

**TITLE**            *Global Restructuring,  
The Persian Gulf War, and  
The United States Quest for  
World Leadership*

**AUTHOR(S)**      HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI

**WORKING PAPER NO.** 34

© 1991

HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI  
Department of Urban Planning  
and Policy Development  
Rutgers University  
New Brunswick, New Jersey

CENTER FOR URBAN POLICY RESEARCH  
RUTGERS—THE STATE UNIVERSITY  
P.O. Box 489  
PISCATAWAY, NEW JERSEY 08855-0489



HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI, holds a Ph.D. in city and regional planning and economic development from Cornell University and is an Associate Professor in the Department of Urban Planning and Policy Development and Director of the Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University. He also holds an MS in industrial management and worked at the rank of top management for the Industrial Development and Renovation Organization of Iran. His publications include six books: Revolution and Economic Transition: The Iranian Experience, State University of New York Press; Post-Revolutionary Iran, Westview Press; Reconstruction and Regional Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, Routledge; Urban Development in the Muslim World, Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University; Iran and the Arab World, St. Martin Press; and The United States and the Middle East, State University of New York Press. Dr. Amirahmadi's other publications include numerous journal articles, book chapters and reviews. Translation of his works and his original contributions have also appeared in Persian. He has been a recipient of several grants (from NEH, SSRC, NJDHE, NJCH, U.S. Outreach Fund, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, among others), and is a frequent contributor to media (TVs, Radios, Newspapers) and scholarly conferences around the world. Dr. Amirahmadi has worked as consultant in a number of developing nations (including Iran, Turkey, and Mexico) and for the Agha Khan Foundation on matters of national development, urban and regional planning, disaster management, post-war reconstruction, and industrial location analysis.

# Global Restructuring, the Persian Gulf War and the United States Quest for World Leadership

Hooshang Amirahmadi

## 1. Introduction

In August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and then annexed the tiny country of Kuwait, citing its historic claim over that territory as its prime reason. The United States reacted almost immediately by sending a 200,000-strong "defensive" force to the region to create a "Desert Shield" against possible Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. President George Bush also put together an immense, though largely Western, coalition against Iraq in the United Nations and on site in the Saudi desert. The U.S. subsequently increased its forces to over 500,000 and declared their mission as basically "offensive". Meanwhile, twelve United Nations Security Council resolutions were passed against Iraq in less than a few months, an event unprecedented in the agency's 46-year history. The resolutions imposed a variety of demands and conditions on Iraq including total and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, economic sanctions, military blockade, and reparation for the damage done to Kuwait. A final resolution before the war authorized the use of "all necessary means" against Iraq if it did not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.<sup>1</sup> Iraq did not comply by the deadline and the U.S.-led multinational forces began their devastating air campaign against Iraq on January 16, less than six months after Iraq had invaded Kuwait. On 28 February, less than 42 days after the air war had begun and only 100 hours into the ground war, President Bush declared it all over with Kuwait liberated, 1,000,000-man Iraqi army cut down to size and its weapons of mass destruction eliminated.<sup>2</sup>

The U.S.-led "Desert Storm" has caused the near catastrophic destruction of Iraq and Kuwait and brought colossal damage to the regional ecosystem. It has also ushered in a new period in the already turbulent politics of the Middle East. While the war's long-term and global implications remain largely unpredictable, it is generally understood that "the Middle East will never be the same again." This well-placed prediction is shared by both advocates of the status quo and those who wish to see democratic changes as a result of this first major post-Cold War confrontation. Beyond the Middle East, the

United States is the one force that will be the most affected by the crisis. This is not so only because the U.S. has had the most critical role in the war, but also because the crisis took place at a transitional moment in world politics, when the cold-war era was being left behind while the shape of a substitute remained largely indeterminate.

In this paper, I shall argue that in waging the war against Iraq, the U.S. was motivated by a complex set of factors, but most fundamentally by a desire to influence the shape of the emerging world order in its favor. The war was also to end the rising criticism against the Bush administration for lacking clear vision of a new American paradigm in world leadership and for taking an allegedly anti-Israeli stand in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, the central concern of this paper is to indicate the prospect for the U.S. quest for world leadership in the wake of the Persian Gulf War (PGW) and the on-going global restructuring process. I shall argue that unless the domestic situation in the U.S. changes toward a more dynamic and all-embracing socioeconomic development, the U.S. may not be able to sustain its new-found world hegemonic role. Domestic politics can also impose restraints on U.S. leadership in the 1990s. Other major constraints emanate from forces seemingly external to the U.S., including the emergent multipolar world, diminishing utility and acceptability of offensive force, and the lack of a new paradigm of social change and leadership. The military victory in the PGW and the near-collapse of the Soviet empire will do little to change the situation in U.S. favor.

The paper is organized into five parts. In the first part, I shall focus on major U.S. motivations for its swift and decisive military intervention in the crisis. The U.S. quest for world leadership emerges as the primary reason among a web of other important objectives and interests. The second part gives a balance sheet of U.S. achievements and failures in the wake of the PGW. In the third part, I shall focus on the forces that may constrain the U.S. quest for world leadership in the 1990s and beyond, which include the emergence of a multipolar world and the diminishing utility of offensive (military) force. In part four, I focus on the reactions of the superpowers to the ongoing global changes. Finally, the arguments are concluded and a few

concluded and a few policy recommendations are advanced.

## 2. U.S. Motivations for the Persian Gulf War

In this part, I shall focus on the major U.S. motivations for the swift and decisive military intervention in the Kuwaiti crisis. The U.S. quest for world leadership emerges as the primary reason among a web of other important objectives and interests. I contend that this quest for a new "Pax-Americana" is indicative of a shift in policy, but not a complete break from the past. The war was also to end the rising criticism against the Bush administration for not developing a clear-cut, new American paradigm of world leadership and for supposedly assuming an anti-Israeli stand in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Next, the U.S. had increasingly become concerned with the changing balance of power in the Middle East. Iraq was considered, somewhat exaggeratedly, a new threat to the security of the American friends in the region, Israel in particular. In addition, there were other old as well as new concerns: oil, petro-capital, and the future of the Western alliance. These and other concerns were reflected in a series of announcements made by American officials throughout the crisis, before and after the war.

To begin with, President Bush originally cited four reasons for his swift and decisive response: reversal of the aggression, security of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, restoration of the al-Sabah rule, and safety of Americans in the area.<sup>3</sup> Later, he added the oil factor, "the American way of life," Saddam Hussein's danger to Israel and the world peace (citing his weapons of mass destruction and missiles that could deliver them), and finally, the creation of a "new world order". Similar reasons were also echoed by other high-ranking American officials including Secretary James Baker. In a speech delivered before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on October 29, 1990, he argued that Hussein's aggression "challenges world peace", "is a regional challenge", and "challenges the global economy" which depends on "secure access to the energy resources of the Persian Gulf", namely oil.<sup>4</sup> In other occasions, Mr. Baker asserted that the gulf war was for the American "jobs", "pocketbook", and "standard of living".<sup>5</sup>

After the victory, Bush outlined his vision of a new order for the

Middle East in the following four objectives: first, "to create shared security arrangements in the region," which means "American participation in joint exercises involving both air and ground forces," and "maintaining a capable U.S. naval presence in the region;" second, "to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them;" third, "to create new opportunities for peace and stability in the Middle East" by ending the Arab-Israeli conflict and solving the Palestinian problem, which in Bush's view "must be grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace;" and fourth, to "foster economic development for the sake of peace and progress" and "economic freedom and prosperity for all people of the region."<sup>6</sup> Note that the two most pressing problems of the region, extreme inter- and intra-national wealth and income inequality and the lack of political democracy are not included in President's agenda for the troubled region.

President Bush also indicated that the PGW's impact will go well beyond shaping the new order in the Middle East. "Our success in the Gulf" he told Americans, "will shape not only the new world order we seek but our mission here at home." He defined the "new world order" as: "a world order in which the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong; a world where the United Nations freed from the Cold War stalemate is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders; a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations. The Gulf war put this new world to its first test. My fellow Americans, we passed that test." President Bush then made a reference to his agenda "to prepare for the next American Century".<sup>7</sup>

How do these objectives and the "new vision" differ from the U.S. traditional interests in the region and vision of the world order? To arrive at a more informed answer, we must take a historical perspective of United States Middle East policy. Traditionally, the Policy has been based on four pillars: (1) containment of alleged Soviet expansionism; (2) assurance of the flow of inexpensive oil to the West; (3) protection of the security of Israel; and (4) preservation of the status quo by supporting conservative and anti-Communist regimes. The guiding policy principle was, however, the "Soviet

threat" to the well-being of the capitalist world and to the U.S. national security. After the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter declared the Middle East a region of "vital interest" to the U.S. This doctrine continues to guide U.S. policy in the Middle East, but the ingredients of the vital interest are changing.

Specifically, in the post-Cold War period, while the Soviet threat has diminished, U.S. Middle East policy has sharpened its focus on oil and countering unfriendly regional powers. This is also seen as a test of a new American paradigm of world leadership in the post-Cold War period when the other superpower has temporarily left the scene. We are also witnessing a gradual return to what was once called "the Nixon doctrine", as indicated by talks about the formation of a new regional security system, in which U.S. friends in the Middle East will have the leading role with peripheral U.S. participation. "The Carter doctrine" called for direct U.S. military response to external threat (that is the Soviet threat, and to a lesser extent revolutionary Iran's threat to its wealthy Arab neighbors in the Persian Gulf) to the Middle East and was in essence based on the concept of a "balance of power". The Nixon doctrine, on the other hand, called for reliance on regional powers (subimperialists) such as the late Shah of Iran for policing the Persian Gulf, a doctrine based on hegemonic designs.

The "containment" strategy began to change following Mikhail Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika policies, the collapse of the so-called socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, and disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. The U.S. no longer adheres to the Cold-War idea that the Soviet Union poses a threat to Iran, Middle East oil, or any country in the area friendly to the U.S. -- an idea dropped by the Bush administration in early 1990.<sup>8</sup> Even before that date, President Bush had indicated that "the United States now has its goal much more than simply containing Soviet expansionism. We seek the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations."<sup>9</sup> The unprecedented cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR during the Kuwaiti crisis, the war against Iraq, and in the post-war period only served to reinforce American policy makers' view that the Soviet Union is no longer a threat to the Middle

East.

In his speech at the Forty Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly on October 9, 1990, President Bush characterized the containment strategy as an idea of the past and hinted toward a more cautiously conceived, accommodative approach to the U.S.-Soviet relations. This new approach became gradually solidified in the course of the Kuwaiti crisis and a few summit meetings between Bush and Gorbachev. According to a New York Times editorial, after the July 1991 summit in Moscow, the two "superpowers" will become "allies".<sup>10</sup> The U.S. policy makers are hardly mistaken in charting such a bold new direction. Clearly, changes in Soviet international thought are strategic, based on profound ideological rather than tactical revisions emanating from the nation's deep economic and political crises.

The West's vulnerability to the flow of inexpensive oil was originally related to the Soviet threat and, therefore, it had developed a military and strategic dimension. However, as the Cold-War ideology faded, the U.S. discovered a new threat to its regional interests: unfriendly regional powers such as Iraq and Iran which are said to possess the potential to take control of OPEC oil production and pricing away from pro-American Saudi Arabia and its Persian Gulf allies, or create instability in the status quo favorable to American interests. For the U.S., the seriousness of this threat is underscored by the fact that the Persian Gulf oil reserves will last longer than other world reserves and production cost is the least expensive. This dependency on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf must also be viewed in relation to the predicted increase in demand for oil in the West and the world as a whole.<sup>11</sup> Meanwhile, the ailing American economy has become even more sensitive to higher oil prices and other unexpected external shocks under the prevailing conditions of a chronic fiscal deficit, trade imbalance, savings and loan crisis, and a huge public debt.<sup>12</sup> Thus, it is no wonder that the U.S. "vital interest" in the Middle East has increasingly become defined in terms of assuring the uninterrupted flow of inexpensive oil made possible by preserving the dominant role of Saudi Arabia within OPEC. The Bush administration's overreaction to the Kuwaiti crisis is partly explained on the basis of this concern.<sup>13</sup>

Yet, the threat to the flow of inexpensive oil is exaggerated. For example, even before the PGW destroyed Iraq, that country's economy was in ruin because of the Iran-Iraq war and could hardly afford to use the "oil weapon" against the West, its main customer. On the contrary, Iraq needed (and desperately needs) to sell oil at an increasing volume to maintain its huge and dependent army, import food, and reconstruct its war-devastated economy. This is also true of other countries in the Middle East, particularly those more or less hostile to the U.S. These nations compete to export more oil and OPEC's main problem over the last decade has been to regulate overproduction. Indeed only the pro-Western Persian Gulf states may survive without exporting oil for a while since they have huge cash reserves. Besides, even if Iraq wanted to withhold its oil supplies, the impact on the oil market would still be marginal. As Doug Bandow has shown, "even if Saddam Hussein conquered the gulf and hung onto his empire into the next century, he would never have the sort of control over oil that the widely cited 50 percent figure implies."<sup>14</sup> Note also that since August 1990, oil from Iraq and Kuwait has stopped flowing into the West. Yet the effect on world oil supplies and prices has been minimal, except for short-term fluctuations in response to speculative trading.

