practical needs, the dominance of procedural concerns over substantive issues, and exclusion of such fundamental issues as democracy and the limits of private property. To achieve TSJ, power and functional relationships between the central government and territorial administrations need to be redefined, the people incorporated in the governance of the local affairs, and existing policies and priorities changed.

Ce document examine les principales influences sur et changements apportés au DEVELOPPEMENT territorial de l'Iran depuis la révolution de 1979 et évalue les efforts de l'État pour réaliser la Justice Sociale Territoriale (JST). Ce concept englobe les principales relations socio-économiques, politiques, idéologiques et culturelles au sein de et entre les territoires ou régions d'une nation. L'approche de cas a été adoptée et les données et renseignements fortement empiriques sont analysés dans la perspective de l'économie politique. La guerre Iran-Iraq a fait disparaître une bonne partie de l'extrême disparité entre les provinces, mais son effet sur la hiérarchie urbaine a été moins important, en dépit d'une massive migration intérieure. La désorganisation de la machine statique a affaibli le gouvernement central et entrainé une décentralisation administrative de fait, un regain des initiatives locales, et une participation active du peuple dans les affaires locales. Cependant, la centralisation croissante de l'État a érodé les effets positifs de ces tendances. Si diverses mesures constitutionnelles, administratives, de planification et politiques dues à l'État ont été conçues pour réaliser la JST, leur effet reste limité par suite de problèmes d'exécution. Les facteurs inhibiteurs comprennent l'incapacité de l'État à mettre sur pied une stratégie de développement cohérente, d'énormes contraintes sur le plan interne comme international, le déséquilibre entre des aspirations idéalistes et les besoins pratiques, la dominance des questions de procédure sur les problèmes matériels, et l'exclusion de considérations fondamentales comme la démocratie et les limites de la propriété privée. Pour atteindre la Justice Sociale Territoriale, la répartition du pouvoir et les relations fonctionnelles entre le gouvernement central et les administrations territoriales auront besoin d'être redefined, le peuple à la gestion des affaires locales, et les stratégies politiques et priorités actuelles devront être modifiées.


Este documento examina las principales influencias y cambios ocurridos en el desarrollo territorial de Irán desde la revolución de 1979, y evalúa los esfuerzos del Estado para poner en práctica la justicia social territorial (JST). La JST comprende las principales relaciones socioeconómicas, políticas, ideológicas y culturales en y entre los territorios de una nación. El enfoque adoptado es el de estudio de caso, y los datos e información, en su mayar parte empíricos, son analizados y presentados desde una perspectiva económico-política. La guerra irano-iraquí ha revelado la extrema desigualdad entre las provincias, pero sus efectos en la jerarquía urbana han sido menos significativos, a pesar de la masiva migración interna. La interrupción del aparato del estado debilitó al gobierno central y condujo a una descentralización administrativa de facto, un aumento de iniciativas locales y una participación activa del público en los asuntos locales. Sin embargo, la creciente centralización del Estado ha erosionado los efectos positivos de estas tendencias. Si bien las medidas constitucionales, administrativas, políticas y de planificación inducidas por el Estado están pensadas para implantar la JST, sus efectos reales se ven limitados por culpa de problemas de la puesta en práctica. Algunos de los factores inhibitorios han sido la incapacidad del Estado para proponer una estrategia de desarrollo coherente, las enormes limitaciones nacionales e internacionales, el desequilibrio entre las aspiraciones idealistas y las necesidades prácticas, una mayor preocupación por el procedimiento que por los temas sustanciales y la exclusión de aspectos tan fundamentales como la democracia y los límites de la propiedad privada. Para conseguir la JST, habría que redefinir las relaciones de poder y funcionales entre el gobierno central y las administraciones territoriales, conseguir la participación del pueblo en el gobierno de los asuntos locales y cambiar las políticas y prioridades existentes.