The experience in the 1980s also indicates that OPEC oil prices are not primarily determined by monopoly pricing but by market forces, the demand side in particular. These prices have become increasingly sensitive to transformations in the structure and level of demand in the West and Japan. Thus, the oil glut caused by Saudi and Iraqi overproduction in 1979-80 could not prevent a major price hike while a lesser glut in 1985-86, caused by Saudis and Kuwaitis, depressed the price of OPEC oil significantly in 1986. Contrary to the widespread belief, OPEC in the 1980s has largely been a price-taker rather than a price-maker. Additionally, no single state in the Middle East, including Iraq and Saudi Arabia, has the capability to influence the oil market in the near future.

To effectively use oil as a weapon, no fewer than three or even four major OPEC producers must be able to coordinate their actions and succeed in intimidating others. The economic and political realities in the Middle East

will not permit this to happen. The July (1990) OPEC meeting was able to raise the price not just because of Iraq's threat to use force against Kuwait, but also because most OPEC members, including Saudi Arabia and Iran, were disturbed by the sharp decline in oil prices in the preceding months and wanted "to see higher oil prices in the next few years."<sup>15</sup> It had declined to as low as \$13 a barrel while OPEC's benchmark price was \$18 a barrel. The sharp drop was also a source of concern for the Bush administration and the U.S. oil companies which remained happy with the official OPEC price at the time.<sup>16</sup> In the post-PGW period, oil prices have risen to around where they were before the crisis (close to OPEC's prices) and the U.S. has not made any effort to use its new-found power vis-a-vis OPEC to lower its prices.

We must also be reminded that anytime in the past several decades when Western forces intervened in the Middle East to assure a steady flow of inexpensive oil from the region, the result has been just the reverse: less oil has flown out at exorbitant prices. The so-called tankers war in 1988 in the Persian Gulf and the Kuwaiti crisis are two most recent examples. Incidentally, the U.S. (which depends on the Middle East for less than 10 percent of its energy) remains far less vulnerable to an interruption in oil flow from the region than do other members of the OECD. The Western Europe and Japan, for example, import more than 50 percent of their oil from the region. The U.S. also has the option of developing its own domestic oil production (an option that Western Europe and Japan do not have) and encourage conservation as in the late 1970s. That is perhaps a more prudent energy policy than policing the Middle East oil or fighting on the side of the undemocratic oil-rich monarchs, sheikhs and emirs in the Persian Gulf area.

From the preceding paragraphs it may be concluded that while the U.S. remains very concerned about the Persian Gulf oil, the source of that concern is only partially related to its own economy. Moreover, the U.S. is only marginally concerned about a sharp rise in OPEC oil prices, use of oil as a political weapon by any member of OPEC, or a sudden drop in world oil supplies. The real source of the Bush administration's concern about oil and "the American way of life" should thus be located elsewhere. In particular, the U.S.' control over oil supplies in the 1990s and beyond will also enable

it to control the world economy and directly or indirectly control the economies of two powerful competitors, Japan and Germany. From this perspective, oil has become a new medium in the U.S. quest for world leadership and consequently more vital to the U.S. than anytime in the past.

The nature of the Israeli dilemma for U.S. Middle East policy is also changing. While the security issue remains a source of concern, policy makers are rightly shifting attention to mitigating tension between the Arabs and the Israelis in the hope of finding an acceptable peace formula. Already in May 1989, Secretary Baker in a speech to the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (the Israel lobby) had called on Israel to "lay aside once and for all the unrealistic vision of a Greater Israel."<sup>17</sup> While the Kuwaiti crisis was in progress, President Bush stressed the need for a solution to the Palestinian question in his address to the Forty Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly in October 9, 1990. The U.S. also voted twice during the same month with the U.N. Security Council to condemn Israel for its mistreatment of the Palestinians and the lack of cooperation with the U.N.<sup>18</sup> While the Bush administration was anxious to see that the Arab-Israeli conflict did not become a cause for probable disintegration of the alliance against Iraq, it was also motivated by concern for the Palestinian problem.

The fact that the U.S. opposition to link the Kuwaiti and Palestinian questions was not an opposition to a settlement of the Palestinian question became evident in the post-PGW period when the new U.S. approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict became even more visible. As noted above, President Bush's four-point vision for the post-PGW Middle East included an important policy statement about the Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He emphasized that the solution "must be grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace". Days after the PGW, Secretary Baker began his "shuttle diplomacy" in the region, focusing on confidence-building measures and organization of a regional peace conference. The new diplomacy has already succeeded in making the conflicting parties participate in a largely ceremonial regional peace conference in October of 1991.

There are several reasons for this change in policy. From the American

and Israeli perspective, the PGW has enhanced Israeli security by destroying Iraqi army. Israelis are, generally speaking, very pleased with President Bush for the war, the free Patriot Missile protection, and increased financial and military assistance in the aftermath of the war. Even before the PGW was over, the Israelis "present[ed] the United States with a bill: \$13 billion."<sup>19</sup> At least another of Israel's potentially powerful enemy, Syria, is now in the U.S. camp and may also be considered as neutralized. President Hafez al-Assad's concessions and acceptance of the U.S. compromise plan for a regional peace conference must be viewed from this perspective.<sup>20</sup> Other Arab states in the alliance against Iraq have made similar concessions and demanded that the U.S. reward them by solving the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem. The U.S. could not afford to ignore their request since it well reflects their vulnerability to the growing domestic grassroots pressure and Islamic radicalism.

Mounting international pressure on the U.S. was also evident during the Kuwaiti crisis when the Security Council was passing resolution after resolution against Iraq. The issue of the "double standard" had already become part of the criticism against the new U.N./U.S. political discourse. It is also the first time in the Arab-Israeli conflict that the U.S. finds itself in the middle of it. Any future cross-fire will have to go through the United States, a situation that has become a new source of concern in Washington. The Bush administration also realizes that with the Soviet Union effectively withdrawing support from its client Arab states and with the Arab states in total disarray no credible threat exists to Israel's security, now and in the foreseeable future. Indeed, Israel's security is being challenged by no other force but the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, hardly a "high tech" military force. The Intifada (uprising) there has shaken the foundations of Israeli politics and continue to undermine the state's legitimacy at home and abroad.<sup>21</sup>

Moreover, if a "new order" is to emerge in the Middle East under the U.S. leadership, then the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem have to be resolved. The U.S. can not consider itself a new world leader and yet patronize the small state of Israel whose "strategic" value has come into

question in the wake of the PGW; Egypt may indeed have already replaced that "asset" for American diplomacy in the region.<sup>22</sup> The increased strategic value of oil also makes it imperative for the U.S. to forge an even stronger alliance with the Persian Gulf states. Finally, the sharpening global economic competition so vital for securing world leadership has made Americans even more attentive to closer friendship and relations with Arab nations. From this perspective, a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict also becomes a necessary component of the U.S. quest for world leadership.

One area of U.S. Middle East policy that awaits significant change is American protection for conservative and dictatorial regimes who hide their largely undemocratic practices behind their so-called pro-American policy. It is no wonder that protecting the Saudi regime and restoring the al-Sabah family rule in Kuwait were among the four-point objectives which President Bush announced when he dispatched American troops to the Saudi desert. Ironically, almost all Arab states which took sides with the democratic U.S. are undemocratic and abusive of human rights. They include Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf emirates, Morocco, Egypt and Syria. In sharp contrast, most Arab states which sympathized with the undemocratic Iraqi regime have been experiencing democratic changes in the recent years. They include Jordan, Tunisia, Yemen and Algeria. The House of Saud, the Emirate of Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are "feudal monarchies", according to a New York Times editorial.<sup>23</sup> The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia lacks a constitution and does not permit women to drive. Nor is Kuwait a democratic state. There, a fragile parliamentary process was brought to a complete halt in 1986 when the present Emir al-Sabah closed the parliament. The Emir's undemocratic practices in the post-war Kuwait have become a source of embarrassment for the Bush administration who helped restore his throne. "Liberated in Kuwait" said New York Times, is "arrogance".<sup>24</sup>

Unfortunately these undemocratic regimes remain a vital component of the new American diplomacy toward oil, the Arab-Israeli relations, arm sales and the U.S. quest for world leadership in a highly uncertain post-Cold War era. This is despite the fact that communism will not be a serious threat in the foreseeable future and the rapidly changing world will make it impossible for

the reform-resisters and undemocratic forces to survive. Unless resolved, the contradiction between the need for preserving these regimes and their dislocation in a new world order will eventually run U.S. Middle East policy into an explosive deadlock. Which way and how soon the U.S. will resolve the contradiction remains largely unpredictable. As past experiences indicate, the status quo will be preserved until resistance to a change becomes untenable or it develops into a real fetter to the U.S. quest for world leadership.

While the U.S. has modified some of its traditional concerns in the Middle East, it is adding new ones to the list as the world enters a new era in international relations. Most significantly, "the Soviet threat" is being replaced with threat from marginalized groups and unfriendly regional powers who tend to destabilize the emerging post-Cold War order by attempting to alter the status quo. Secretary Baker's point that Iraq represented a threat to world peace emanated from this new perspective on emerging regional powers. In his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Baker said: "We are entering an era in which ethnic and sectarian identities could easily breed new violence and new conflicts. It is an era in which new hostilities and threats could erupt as misguided leaders are tempted to assert regional dominance before the ground rules of a new order can be accepted."<sup>25</sup> While some previously less significant developing countries are growing stronger, the U.S. exaggerates their danger to the American interests, among other reasons, with the purpose of maintaining a sense of crisis in order to legitimize the continuation of the ideology of the national security state. A sense of external threat can also legitimize the maintenance of the high defense budget on which the prosperity of the U.S. military-industrial complexes depend.

Iraq is a case in point.<sup>26</sup> To begin with, the myth the U.S. created about the Iraqi military might proved to be just that: a myth.<sup>27</sup> The Iraqi "million-man" army which was propagated as "the fourth largest in the world" was defeated in less than 42 days and could not sustain the ground war for more than a mere 100 hours! Iraq would have also been defeated in its war against Iran if it had not received support from the U.S., the Soviet Union,

France, England, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait, among other countries. These countries, the U.S. in particular, helped build and maintain the Iraqi war machinery and its weapons of mass destruction.<sup>28</sup> Even with such support, out of eight years of war between the two countries, no less than five years were fought inside Iraqi territory and Iran had taken at least three major Iraqi cities and ports.

Saddam Hussein's unprincipled use of the Westerners in Iraq and Kuwait as "foreign guests" or "human shields" to ward off possible American air attacks on Iraq's strategic installations should have served to underscore his extreme vulnerability to a major confrontation with the U.S. The "Hitler of the new age" did not also dare to use even a drop of his chemical agents against the U.S.-led forces and accepted all terms and conditions that the U.S.-led U.N. Security Council imposed on Iraq for a cease-fire. The Iraqi missile attacks on Israel were also a desperate attempt to involve that country in the hope of extending its losing war to the whole of the Arab world and perhaps beyond. The "madman of Baghdad" also proved to be an intelligent survivor who could convince his enemies that he was a better choice for the post-war Iraq than either the Kurdish or the Shia rebels.<sup>29</sup>

Incidentally, President Hussein's real power originated from his initial popularity among a sizeable segment of the disenchanting, poverty-stricken and humiliated Arab masses. Yet, they were as useless to the pan-Arabist Saddam Hussein as they were to the Pan-Arabist Gamal Abdul Nasser in 1967, for they are divided into 21 pieces throughout a disunited Arab world mostly dominated by dictators. Hussein was not known to most Arab masses as a champion of the have nots. On the contrary, as shown on a CBS 60 Minutes on August 11, 1991, Saddam Hussein is among the wealthiest of world leaders; he has stolen billions from the Iraqi treasury (oil revenue) and deposited them into his own bank accounts around the world. Besides, most politically active members of these Arab people belonged to Islamic movements in the region and knew that Saddam Hussein was a secular leader with little devotion to Islam as an ideology of the modern state. Saddam Hussein's hypocritical call for a "holy war" and a proposal (August 12, 1990) to withdraw from Kuwait in return for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories only indicated how

desperately he needed the Arab masses for his survival in the crisis.

Iraq's threat to Israel was also exaggerated. As demonstrated by the war, Iraqi air power was no match for that of the Israelis while Iraq's chemical weapons were at the least matched by those of Israel. This inequality of forces is further exacerbated by the fact that Israel is already a nuclear power while Iraq would have not reached to that stage for some years to come. It is also important to note that Iraq has, in the past, only tangentially been drawn into a war with Israel, with whom it shares no border. Thus, an effective Iraqi ground war against Israel was also an impossibility since Iraqi forces had first to cross into Syria, Jordan, and/or Saudi Arabia. None of these options could be considered serious under the prevailing pre-war conditions in the region. Even if President Hussein had a Hitler mentality, he hardly had the means to back it up.

Saddam Hussein made a tactical mistake by challenging Israel. The "butcher of Baghdad" thought he may have a chance to replace Israel as a "strategic asset" for the U.S. and also become the master of the Arab world. For the U.S., however, the choice between Iraq and Israel was an easy one. Even before Iraq invaded Kuwait, the American media had waged a crusade against Saddam Hussein, reminding their readers and the administration of the Iraq's danger to Israeli security. The Congress was also busy drafting bills to ban trade with Iraq while U.S. secret agents were busy uncovering illegal shipments of sensitive technologies to that country.<sup>30</sup> Meanwhile, the Israel lobby was waging a propaganda campaign against President Bush's alleged anti-Israeli stand on issues ranging from peace and aid to settlement of the Russian Jews in the occupied territories.<sup>31</sup>

The Kuwaiti crisis, thus, came at an opportune moment for the Bush administration. Followers of the conspiracy theory have even argued that the administration tricked Iraq into invading Kuwait. They give as evidence the public statements coming out of Washington during the two weeks prior to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and from April C. Glaspie, the U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad. They particularly focus on the July 25, 1990 meeting between President Hussein and the Ambassador. According to the New York Times, the Washington message to Baghdad was that: "the United States was concerned about Iraq's military

buildup on its borders with Kuwait, but did not intend to take sides in what it perceived as a non-win border dispute between Arab neighbors."<sup>32</sup> Whether the conspiracy theorists are right or wrong does not change the fact that when the crisis occurred, the Bush administration used it as a god-given opportunity to reassert American military might. It is not surprising that the administration argued against waiting for the sanctions to work and feared a possible early Iraqi pullout from Kuwait which could have become a "nightmare" for the administration, according to the New York Times.<sup>33</sup> "The officials [were also] concerned", wrote Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, "that the natural instinct of Saudi Arabia and its neighbors to bargain with Iraq could weaken efforts to force a withdrawal through a combination of a worldwide oil boycott against Baghdad and an American military buildup in the Persian Gulf."<sup>34</sup>

From Washington's perspective, Iraq had to be destroyed and subordinated to Israel since a dominant Iraq would be contrary to the U.S. policy shift on the Arab-Israeli conflict: it would have made both the Arabs and the Israelis less flexible in the peace process. But the "Hitler" had to survive for the time being so that a sense of continuous threat could be maintained. Otherwise the world could not be easily characterized, as President Bush did several times during the crisis, as "a dangerous and unstable place" and the national security state would lose its underlying logic in the post-Cold War era.<sup>35</sup> "The Vietnam syndrome" also had to vanish and be replaced with a new patriotic spirit of victory and strength. The war also set a new example of how the U.S. might fight against a developing nation if it were to misbehave: it would not be like the Vietnam War, but like the one against Iraq. This intention was alluded to in President Bush's 1991 State of the Union address: "We will succeed in the gulf. And when we do, the world community will have sent an enduring warning to any dictator or despot, present or future, who contemplates outlaw aggression."<sup>36</sup>

The U.S. also exaggerated Iraqi stamina as a balance-altering force and purposefully overreacted to the crisis in order to make the world see the PGW as a test of a new American resolve for global hegemony and rally the world behind its leadership -- a trick that actually worked. President Bush also

demonstrate to an increasingly rebellious Western Europe that it still needed the U.S. in the post-Cold War era to police the world against hostile regional powers.<sup>37</sup> The U.S. reaction to the crisis was also meant to show the newly- united Germany and Japan, its two powerful economic competitors, that it is still Washington, not Tokyo or Bonn, that can "draw a line in the sand".<sup>38</sup> Both of these countries have recently been asking for a bigger leadership role in the world than they have been given since their defeat in World War II.<sup>39</sup> Meanwhile, the Bush administration's argument for the modernization of NATO would gain, as it did, increased credibility.<sup>40</sup> He also used the crisis to build support for reversing defense budget cuts. In a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars a few weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Bush pleaded to them: "help me convince the Congress, given recent events, to take another look to adequately fund our defense budget."<sup>41</sup> The administration also used the crisis to deploy part of the U.S. European forces in the Middle East.<sup>42</sup> The move would bring American forces closer to the Soviet Union where the situation remains uncertain to say the least.

The crisis also provided the U.S. with a golden opportunity to turn the Saudi deserts, Kuwait and Iraq into a testing field for its new military technologies; various American administrations had long sought military bases in the region and wanted to make the Saudis loudly acknowledge their friendship with and dependency on the U.S. Finally, the crisis helped the Bush administration to put a temporary stop to the rising criticism against his administration's inability to cope with the changing international environment and domestic problems.<sup>43</sup> The essence of that disappointment is aptly summarized by Flora Lewis: "The Bush Administration is being criticized for passivity and lack of "the vision thing." The real failure now isn't in not commanding the world but in not giving a clear sense of our new relations with it and why they matter."<sup>44</sup>

In sum, the crisis in the Persian Gulf generated by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's gamble on Kuwait provided the United States a "window of opportunity" to establish its leadership, or in the words of one critical analyst, to establish "strategic bridgeheads, secure the Gulf, and ensure that it retains a virtual monopoly on global violence."<sup>45</sup> American troop

deployment in the region under the rubric of Operation Desert Shield, and their use against Iraq in Operation Desert Storm, will test the principles of the emerging Bush Doctrine. This doctrine envisions a post-Cold War global arrangement dominated by the United States, with Western Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union acting as junior partners. As stated more bluntly by Michael Vlahos, director of the U.S. State Department's Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, "If we [the United States] marched right into Baghdad, brought Saddam Hussein back in a cage and paraded him down Pennsylvania Avenue, the world would take notice. We would have great freedom of action in the world for the next 10 to 20 years,... People would truly respect us, and if we said that we didn't like what they did, they'd sit up and take notice."<sup>46</sup> Mr. Vlahos's wish was not fully realized but the "victory parade" in New York City and Washington, D.C. sent a similar message to the world on T-shirts for sale: "Don't mess with US".

### 3. U.S. Achievements and Failures

This section offers a balance sheet of U.S. achievements and failures in the wake of the PGW, indicating various constraints on U.S. Middle East policy for creating a new order in the region, as outlined in President Bush's post-PGW four-point plan. Also discussed are implications for the U.S. quest for world leadership. To begin, the military victory has achieved several of President Bush's pre-war objectives, namely the "liberation" of Kuwait, restoration of the al-Sabah family autocracy there, security of the House of al-Saud, and destruction of Iraq's military capabilities (actual and potential) for some time to come. Most significantly, "Iraq no longer serves as the Arab deterrent to a nuclear-armed Israel."<sup>47</sup> All these achievements are to serve the status quo in favor of the U.S. and to establish firmer American control over Middle East oil and political structures. The victory has also improved the U.S. chance for mediating a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and thus altering the Palestinian plight.

However, the victory was not a "clean win" as General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, termed it.<sup>48</sup> In reality, Americans are not safe in the long-run since anti-Americanism will sure increase in the

region both at practical and intellectual levels. Moreover, the larger question of security in the region remains unsettled as national interests of various regional players clash over the form and contents of the new system. Yet, rapidly finalizing a new regional security arrangement is a matter of high significance for President Bush's new world order, which he defined in his 1991 State of the Union address as a world of "peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law." Indeed, the war has not as yet achieved any of these objectives in the Middle East. Possible Lebanization of Iraq continues to disturb even Saddam Hussein's enemies, Arab-Iranian tension could intensify over a security system for the Persian Gulf, despots continue to rule, and the tension between the Palestinians and Israelis has increased in the aftermath of the war. Indeed, they killed more of each other during the crisis than during any similar time frame in the past. Moreover, potential for political instability remains high in most so-called pro-American states in the region as dictators and ancient family autocracies are losing much of whatever legitimacy they commanded for ruling their respective nations. Meanwhile, American sales of military hardware to these countries has increased substantially following the PGW, adding more fuel to an already explosive situation.<sup>49</sup> This action of the Bush administration is contrary to the President's stated objective of reducing weapon sales to the region.

Next to these problems remain a whole set of issues that existed before the crisis or have been created because of the war. Among the new problems, human loss, economic damage, moralistic issues, political instability, and environmental damage have to be emphasized. The human toll on the Iraqi side is estimated at tens of thousands. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency of the U.S. Defense Department, Iraqi toll includes about 100,000 killed and another 300,000 injured. The figures do not include civilian casualties. Commenting on these figures, the New York Times wrote that: "By applying the D.I.A.'s error factor of 50 percent, today's estimate suggests that Iraqi casualties and desertions could have been as low as 275,000 and as high as 775,000..."<sup>50</sup> But on the allies' side, the human loss is not so great, though not negligible, with American and European losses estimated at about 400 and "over a hundred" respectively, and those of the Arab forces in

"several thousands". To these figures we must also add the millions of civilians in Iraq and Kuwait who died, were disabled or maimed, lost their homes and jobs and became refugees. Over 2,000,000 Iraqi Kurds fled to refugee camps on the Iranian and Turkish borders, with some 400 to 1000 dying every day. According to the New York Times, the death rate later "stabilized at about 500 a day."<sup>51</sup> Representatives of international relief organizations estimated that some 5 million people from 30 countries were displaced; and as a State Department refugee official put it, the PGW created "A world on the move."<sup>52</sup> A U.N. report put the number of Iraqis who became homeless at 72,000.<sup>53</sup>

Environmental damage to the region is simply arch. The Gulf oil spill is the largest in history, estimated at 450 million gallons of crude oil. That is, it was a spill 40 times the size of the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska, stretched over an area 100 miles long and 40 miles wide in the eastern Saudi coastline, 15 inches thick in some areas. The ecological calamity has already included thousands of wild-life exterminated and many fishing industries and fishermen's lives destroyed. Its cleanup will require from five to ten years of hard and complicated work, from \$1 billion to \$5 billion in investments and expenditures, and close, continuous international cooperation.<sup>54</sup> It is also reported that most of the area is covered by heavy smoke from burning oil wells and in rainy days, according to local observers in Southern Iran, "black rain" pours on the people and their life environment. The fires from the burning oil wells have "sent soot as far as the Himalayas."<sup>55</sup> Commenting on the conflicting reports of the National Science team and the Friends of the Earth on the environmental impact of the PGW, the New York Times concluded that "the two reports were, in effect, a declaration by environmentalists that the situation is half way to catastrophe."<sup>56</sup> According to one estimate, "50,000 people in the Kuwait region will have their lives shortened in some way in the next several years because of the smoke."<sup>57</sup>

The economic costs of the war have just been simply enormous. Billions of dollars, needed at home and in the third world, were wasted in the Saudi desert and elsewhere in the Middle East. At the end, the total cost of the war to all sides could amount to something close to half a trillion dollars.

To the world community as a whole, it was immaterial where the money came from or who lost it.<sup>58</sup> The U.S.'s appeal for financial help from Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, among other nations, was both counterproductive and humiliating. It is the first time that Americans were seen as "mercenaries" overseas, policing the Western and Japanese interests in return for money.<sup>59</sup> Billions of dollars were also paid to Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, and many Eastern European countries which lost substantial trade with Iraq by going along with the U.N. sanctions.<sup>60</sup> These economic losses will harm the Eastern European democratic changes and Middle Eastern economies, with far reaching consequences for political stability in these parts of the world.

The economic loss on the Iraqi side could amount to some \$150 billion, with the nation's industrial, military and physical infrastructures in almost complete ruin. According to a U.N. report:

"The recent conflict has wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society. Now, most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology."<sup>61</sup>

In a subsequent article based on "a series of interviews with administration analysts", the New York Times reported that the Bush Administration's internal findings "parallel" those reported by the U.N. special mission, and that the CIA "estimates a national repair bill in Iraq of up to \$30 billion..."<sup>62</sup> The article also spoke of "catastrophic health crisis" in summer of 1991 and quoted a Harvard University report which said that "the collapse of electrical generating capacity has been a crucial factor in this public health catastrophe".<sup>63</sup>

The economic cost is equally high on the allied side. Kuwait is largely destroyed with some 740-750 of its oil wells on fire (290 had been capped by August 1991), costing at least \$100 million a day.<sup>64</sup> "Kuwait is burning almost as many gallons of oil each day as the United States consume gasoline."<sup>65</sup> The damage to its economy and physical infrastructures is put

at about \$50 billion. The total costs of the military campaign to the U.S. tax payers is put at about \$61 billion, \$54 billion of which is covered by the wealthy Arab allies, Japan and Germany. Note, however, that not all such payments have been in American dollars; \$6 billion is in kind and a portion of the cash contributions from Japan and Germany is paid in their respective currencies, ultimately against their exports to the U.S. at a future time. The U.S. also hopes to recover the remaining \$7 billion from a war-induced economic growth at home, the post-war reconstruction in Kuwait, and sales of new military hardware to the wealthy Persian Gulf Arab states. In the end, the U.S. may well end up making a small "profit" from the war.<sup>66</sup> However, the costs and benefits will be unevenly distributed across income groups, with a minority at the upper end of the social hierarchy accruing most of the benefits while those at the bottom end will pay for a lion share of the costs. Also it was mostly the children of this same group who were sent to the Saudi desert to fight.<sup>67</sup>

On the political side, the cost has ostensibly been negligible for most top political participants: all the pre-crisis leaders remain in power and streets did not fall into the hands of the Arab masses as some had predicted. Changes in the popularity of different leaders and groups can also be considered temporary and indeed insignificant, given the magnitude of the events that have taken place. However, looking deeper into the political scene, we see losses to all sides. Saddam Hussein is no longer an effective force in the region for some time to come, despite his success in putting down the Shia and Kurdish uprisings. The war was particularly devastating to these last two groups who were encouraged by the allies to take up arms against the central government in Baghdad and were then left alone to be crushed by Saddam Hussein's Republican Guards. The U.S. pretext for not supporting the Iraqi Kurds and Shia population was that it did not wish to see the Lebanization of Iraq; in reality, however, the Bush administration, along with the Saudis, preferred President Hussein's heavy-handed approach over a possible democratization of Iraq.<sup>68</sup>

The Arab world has also been divided into antagonistic camps: the poorer Arab states are mostly in the opposite side of the rich Arabs with far

reaching implications for intra-Arab distribution of Arab funds and cooperation for economic development and regional integration. After the Kuwaitis and Iraqis, the Palestinians are at third place in terms of the magnitude of losses that they have incurred from the war. Israelis have also sustained damage: they were humiliated by Scud missiles, their value as a "strategic asset" for the U.S. is now questionable, and they may find it difficult to resist the U.S. peace formula which underscores territory for peace. With these costs set aside, however, Israelis benefitted from the war which destroyed Iraq's potential military threat to their future security. Moreover, tension among the nations as well as anti-Western feeling in the region still runs high in the post-PGW period, but remains subdued for the time being.

There are also the issues of morality and justice. Saddam Hussein is a cruel dictator with no respect for the sanctity of life or human rights. The atrocities of his men in Kuwait, and before that in Iran and Iraq, are deplorable and should be emphasized in all ethical and legal debates about the crisis. Yet, the allies have not been less brutal in their destruction of Iraq. The amount of bombing on Baghdad alone is said to equal six times the bombing poured on Hiroshima during World War II, and the number of sorties flown on Iraqi cities are several times larger than the total sorties flown by all forces during World war II. Never before in recent history, has a nation been subjected to such a brutal and disproportionate response, regardless of the magnitude of its crime, including Nazi Germany. The National Council of Churches, a major voice of mainline Christians representing over 40 million Americans, passed a resolution criticizing the Bush administration for "Reckless Rhetoric" and "imprudent Behavior" and warned him against a war in the Middle East. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops also argued that the U.S. military involvement in the Persian Gulf could well fail the traditional catholic "just war" standard. In sharp contrast, the Council of Jewish Federations supported President Bush's war policy.<sup>69</sup>

Among the old problems, I wish to include the Palestinian question, the regional security issue and traditional inter-state rivalries, the lack of democracy in the region, and extreme inequality in wealth and income

distribution among the states and social classes in the Middle East. The crisis exposed these and other problems as never before. The link between the Kuwaiti crisis and the Palestinian problem and the issue of double standards became sources of significant agony for the allies during the crisis. Significant border problems remain as sources of international disputes and potential wars in the region. The American public was also exposed to the reality of life in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, where not laws but whims of the Emir and the King rule. It is safe to assert that the Middle East is the only world region where the current global democratic movement has not produced tangible changes. Many in the world have also come to know that not all Arabs own oil wells as stereotypes suggest and that more than two thirds of them live a life of absolute destitution while a very tiny minority has accumulated legendary wealth, held in the Western banks, investment portfolios, and luxury palaces.

Kuwait holds over \$120 billion in foreign investments, almost all in the West. Last February, one Saudi Prince, Waleed bin Talal, bought some \$590 million worth of Citicorp's share as reported by the New York Times, making him "the largest single shareholder in Citicorp."<sup>70</sup> The man who lost \$1 billion in one of the biggest banking collapses in the West was not an American, European or Japanese; he was Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan of Abu Dhabi. He owned, according to The Sunday Times of London, 77 percent of the assets of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the so-called "cocaine bank".<sup>71</sup> Meanwhile, many Arabs are unable to feed their children in Yemen, Egypt and the Sudan to name only a few examples. It is no wonder that the Arab masses hardly manifested any love for the rich Kuwaitis even though many objected to Iraq's invasion and annexation. Disparity among these states is also widening, resulting in increased interstate tension. While the poorer Arab nations have received only meager assistance (but a lot of humiliation) from the wealthy oil exporting Persian Gulf States, the oil wealth has been corrupted by the ruling groups and then deposited and invested in the West at a rapidly increasing pace and scale in recent years.

It was with some of these old and new problems in mind that President Bush outlined his four-point vision for the post-war Middle East and Secretary

of State James Baker began his shuttle diplomacy in the region on February 27 to look for ways to create a "new order" there as a prelude to a new American paradigm of world leadership. The administration is particularly right in emphasizing a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem, the creation of a new regional security system, and economic development in the region. If there is to be a new order in the Middle East, these problems have to be resolved. However, the issues of political democracy and economic justice should also be addressed. One can not build a new structure using the same old elements and form.

What, then, does it take for the U.S. to create a new order in the region? Above all, it takes a change of perspective and a real commitment to creating such an order according to a "balance of interests" concept. Is the U.S. ready for such a bold approach? My response is largely on the negative side although significant shifts are occurring in U.S. Middle East policy in the post-Cold War era. One major exception is a new U.S. commitment to end the Arab-Israeli dispute and solve the Palestinian problem. The old policy of preserving the emirs, sheikh and kings will not change. Restoring the al-Sabah family rule and preserving the House of Saud were among President Bush's declared four-point objective for sending troops to the region. The U.S. will not put pressure on the Saudi and Kuwaiti despots to open up their closed feudal societies and allow for democracy and rule of law there. As President Bush candidly said in a statement reported by the New York Times, the PGW was not fought for creating democracy in the region, Kuwait in particular. The lack of enthusiasm on the part of the U.S., for democratic changes in the region, will no doubt weaken reformist forces; grassroots pressure, however, is making it difficult for reform-resisters to adhere to their autocratic practices.

The question of wealth distribution will also remain unaddressable. First of all, some of the poorer states were on the Iraqi side (Yemen, Jordan, the Sudan), rendering them unlikely to receive enumeration for their unfriendly behavior toward the Persian Gulf Arab states; secondly, these wealthy states, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, have pledged billions of dollars in financial help to the U.S. and other allies to pay for the war

expenses; thirdly, Saudi Arabia is already in the market to borrow money to pay for its debt, while Kuwait faces tremendous money expenditures to rebuild its destroyed economy and infrastructures; and lastly, the oil revenue of Saudi Arabia will decline in the near future as Iraq and Kuwait begin producing again. Not only will the U.S. will not press for any major change in the wealth status quo in the region; it will make sure that its share is paid first. Note that the Bush administration faces tremendous budgetary problems at home. It is also certain that most of whatever benefit that the post-war reconstruction generates will go to the Western countries in the alliance, the U.S. in particular. The remainder will flow to the wealthier segments of Arab nations, further exacerbating social inequalities.

One important area in which the Bush administration is interested and wishes to act as a "catalyst" is the Palestinian problem. Secretary Baker's shuttle diplomacy has led to a significant narrowing of the gap between Arabs and Israelis on the peace question. Concessions from the Arab states and a "conditional" yes from Israel to a largely muted American plan is producing a regional peace conference in October of 1991.<sup>72</sup> The Soviet Union, the initiator of the conference idea, will co-sponsor it. It is hoped that the conference will result in bilateral and multilateral talks among the Israelis and the various Arab states leading to a more comprehensive peace among them. There are several reasons for this U.S. policy shift. In a nutshell, overwhelming changes have occurred in the regional balance of power in favor of Israel. Pressure from international public opinion has been mounting since the issue of the double standard became a word of mouth during the Kuwaiti crisis. The U.S. finds its new position in the middle of the belligerents pre-carious at best in the post-PGW Middle East environment. The Bush administration also seems convinced that the Israelis will benefit more from a two-state solution to the conflict based on the principle of territory for peace. The Iraqi Scuds must have also convinced the Israelis that more territory does not mean a more peaceful environment. The future political stability of the Arab states who supported the U.S. in the PGW also depends, to a large extent, on a solution to the Palestinian problem.

These and other favorable conditions could be frustrated if Bush

administration tries to use old tactics against the Palestine Liberation Organization. There is a temptation to ignore the PLO because it has supported Iraq. Some argue that the U.S. should capitalize on the new earned popularity of King Hussein of Jordan and ask him to represent the Palestinians. Others have gone even further to argue that the Palestinians be incorporated into a larger Jordan which will include the West Bank. The problem is that none of these schemes will work. The Bush administration will be missing a great opportunity if it tries to bypass the PLO, which remains the sole representative of the Palestinian people. What then I am saying is that in essence, Palestinian question is back again to square one with regard to the PLO question, but new opportunities have developed that are making a solution more accessible.

President Bush has also spoken about establishing a new security system in the Persian Gulf. The original outline of the system was given by Secretary Baker in December 1990 and rectified in February 1991.<sup>73</sup> It amounted to this: The Gulf Cooperation Council was to be joined together with Iran and possibly Iraq into a security framework. The Secretary said Iran should play a "major role" in such an arrangement. U.S. forces would also remain in the area but their number will be sharply reduced from the war-time level but significantly increased compared to the pre-war period. The U.S. would also maintain military bases and an inventory of military hardware in almost all GCC states, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Even the forward headquarters of the U.S. Central Command is planned for establishment in Bahrain.<sup>74</sup> This will be the first time that the U.S. operates bases in the Persian Gulf states.

The exact U.S. involvement was spelled out by President Bush himself. He disclosed that his administration wanted "to create shared security arrangements in the region" which would include "American participation in joint exercises involving both air and ground forces" and "maintaining a capable U.S. naval presence in the region".<sup>75</sup> Later on, the administration also arranged with the allies to maintain a small contingent in Turkey to "protect" the Kurds from Saddam's atrocities. There is no provision for cooperation with the Soviets within the proposed American "shared security"

framework. The President also did not disclose membership in the collective. Indeed, the proposed system seeks total domination by the U.S. of a region which was previously shared by the U.S. and the USSR. I suppose that this exclusiveness defines the newness in President Bush's "new order" in the region.

Could this be a realistic approach to collective security in the region? If past experiences are of any indication, the answer is negative. Iran still does not have diplomatic relations with the U.S. and Egypt. This will become an obstacle for its participation in the security collective. Yet, without Iran's active participation in such a system, security may not be achieved in the region. A similar problem exists concerning Iraq, the second largest Persian Gulf state after Iran. Syria and Egypt are mostly irrelevant to the Persian Gulf security since they are too far away from it and do not have a historical legitimacy for involvement there. This leaves the GCC states the only participants in the U.S.-led security system for the region. However, these states are too weak to make reliable partners. The most powerful of them, Saudi Arabia, had to request the U.S. assistance for its defense even before Iraqi army appeared on its borders. Moreover, the Soviets and the U.S.-European allies would challenge the U.S. quest for a hegemonic dominance in the Middle East.

Finally, let us focus on the economic side of the new U.S. plan for the Middle East. Can President Bush's call for economic development and prosperity for the region materialize? The prospect, at best, is nil. First, there are few financial resources for the purpose since many billions of dollars have fled the region during the crisis and most will not return.<sup>76</sup> Secondly, existing financial resources in the region are unevenly divided among states, with the more needy ones possessing the least. Thirdly, some of the poorest states supported Iraq and will not be favored by the allies including the Arab billionaires for economic assistance. Finally, wealthy states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are themselves in economic ruin and distress. Kuwait has to spend some \$100 billion in the next 10 years for economic reconstruction, environmental clean up, and military purchases while it will not be pumping much oil for the next few years. The country is also

under heavy obligation to reimburse the allies for a part of their military expenses during the crisis. Kuwait has also promised to lend money to a good number of countries for their help during the crisis. These include the Soviet Union, Egypt, Turkey, Syria and many more. Saudi Arabia is equally in equally distressed financially. The Kingdom has been running an \$8 to \$10 billion budget deficit for the past few years. In addition, it has also contributed some \$48 billion to the United States military operation and pledged billions to a variety of nations including the Soviet Union, Egypt, Turkey, and Syria. The Kingdom will also buy billions of dollars worth of military hardware and spend many millions more for post-war reconstruction and environmental clean up.

The post-war reconstruction will not generate any lasting economic prosperity in the region. Reconstruction activities are planned in stages, the first of which will be devoted to emergency clean ups followed by patch-up jobs and restoration of some basic necessities. Only then will real developmental reconstruction begin. The stage approach will be more manageable and realistic since Kuwait faces a severe labor shortage; but it will also prevent an economic boom from emerging in the immediate future. Besides, most contracts will be awarded to the industrialized nations, with businesses in the region receiving the less lucrative subcontracting jobs. Days after the cease-fire, the fight over the largest share in Kuwait's post-war reconstruction began among the Western members of the anti-Iraqi alliance. The U.S. government established a Reconstruction Center in the Commerce Department to help American businesses sign contracts with the Kuwaitis and the Saudis and the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers monopolized most of the emergency clean-up activities in Kuwait. Reportedly, some 70 percent of the 200 or so contracts (worth more than \$800 million) that the Kuwaitis signed in the first three weeks following the war were awarded to American firms. The Army Corps of Engineers, Caterpillar, Raytheon, AT&T, Bechtel Group, Fluor and Parsons Corporations, GM, Ford and Chrysler have all bagged major contracts, wrote the New York Times. The rest of the Fortune 500 were, the newspaper wrote, also in line.<sup>77</sup>

The regional impact of Kuwait's reconstruction will be particularly

limited if the Kuwaiti government was to actually implement the new emigration and industrial policies announced after the war. Accordingly, Kuwait will adopt a selective and restrictive emigration policy and follow a capital-intensive industrial development approach that will require far fewer foreign workers than will otherwise be the case. Note that the largest contribution of Kuwait to the Middle East was the low-skilled jobs that it provided to over 1.5 million workers from all over the region. This new Kuwaiti policy will thus have far reaching consequences for working people in the region, Palestinians, Yemenis, and Iraqis in particular.

In conclusion, the military victory has, at best, produced a mixed result for the U.S. and the region. It has generated new opportunities for change and tremendous constraints on top of existing ones. To facilitate opportunities and mitigate constraints, a new approach is needed: one which is as bold in its outlook and practice as "Operation Desert Storm". Otherwise, much time and energy will be lost with no concrete gains for either the U.S. or the other players in the region. However, is the U.S. as competent in the economic, political and diplomatic arenas as it has been in the Persian Gulf war? The future could be as unpromising as the past has proved, given the new confidence in militaristic approach.

American policy makers could come to the dangerous conclusion that the world has become unipolar and amenable to the U.S. hegemonic leadership. Referring to the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, President Bush said in his 1991 State of the Union address that "Among the nations of the world, only the United States of America has had both the moral standing, and the means to back it up. We are the only nation on this earth that could assemble the forces of peace."<sup>78</sup> Every nation has the right to demand world leadership. What is questionable is the means used to achieve it. The Japanese and the Germans have gained world leadership through economic growth and competition since World war II. However, the U.S.' comparative advantage lies within its military strength. Therefore, it is safe and reasonable to assume that the U.S. may attempt to impose its leadership on the world by military means if necessary. In that case, the world will be, to use President Bush's phrase, "a dangerous and unstable place".

#### 4. Global Restructuring and the U.S. Quest for World Leadership

This section will focus on two specific aspects of the new global condition that may constrain the U.S. quest for world leadership in the 1990s and beyond. They are the emerging multi-polarity in the world system and the consequent diminishing utility of offensive force. I shall also discuss the superpowers' reactions and implications of these changes for a new foreign policy perspective for the U.S. In particular, I wish to underscore the irrelevancy of a foreign policy that is based on the assumptions of a unipolar world and the use of offensive force for sustaining world leadership. These assumptions form the foundation of a new interventionist thought in certain sectors of American foreign policy establishment. The military victory in the PGW and the near-collapse of the Soviet empire have reinforced these assumptions and the new belief that has followed.

##### a. Emerging Multipolar World

World War II was a turning point in human history which has led to the emergence of the nation-state as the key player in domestic and world politics. The collapse of the colonial order was the prime cause of this development. Among the emergent nation-states, the U.S. and the USSR became hegemonic, each with their respective sphere of influence. A hegemon is defined as an actor that has both the ambition and the power to organize and lead a system of nation-states and control the external and internal behavior of the system's members in the direction of its expanded reproduction and common objectives. This control is never absolute as even the weakest nation-states tend to enjoy certain degree of relative autonomy.

In the late 1960s, after the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the United States, the planet was for all practical purposes, divided into two antagonistic world systems of capitalism and socialism, under the hegemonic control of the U.S. and the USSR respectively. A new bipolar world was born. This division notwithstanding, the key players remained nation-states within the two systems. Because they were more or less autonomous and pursued differing national interests, instability and structural anarchy remained major characteristics of international politics between the two systems and

within them. Therefore, it is not surprising that the search for causes of wars and conflicts, and for conditions of peace, security and cooperation between the two systems and among nation-states were the central problems and processes in post-war international politics.

The two hegemons, or superpowers, however, found another way to bring the intra-system instability under control: system integration. In the absence of any significant nongovernmental actors, this task was focused on nation-states. Both economic and extra-economic forces were applied. In particular, rapid and sustained economic growth and relative economic strength were among major factors that enabled the superpowers to maintain a powerful military force and use it to impose hegemonic leadership on their respective systems for the purpose of system integration. Meanwhile, the process was facilitated by the formation of various multilateral and bilateral organizations.<sup>79</sup> In the "capitalist camp" they included the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), International Monetary Funds (IMF), General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT), European Economic Community (EEC), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of American States (OAS), Australian-New Zealand-United States Treaty (ANZUST), and International Energy Agency (IEA). The "socialist camp", on the other hand, formed the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON), the Warsaw Pact, and International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties (IMCWP).

Integration within each system was also facilitated by the advancements in transport, telecommunication, and information technologies. Integration of the capitalist camp took place at the levels of the state and the private sector, assisted by multinational corporations, progressive trade liberalization, removal of barriers to capital and money transfers, globalization of production sites, achievement of convertible currencies, formation of Free Trade Zones and Custom Unions, various regional integration schemes, and the culture that international firms have used to propagate their business throughout the world.<sup>80</sup> While market forces played a significant role, government policies were catalysts in capitalist integration. The main instrument of the socialist integration, on the other hand, was a "planned

socialist division of labor" among the various states. Hardly any integrative schemes were developed at the level of private citizens or nongovernmental organizations. Market forces rendered negligible service to this process while inter-state planning and policies played the leading role."

The Cold War ideology and the wars in a number of third world countries, in Vietnam and Korea in particular, also played significant role in unifying parts within each system, reducing intra-system instability while securing the division between the two poles. The hegemons also developed certain interests for maintaining the division. For example, the military-industrial interests in the U.S. used the "Soviet threat" to legitimize a growing defense budget, while the bureaucrats of the Communist Party in the USSR used the Cold War to maintain their dominance over Soviet society and Eastern Europe. The East-West division was also maintained and reproduced by a paradigmatic partition within the field of development, between the capitalist model and the socialist path. The two camps hardly learned from each other or acknowledged the rival's contributions. Instead, they were defined in mutually exclusive terms. Thus, instead of mutual understanding and cooperation, the two camps developed dogmatic and extremist perspectives about each other.

To be sure, many countries, including the People's Republic of China and India, remained outside the two camps and a good number of them formed various economic and political alliances such as the Nonaligned Movement, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Association of South Asian Nations (ASAN), Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO). Regional integration and common market schemes were also attempted, largely unsuccessfully, in Latin America, Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The world outside the two poles, however, played only a peripheral role in the post-war international political economy and their demand (since early 1970s) for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) has not been successful.<sup>82</sup> Theoretically, the United Nations was the only international organization that stood above these divisions. Practically, however, the agency proved largely incapable of functioning effectively in a divided world ruled by the superpowers and torn by conflicts and antagonistic relations. The U.S. and its allies (Britain and France) are on record for

using their veto power the most frequently compared to the Soviet Union and China.<sup>83</sup> Such vetoes were used to block the passage of almost all possible resolutions that may not directly or indirectly benefitted the capitalist world.

This divided picture of the world began to change in the early 1970s when an asymmetrically interdependent one-world system began to emerge.<sup>84</sup> Interdependency is defined in terms of interlocking, common interests and issues among nation-states; that is, interests and issues that extend beyond national borders, recognize no political geography, and are universally applicable to the human race. Examples of these are AIDS, global warming, human rights, and peace in a nuclear age. Let us also consider the following: U.S. dependency on European markets, on Japanese banks, and on the Soviet and Chinese cooperation to fight Iraq; Europe's and Japan's dependency on U.S. market and military protection and on Middle East oil; or China's and the USSR's dependency on assistance from the West for technology and economic development. In the same way, the global spread of production and resources and the consequent multi-sourcing and multi-marketing strategies of most transnational corporations have resulted in interdependencies among firms and between them and the nation-states where they buy resources and sell their goods.

Even the third world's dependency upon the developed countries is no more unidirectional than it was in the past. For example, the world's monetary system is very much threatened by the instability caused by the third world debt problem. A debtor third world with little means to pay for its international trade is of the least use for economic development in the industrialized countries. Therefore, it is of little wonder that the West has become interested in debt relief for the third world.<sup>85</sup> Further complicating this picture of interdependency is a gradual rise in power of what is called nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). These forces are in direct competition with nation-states and operate both locally and transnationally. The result is the insertion of another layer of players in world and domestic politics, creating what James Rosenau has termed a "bifurcated" world system composed of two "state-centric" and "multi-centric" systems which have lives of their own

but interact with each other as well.<sup>86</sup>

Ironically, the very world-integrating forces which had consolidated the two-world system became the causes of its transformation into an integrated one-world system, at least economically for the time being. Globalization of economic and political relations and the rapid growth of telecommunications, information and transportation technologies has brought nation-states and their citizens ever closer to each other. Meanwhile, the spread of international trade, global finance, and multinational corporations has further helped to break the boundaries between the two world systems. The universalization of demand for human rights, democracy, social justice, and environmental safety soon followed. Finally, the demise of the very Cold War ideology became a source of new world integration, so well symbolized by the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequent German reunification.

The primary force that has melted the ice between the East and the West was President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. Even his direct rival, President Bush, had to praise him for "instituting reforms that changed the world" and for "his uncommon vision and courage in replacing [the] old orthodoxy."<sup>87</sup> Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika opened the door to a revolution in world politics that continues to transform international relations toward a safer, less dogmatic and more pluralistic world. His courageous concession to the U.S. made the historic INF and START Treaties possible, while his gallant redefinition of socialism has brought market back to where it once operated: streets of the old East Bloc. A new kind of outlook in economic development is also gaining ground, promoting a hybrid "third way" in which contributions of market and planning mechanisms, private and public sectors, domestic resources and foreign investment and trade, global interdependence of interests, and international cooperation are acknowledged.<sup>88</sup> Moreover, while individualism is on the rise, concern for the social and cultural aspects of life is receiving added attention in the emerging development paradigm. All these changes have brought capitalism and socialism closer, melting them into each other.

However, the world-integrating forces have generated their counterparts, namely the world-disintegrating forces, which are undermining the emerging

world unity, leading to the creation of a multipolar world system. These forces include, above all, the relative economic decline and crises in the hegemonic nations of the U.S. and the USSR and a corresponding growth in productive and competitive powers of Japan, the EEC (particularly Germany), and the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). No less responsible for the emerging world discord were the rising level of world education and mass awareness, growing ethnic and gender consciousness, widening cultural and religious diversities, and the mounting populist and nationalist resistance movements in the third world. At the same time, the nuclear parity between the two postwar superpowers has led to increasing brevity among the less-powerful nations and thus to further chaos in the world order in which the weaker nations were, more or less, forcibly incorporated. Lastly, as the two postwar blocs have weakened and lost their internal coherence, we are witnessing the emergence of what I like to call pan-continentalism and neonationalism, both of which feed into the rising neomercantilism and regionalism in international trade and capital flows.

As Paul Kennedy has demonstrated, no nation can lead the world or even remain a great power without a solid economic strength.<sup>89</sup> The problem is further complicated since economic strength in international system, just as military strength, is measured in relative terms; and that without economic strength, military strength can not be sustained for any significant period of time. Yet relative strength is not an immutable state; on the contrary, it is an ever changing phenomenon rooted in the laws of change and uneven economic growth rates across nations. Thus, great powers may become weaker (fall) or grew stronger (rise) relative to each other as time passes. The rate of this uneven development may be retarded or accelerated but it can not be stopped or reversed by normal economic means since factors that contribute to it remain largely outside the sphere of influence of any given great power. For example, the new pattern of uneven development in the capitalist world has resulted from the growing globalization of the world political economy, a transformation that could not be controlled by the superpowers or their new rivals. In the past, the great powers resorted to wars in response to secular shifts in balance of power among them. In the present age, however, nuclear

weapons have become a fetter to a global war, making that solution impossible. Thus, while economic strength is the only feasible means to great power status, its sustenance has become increasingly difficult as the world political economy changes unevenly.

The U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) has declined from about half of world gross product in 1950 to less than a quarter of it in 1989. Compared to OECD's total, its GDP fell from 51 percent in 1965 to 37 percent in 1987. The U.S. also has lagged behind in per capita growth rate when compared to EEC, Japan, and the third world as a whole. The country also puts a smaller percentage of its gross national product (GNP) into investment (16 percent in 1987) than does Japan, Germany or the OECD as a whole (30, 20, and 21 percent respectively).<sup>90</sup> Japan has also led the U.S. in new stock sales since the stock market crash in October 1987. For example, in the first 8 months of 1989, "Japanese corporations raised more than \$110 billion, compared with \$20 billion by American companies."<sup>91</sup> Americans also save and invest less and consume more when compared to their rivals in OECD. The result has been a decline in productivity and a gradual transformation of the economy from one based on manufacturing to one dominated by services and low-paying jobs.<sup>92</sup> Among a small group of dynamic manufacturing industries still remaining in the 1980s, the military-industrial complex was in distinctive lead because of President Reagan's huge defense spending.

In the meantime, the U.S.' direct foreign investment and share of total world exports have declined substantially and the country has become a debtor nation. The United States' nonfinancial debt stood at about \$9.5 trillion or 180 percent of the nation's GNP in 1989, of which about \$3 trillion was the government's share. The huge private debt is taking its toll: "The number of Americans declaring personal bankruptcy has grown by 152 percent in six years, from 285,000 in 1984 to 718,000 last year [1990], and the trend shows no sign of abating immediately..."<sup>93</sup> The estimated interests on the government debt alone in 1989 was \$200 billion. This is a figure close to two thirds of the defense budget or 15 percent of all government spending. By 1993, the government debt is estimated to hit \$4 trillion.<sup>94</sup> A part of this debt is owned by foreign nationals and was incurred to finance a growing budget

deficit which grew to a historic peak during the Reagan years when defense budget skyrocketed. In 1991 it is \$279 billion and will rise to \$362 billion in 1992.<sup>96</sup> The U.S.'s twin deficits (budget and trade) have, in recent years, been major sources of worry for both its allies and competitors. In particular, the country's deficit spending strategy has led to increased interest rate and the consequent inflow of capital from Overseas including the third world.<sup>96</sup> The foreign-ownership of the debt has also increased the specter of a "hard landing" for the economy at some future point. Meanwhile, foreign purchases of American concerns continue to climb, with British, French and Japanese in the lead.<sup>97</sup> The U.S. is also suffering from an over-globalization of its large and major firms. They are no longer controllable by Washington or useful for foreign policy purposes.

Transformation of the economy from a welfare into a warfare system under the Reagan administration was partly responsible for this debt explosion.<sup>98</sup> While the economy was stabilized at a moderate rate of growth, inflation and employment in the 1980s, military spending increased to the historic peacetime peak of \$300 billion in 1990. Attempts to reduce the size of the government and its non-military expenditures largely failed. On the contrary, the state became even bigger under Reagan who carried the banner of "the least government the best government" with him to the White House. Policies of the conservative governments under Presidents Reagan and Bush have also led to significant inequalities and social problems: taxation became less progressive, income inequality widened, social programs were reduced, educational standard declined, the cost of health care became prohibitive, infant mortality rate increased, the number of homeless people swelled, drugs became a national problem, crime rate soared, and pollution became a major source of public concern. For example, "from 1979 to 1987 the standard of living for the poorest fifth of the population fell by 9 percent. At the same time, the living standard of the top fifth rose 19 percent."<sup>99</sup>

As a consequence of Reaganomics, violence has also increased substantially. A study at the National Center for Health Statistics indicated that the U.S. is by far the homicide capital of the industrialized nations. For example, "4,223 American men from 15 to 24 years old were killed in 1987,

a rate of 21.9 per 100,000... the rate for black men in that age group was 85.6 per 100,000, an increase of 40 percent since a low in 1984. In contrast, the rates in other countries for men in the same age group ranged from a high of 5 per 100,000 in Scotland, to a low of 0.3 per 100,000 in Austria."<sup>100</sup> Another study finds that "young men in Harlem are less likely to reach age 40 than are young men in Bangladesh, one of the poorest and most overcrowded of all nations."<sup>101</sup>

At the same time, tremendous corruption has ravaged Savings and Loan Associations, major banks, stock markets, and public offices.<sup>102</sup> The cost of the S & L bail out to the American tax payers is estimated at no less than \$300 billion in the next 30 years, a rather conservative estimate.<sup>103</sup> Even more pervasive and dangerous is political corruption. In a report on "The Trouble With Politics", New York Times wrote that "The pursuit of money is a central part of officeholders' lives, and the rules are written to make it almost impossible for politicians to avoid either the appearance or reality of conflict of interest." The report then goes on to say that "The average senator who was elected in 1988 spent \$3.7 million on his or her campaign, a 22 percent rise from only two years before. The winning candidates for House seats spent, on average, \$393,000, an increase of more than 10 percent over 1986."<sup>104</sup> The problem, however, does not end here. The system that has created "a new superstructure of politics that makes ideas harder to discuss and exalts public opinion over leadership."<sup>105</sup> One major consequence of these changes have been a reduced public confidence in the nation's political process with far reaching implication for American democracy: in the last presidential election in 1988 "about half the eligible voters stayed home."<sup>106</sup> The American public is at the same time beset by what Paul Krugman, MIT economist, calls "diminished expectations."<sup>107</sup>

Similarly, the Soviet Union has also been weakened since the 1970s, both politically and economically. Ethnic conflicts and political chaos that have followed the glasnost (openness) since the mid-1980s are crippling the central government's ability to affect an orderly transition to a wholly new society based on the so-called market or democratic socialism. Even in the absence of such conflicts and chaos, the Union would still have to struggle with the

ideological crisis that it is facing at present. The economy particularly has been in bad shape since 1989 when the pace of changes has become increasingly less manageable. Tragically, the economy refuses to improve despite various structural and other adjustment programs that have been or are being implemented. In the meantime, a more drastic perestroika (restructuring) strategy has become harder to implement under the condition of political chaos and lack of consensus among the various domestic players in the Soviet game over a theory of transition to a new system. It is by now obvious that the country has lost its position of leadership in Eastern Europe and its trade with these countries has all but totally collapsed.

A low level of economic growth and labor productivity along with allocative imbalances and structural distortions continue to remain among major economic problems of the Soviet Union. Added to these are a highly centralized bureaucracy that refuses to delegate management authority to those below the power bloc, a comprehensive planning system which finds itself unable to program an extremely complex economy and yet hesitates to make market a full partner, and a property relation that only partly corresponds to greedy human nature. These and other economic problems have also sharpened political struggles at ethnic and republic levels for democracy and decentralization. Meanwhile, the economy is being opened to new ideas and foreign economic players, making a more complex and confusing situation even less manageable, at least in the immediate future.

In sharp contrast to the decline of the U.S. and the USSR, particularly in relative economic terms, Japan, the EEC, China, NICs, and a few other countries have been growing in their productive and competitive abilities, both in absolute and relative terms. These emerging economic powers, without being able to replace the U.S. or the USSR as the world leaders, at least for the time being (particularly for lack of adequate military power), have contributed to the superpowers' gradual demise. This is particularly true in the case of the U.S. whose decline is more relative than absolute, which is the case with the Soviet Union. Ironically, diffusion and relocation of major American transnational firms have been partly responsible for the growing strength of the U.S. competitors. The NICs are, for example, a product of

(among other factors) a new international division of labor (NIDL) that began to develop in the 1970s following the increased direct foreign investment by the American (and Japanese) multinational corporations. The NIDL is based on global industrial production as opposed to the old system which was primarily based on industrial production in the West.<sup>108</sup> In the meantime, the U.S. lost its leading edge in scientific and technological inventions and innovations, particularly to Japan and West Germany, but also to many other nations.<sup>109</sup>

Japan and Germany, both "losers" of World War II, are at present the major sources of world's technological advancements and economic surpluses, far ahead of the "winners" of that war.<sup>110</sup> Many of the leading banks in the world are now Japanese as are such consumer industries as automobiles, computers, televisions, and VCRs. In 1990, e.g., only one U.S. bank ranked among the top 20 in the world compared to 11 of Japan, of which 6 were at the very top.<sup>111</sup> That country also leads the world in electronics, transportation and communication technologies, production management, and manufacturing processes. Japan has also become the number one donor nation with a foreign aid package of over \$10 billion for the third world in 1989, some 1 billion more than the foreign aid granted by the U.S. in 1988.<sup>112</sup> The nation has also taken a leading role in third world debt crisis to such an extent that the American officials "jokingly refer to the 'Brady plan' as the 'Bra-Zawa' plan".<sup>113</sup> Japan has also declared its readiness "to shoulder more of the cost of America's international commitments, as long as it receives more decision-making power in return."<sup>114</sup> These moves will undoubtedly increase Japan's influence in the World and in the United Nations, among other multilateral organizations. In Spring 1990, Japan was also acknowledged as being second to the U.S. in the IMF power structure, having already secured the second-ranking status in the World Bank. In the meantime, Japan's defense budget, already the sixth largest in the world, is rapidly increasing. It is expected that the expanding Japanese military-industrial complex will soon replace the U.S.' military presence in Asia.<sup>115</sup> The specter of a Japanese military build up and its rapprochement with China is already creating tension within the OECD, adding new complications to the existing trade tension within

the so-called group of seven.

Germany is rightly considered "the locomotive of Europe." Its reunification has further increased the nation's economic and political potentials to a significant degree, adding to its already momentous technological progress, production capacities and global market expansion. Along with the rest of EEC nations, Germany is now looking forward to the huge market that the Europe of 1992 promises and to an economic union with the Eastern European nations and perhaps the Soviet Union where it is putting much of its attention and foreign investment resources these days.<sup>116</sup> Under the economic leadership of Germany, a wholly new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has been formed to assist in the speedy transformation of the East and its integration into the re-emerging European capitalist world economy (the original system existed from 1500 to the World War I in 1914). The European bank "is the first of the major international lending institutions in which the United States does not have the power to block important decisions."<sup>117</sup> Germany has also been taking an increasingly more independent approach vis a vis the U.S. in dealing with the Soviet Union and in NATO.<sup>118</sup> Now that Germans are again united, the U.S. can expect further assertiveness on their part.

Significant for the emerging world discord were also rising level of mass education and political awareness, flourishing ethnic and gender consciousness, widening cultural and religious diversities, growing desire for revival of native cultures, and mounting populist and nationalist resistance to underdevelopment, inequality and dictatorship. These trends reflect the growing importance of grassroots politics, informal institutions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as new competitors for the nation-state and interstate formal organizations at domestic and international levels. Along with such nongovernmental internationalizing agents such as multinational corporations and global flow of cultures, information, politics and economics, these new tendencies have also led to a growing tension between centralizing tendencies of "authority-bound" formal structures and decentralizing demands of "authority-free" informal subgroups.<sup>119</sup>

The third world reassertion in the Cold-War period and its wavering

balance-altering allegiance to this or that superpower also helped to increase tension at the world level and create a multipolar system. Therefore, it is no wonder that during the Cold War, all bloody hot wars were fought in the third world with direct or indirect involvement of the two rival superpowers. In the post-Cold War period and as the bipolar world melts down, the third world has become, both a potential friend and a dangerous enemy for developed countries. The dwindling influence of the two superpowers has increasingly emboldened previously less significant regional powers. Meanwhile, as the East-West tension has declined, the North-South conflict has become more direct. The third world is also searching for friendship and assistance in the many poles that are emerging. Consider Saudi Arabia's new warm relations with the Soviet Union, Ethiopia's new cordiality with the U.S., China's growing interaction with Japan, and Iran's expanding ties with the EEC and the Soviet Union. Indeed, in a historic reversal, most third world countries now advocate a development strategy that emphasizes foreign assistance and investment despite their bitter experience with the ballooning debt problem (\$1,300 billion in 1989), trade imbalance, and capital flight (some \$20 billion in 1990, mostly lost to the U.S.).<sup>120</sup> At the same time, the third world is trying to redefine its new priorities on the basis of more reliance on local resources and a "third way" development strategy that will supposedly combine the best of capitalism and socialism, a model also attempted in the post-Cold War Eastern Europe. However, this new approach must be viewed in the context of third world dependency upon the capitalist world market for economic growth in the medium-term.

The nuclear parity between the U.S. and the USSR is another important factor in the emergence of the multipolar world. While this development has made any major confrontation between the two superpowers almost impossible in the foreseeable future, it has emboldened smaller power centers around the world (particularly those with economic strength). Added to this trend is a new pressure on the superpowers to contain their arms race at a time that mass destructive weapons are being proliferated at a frightening speed.<sup>121</sup> Meanwhile, the Warsaw Pact has disappeared and NATO will not last for long even at the present feeble level. Moreover, as the two postwar blocs have lost

their internal coherence, member nations are attempting to create their own security forces. In particular, Japan is expanding its defensive capability at a rapid rate and the European nations are forming a new Europe-wide security order. China is already a major military force and its potential to develop into a world superpower, particularly in case of a possible alliance with Japan, should not be underestimated. The military strength of many third world nations has also increased substantially in recent years and in such critical areas as nuclear and chemical weapons testing, production or use. Iraq was one example; others include Brazil and India to name only the two most significant cases. Thus, while the two superpowers have achieved a stable parity and are forced to contain their absurd arms race, other nations are taking advantage of the situation by producing chaos or strengthening their relative military power.

Meanwhile, a neomercantilist tendency is undermining the emerging world unity, within the Western alliance in particular.<sup>122</sup> Neomercantilism is basically reflected in a growing selective protectionism in world trade, rising jingoism in international diplomacy, and increasing (rather than decreasing) government involvement in both domestic and global political economies.<sup>123</sup> It is different from the old Western mercantilism which used brute force in the form of colonialism and military interventions to further its trade interests. Neomercantilism is based on an emerging neonationalism, which is in turn based on a new definition of the "nation-state". In sharp contrast to the old conception of nation-state as a politically independent territory to which one related with intense belongingness, loyalty and patriotism, the new concept focuses on the shared destiny and management of that politically independent entity. Thus, issues such as democracy and participation have become integral parts of a definition of a nation-state and of neonationalism.

Neonationalism is also developing along the lines of ethnic, religious, and continental interests focused on the economic well-being and cultural distinctiveness of the respective community. Thus, pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism, pan-Africanism, pan-Europeanism, pan-Americanism and pan-Asianism are in the rise again. Off these interests, pan-continentalism is becoming a dominant

feature of the emerging neonationalism and of international political economy. An indication of this trend is the rise in regional trading groups, largely demarcated along the existing continental lines. This is partly so because the new one-world system is also polarized along continental and regional lines. Significantly, the European nations are actively promoting pan-Europeanism, based on Eurocentrism, at the expense of the prevailing pan-Westernism which includes North America. Ideas such as the Europe of 1992, a European United Nations (the Paris Charter), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or a "Common European Home," to use Gorbachev's favored phrase, are reflections of this new trend.<sup>124</sup> Similarly, Asian and African politicians and intellectuals have increasingly become conscious of their continental interests and views. "The next century is the Asia Century" or "Africa will rise again" is commonly heard nowadays in the Asian intellectual circles.

Thus, simultaneously with the breaking of the old boundaries between the two poles of power and the emergence of new players in world scene, we are witnessing a progressive division of the "global village" into a multipolar world system in which many small and large economic, political and cultural clusters are expected to engage in competition and cooperation. This conception of multi-polarity refutes unipolarity (the U.S.) and is based on certain assumptions that need further clarification. The world is still bipolar when military strength is considered (the U.S. and the USSR); it is tri-polar when economic strength is used as a criterion (the U.S., Japan, and EEC); and it is multipolar when cultural and political-economic differences are emphasized.<sup>125</sup> Yet, the bipolarity and tripolarity conditions may be considered transitional as the world moves beyond the Cold War era. Moreover, these conditions reduce international players to major nation-states, as realist and neorealist models do, ignoring many smaller, more dynamic nation-states and numerous subgroups and NGOs (ethnic, racial, cultural and gender organizations, transnational firms, multilateral and bilateral agencies, etc.) that have become active and effective at local and global levels. When all these players and the transitory nature of the present stage are considered, then "multipolar" becomes a better adjective for defining the emerging world

system than rival characterizations.

#### **b. Diminishing Utility of Offensive Force**

The Cold War international relations were largely regulated on the basis of the assumption that offensive force, military or otherwise, may be used to achieve foreign policy objectives. While this might have been an acceptable assumption for the pre-1970s world, it does not apply to the present global reality. Specifically, I argue that the utility or usefulness of offensive (i.e., military) force in gaining societal hegemony in the current world environment is diminishing to a significant degree. Offensive forces has also become increasingly unacceptable thereby leading to a more determined resistance to it, which results making it less effective in gaining intended objectives. Societal hegemony may be defined as the ability to control foreign and domestic policies of nation-states within the world system in accordance with the hegemon's needs and purposes. A hegemon may be a nation-state or a dictator. Offensive force, on the other hand, refers to any violent capacity used to introduce, postpone or reverse a change in and/or impose domination and control (partial or complete) over something in spite of its will or the will of the larger community to which it is a loyal and useful member. This is distinguished from defensive force which is used to resist such a change and/or domination and control. An offensive force that intends to reverse an original offense is a defense. What makes a force offensive is not its application but the intention behind its use. Note that offensive and defensive forces may still be used to destroy an enemy or impose temporary conditions. They may also change place in the course of a struggle; thus, an offensive force can take the form of a defensive force and vice versa. It is therefore needless to say that force continues to retain its destructive power; the destroyer, however, cannot hope to advance its cause.

Examples of failed application of offensive force in recent international history include the American wars against Vietnam and Nicaragua, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Iraqi war against Iran and its annexation of Kuwait, Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, South Africa's war against the resistance movement in Namibia and the African National Congress,

and the civil wars in Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Liberia, and El Salvador, to name only a few but important cases. While these episodes have inflicted tremendous damage on the defending parties, they have not been able to achieve their real aim, namely to impose their desired changes in or domination over the conflicting parties. It is notable that what President Reagan and his Contra forces could not achieve in Nicaragua was achieved by an election: the ouster of Sandinista from power, at least for the time being. It is equally notable that the Afghan Mujahedins should succeed in forcing the Soviet army out of their country but fail to overthrow the ostensibly unpopular Najibullah regime afterward?

Ostensibly, the examples of the Falklands (Malvinas) war between the British and Argentineans, the U.S. invasions of Grenada and Panama, and the U.S.-led war against Iraq do not fit in the thesis I have advanced here. However, they were either insignificant in world politics - the Grenada and Panama invasions - or were defensive as in the case of Falklands (Malvinas) and Iraq. Recall that British soldiers were not fighting to take the Island from the Argentines. On the contrary, they went to war to retake it from the Argentineans who had used offensive force to regain possession of their own island which was under the British domination. The U.S.-led war against Iraq was also "defensive" in that it was fought against an invader, a would-be hegemon, an offensive force; its aims were clearly defensive in nature although the Bush administration used the occasion to flex its muscles and leave a demonstration effect. Other examples of defensive use of force in recent times include the national resistance movements in El Salvador, Ethiopia, South Africa, the West Bank and Gaza, Liberia, and Chad.

We have also witnessed the collapse of dictators (although some have re-emerged in other forms) in many parts of the world including Iran, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Chile, Brazil, South Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Haiti, Spain, Portugal, and Romania to name the most significant cases of the last decade or so. Demand and political pressure for democratization and decentralization of the state-people relationship is also growing throughout the world. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Communist and Workers' parties have lost their grip over these societies, while such changes could soon shake China,

Cuba and other socialist countries. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela was freed after about 28 years in the prisons of the apartheid regime which has also been forced to eliminate its legal foundation, recognizing the African National Congress and negotiate with it for a "new" South Africa. Finally, the Palestinians' intifadah (uprising) in the West Bank and Gaza against Israeli occupation has created wide cracks in Israeli politics and national unity; its impact has created the strongest urgency yet for a solution to the Palestinian question.

This impotency of offensive force in my opinion reflects the new global condition brought about by the profound structural changes outlined above. Specifically, the world-integrating forces have brought nation-states ever closer to each other in an integrated and interdependent world system, making them sensitive to each other's behavior, policies and needs. At the same time, the world-disintegrating forces have created a multipolar world system with many smaller poles of power, nation-states and NGOs, reducing the power of the main hegemony and thus creating a crisis of leadership. Thus, the global community is caught between two diametrically opposing tendencies of integration and disintegration, generating significant tension and instability in the world order.

Under this condition, international balance of power and political stability has become a complex matter and extremely sensitive to any major change, particularly to those brought about by the use of offensive, balance-altering, forces. This sensitivity was well demonstrated by the unprecedented global unity against Iraq. Given the enormity and complexity of international infrastructures and the nuclear parity between the old hegemony, only forces which are truly enormous in their destructive or countervailing power could be considered balance-altering. Note also that under the bipolar system, a simple balance of power was largely achieved by means of a force-parity formula between the two hegemony. In the multipolar system, on the other hand, an overall balance of power has to be negotiated among all poles of powers in the system.<sup>126</sup>

### c. Reaction from the superpowers

How have the superpowers reacted or adjusted their foreign and domestic policies with respect to these changes? In a nutshell, the USSR is far ahead of the U.S. in conforming to the ongoing global restructuring and the Soviet domestic reality. The Soviet policy makers seem to have a fairly well articulated understanding of their nation's problems and capabilities, relative international standing, the multipolar world, and implications of all these for defense, use of force, and importance of economic growth. Their problem is an ideological one, related to a lack of a theory of practice and indecision regarding how best to manage the declining conditions at home and changing circumstances abroad. For all these and other reasons, the present Soviet leadership has also discarded the nation's ambition for a superpower status in world politics.

Significantly, Gorbachev, Time Magazine's "Man of the Decade" and the winner of the Nobel peace prize, was first among world leaders who detected the ongoing global restructuring and reformulated Soviet domestic and foreign policies accordingly in an astonishingly short time. Without his glasnost, perestroika and "new thinking" in foreign policy the world would still be frozen in the Cold War era.<sup>127</sup> As was clearly outlined in Gorbachev's historic speech at the U.N. in December of 1988, Soviet foreign policy no longer views the world in bipolar terms, divided into antagonistic camps of socialism and capitalism, a view that formed the cornerstone of its foreign policy for most of the Cold War period. Instead, it is actively promoting a view of the world that corresponds to the multipolar conception and as an essentially unified and interdependent system of nation-states in which the "interests of humanity", to use Gorbachev's term, take precedence over class or national interests.

Accordingly, the Soviet foreign policy now calls for a "balancing" of such interests across the globe by means of negotiation and U.N. mediation. It also insists that there will be no winner in a nuclear war and that security has to be based on political rather than military instruments. Arms control and settlement of regional conflicts should receive particular attention. Gorbachev has also introduced "the principle of defensive (or

reasonable) efficiency and defensive (or non-offensive) defense in order to bring the political effects and the economic costs of defense policy under control."<sup>128</sup> Thus, the new Soviet military strategy focuses on prevention of war and ability to retaliate in case of an attack. Gorbachev has already promised in the U.N. that the Soviet Union will not strike first, a commitment that the U.S. refuses to make.

Further, Gorbachev has insisted that socialism and capitalism cannot develop in isolation because they are parts of one and the same human civilization. This view is radically different from the pre-Gorbachev coexistence policy which was based on the assumption that the correlation of forces in the world was moving in favor of socialism.<sup>129</sup> Indeed, Gorbachev's new thinking even gives priority to peace over socialism if a conflict was to emerge between the two systems. Holloway summarizes this Gorbachev's perspective clearly: "In an interdependent world it is cooperation in defense of universal values, not the conflict between capitalism and socialism, that is at the heart of international relations."<sup>130</sup>

The genuineness of the new policy is reflected in a number of policy practices: (1) decision to cut the Soviet army by almost about a million men; (2) dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON; (3) signing of the INF and START treaties with the U.S., both of which were made possible only because of tremendous Soviet concessions; and (4) promotion of radical democratic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union where political pluralism is replacing Stalinism, and market mechanisms are being promoted to complement state planning and create economic pluralism or free-market socialism.<sup>131</sup> The world nervously watches and Soviet society trembles under various contradictions and conflicts as Gorbachev puts his views to practice. His main challenge now is how to resolve the problem of rising neonationalism, without relying on the repressive measures used by Stalin but through accommodation as in the West. Whether he will finish the task that he has embarked on remains to be seen; one thing is, however, certain: after Gorbachev, the world and the Soviet Union will be radically different from what they were before he took office in 1985.

In sharp contrast, the U.S. policy makers seem baffled and uncertain

about the nature and teleology of the ongoing global restructuring process and are detached from the nation's enormous domestic problems. They are equally unprepared to deal with the implications of global changes and local declines for the U.S. relative international standing and foreign policy. For the lack of a better vision, many of them consider global changes in terms of a transition from socialism to capitalism and a defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War struggle. Francis Fukuyama speaks for many in the Bush administration when he conceptualizes the changes in the East as reflecting the end of history and the ultimate victory of liberal democracy over Communism in the historic battle of ideas.<sup>132</sup> Just like many policy makers, he fails to recognize or acknowledge the enormous negative consequences of that struggle for the U.S.' domestic and international conditions. To give one example, the New York Times called the military-industrial environmental contamination "almost unimaginable." The cleanup project is estimated to cost "\$400 billion, making it four times as costly as the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo space programs combined and a \$100 billion more than the building of the interstate highway system."<sup>133</sup>

Despite their perception of the USSR as declining and irrelevant to world politics, in words of one analyst playing "second Banana" on the world stage, American policy makers continue to react too over cautiously to the emerging global trends and Soviet initiatives in international relations.<sup>134</sup> Worse yet, they have only followed the Soviet lead whenever they responded to such initiatives, without almost any significant original contribution of their own to the processes that are creating a new world order. Indeed, as Dimitri Simes wrote, "Mr. Gorbachev leaves American diplomacy with no choice but to adjust to the new international environment or to be constantly outmaneuvered by Moscow."<sup>135</sup> The U.S. has also used the Soviet demand for change as an opportunity to extract significant concessions from Gorbachev. It has also used the vacuum created by the Soviet withdrawal from the third world to intervene in their domestic affairs and impose wars as in Grenada, Panama and Iraq.

There is as yet hardly any consensus on U.S. domestic and foreign policy at the threshold of the new world. In particular and just like in the past,

the current debate is dominated by the Hamiltonian "interventionists" and the Jeffersonian "isolationists."<sup>136</sup> Note that this division does not follow the conservative-liberal divide, since interventionist and isolationists could come from either of the two tendencies.<sup>137</sup> The emerging global order, argue the interventionist policy makers and their "organic intellectuals", is unipolar and ripe for a new American paradigm of world leadership. Under this condition, U.S. foreign policy should adopt a unilateral approach to promoting global peace and economic well-being toward a new "Pax Americana".<sup>138</sup> They fail in at least two counts: to acknowledge the constraining impact of domestic problems on such leadership, a problem Paul Kennedy has called "imperial overstretch"; and to take account of the fact that even during its "golden age" in the early Cold War period, the U.S. could not even manage its part of the world effectively and remained entangled in a good number of cases in the third world, the Middle East in particular. It is not astonishing that they became disappointed with President Bush's multilateral approach to the Kuwaiti crisis and his unwillingness to finish the job by going all the way to Baghdad; as the New York Times wrote, they had "hoped the war would give rise to a Pax Americana."<sup>139</sup>

If the limits to American power yesterday was real, it is more so today when domestic conditions are rapidly deteriorating as international conditions pose greater challenge. The fact that the rival superpower, the Soviet Union, has declined and the war in the Persian Gulf has been won hardly changes the situation in the U.S.' favor. The isolationists, from the right, the left and the center, focus on these and other problems.<sup>140</sup> In particular, Flora Lewis states:

"At the extremes, the right is saying the world is too bad a place, with too many hostile conspirators, for the U.S. to be involved. The left says the U.S. is too bad, too arrogant, too flawed to presume to lead. Both are moving toward a new isolationism, laced with resentment at economic challenges from former clients.

The more moderate ask what the U.S. is doing locked into alliances and supporting a huge military establishment if

there is no longer a serious Soviet threat...

There is concern about deterioration within American society, the foreign debt, the decaying infrastructure, the huge gap between the comfortable and the interclass.<sup>141</sup>

The isolationists call for drastic changes in domestic and international policies and for an "America First" policy. They argue that unless the domestic situation is improved, a successful foreign policy could not be sustained for any significant period of time. Expansion abroad in the absence of domestic economic revitalization and growth could lead to what Paul Kennedy has termed "imperial overstretch". Their primary demand is thus for a shift of government attention and public resources from abroad and the military sector towards domestic problems and the economy. They also call for more spending in such critical areas as education, infrastructures, public welfare and the environment.

The interventionist strategy was revived under the Reagan presidency, which began with extreme hostility toward the Soviet Union, socialist countries and nonconforming third world nations. The President initially used to refer to the Soviet Union as an "evil empire". The Reagan quasi doctrine postulated a new world order in which "nondemocratic" (meaning socialist and radical third world) governments were considered "illegitimate". His prescription for such governments was simple but horrifying: "Against such illegitimate governments, and particularly against Marxist-Leninist governments, there is a right of intervention."<sup>142</sup> The U.S. was also said to have "moral responsibility" to aid pro-Western insurgencies against them. The "inspiration of the Reagan Doctrine [was] offensive", wrote Robert Tucker. "Its intent [was] to show that communist revolutions [were] indeed reversible, thereby exposing a crucial myth."<sup>143</sup>

President Reagan was hardly successful and his major project to overthrow the Sandinistas in Nicaragua failed miserably; ironically, they were ultimately driven out of power not by the Contras or the "Freedom Fighters" as the President used to call them, but through a democratic electoral process. Nor were the changes in the Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union a result of the Reagan Doctrine; rather they are best characterized as Gorbachev's

revolutions! President Reagan also visited the Soviet Union, accepted accommodation with it, changed his view of the country from an "evil empire" to a "peace-loving nation", and signed an important INF Treaty with Gorbachev.<sup>144</sup> Despite these normalizing steps, he continued to remain a prisoner of the obsolete Cold-War rhetoric and policies.

The "more gradualist and less visionary" Bush administration has initially followed a similar policy of slowly reducing tension with the Soviet Union in certain foreign policy areas while remaining loyal to the outdated approaches to foreign policy in other areas.<sup>145</sup> The U.S. invasion of Panama occurred when Soviet Union was watching Nicholas Ceausescu's fall in Romania. Just like President Reagan, President Bush also believes in "American moral responsibility" and its right to intervene, by force if necessary, whenever and wherever a member of the international system violates its set rules, functions and procedures. More unacceptable yet, the President has claimed that the U.S. is the only country with such moral responsibility because it is the only country on the earth that has the means to back it up.<sup>146</sup>

With the Soviet withdrawal from world politics in recent years and because of other significant global changes, the Bush administration was expected to undertake a major re-evaluation of its strategy in the Middle East and its foreign policy in general. As was demonstrated in the course of the Kuwaiti crisis and after, such an effort has not yet been made although certain shifts are detectable. Days after the Iraqi invasion, President Bush set a non-negotiable agenda for Iraq and kept his option open for the use of force. Besides, as realization of some of the items in President Bush's demands for the resolution of the crisis could not be possible in the course of a normal diplomatic effort, the need for the use of force was already built into his agenda. As the New York Times wrote, "... Mr. Bush was determined to go on the offensive from the start, against the military... the President only affected a posture of due deliberation."<sup>147</sup> The U.S. also used the U.N. and the American military might to intimidate Saddam Hussein rather than encourage him to negotiate. This is not to say that Saddam Hussein would have negotiated in good face, but to indicate the failure of the Bush administration to make a serious attempt in that direction.

The Bush administration is yet to produce a coherent policy for the post-Cold War period. As William Quandt explained to Andrew Rosenthal of the New York Times, "we [Americans] didn't have a grand design going in and we don't have a grand design coming out".<sup>148</sup> When and whether a coherent policy will be formulated remains to be seen. As Michael Mandelbaum has aptly summarized:

The post-Cold War international agenda is beginning to take shape. It is not likely to be dominated by military confrontations between great nuclear powers, or even by crises like the one in the Persian Gulf. Instead, economic issues will dominate, particularly as formerly communist Europe and countries in other regions move toward market institutions and practices. For these challenges President Bush's style of leadership seems less appropriate. The attributes he lacks - the capacity to define clearly American interests abroad and the policies necessary to pursue them, a mastery of the intricacies of economic affairs, and a determination to redress the chronic imbalances of the American economy - may well be the qualities required for effective leadership in the post-Cold War era.<sup>149</sup>

Yet, and as David Boren, Democrat of Oklahoma wrote, "Unless we are prepared to develop and implement a new American strategy in international politics, we could will see our own influence decline in parallel with the Soviet Union's."<sup>150</sup>

## 5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

This final part concludes the arguments made above and advances a few policy recommendations. In sum, I have argued that the U.S. is motivated by a new paradigm of world leadership in the post-Cold War era. The war in the Persian Gulf was partly, if not predominantly, fought to underscore this new orientation in U.S. foreign policy. The perspective finds its advocates in "interventionists" throughout American foreign policy establishment. However, the U.S. faces tremendous odds for the full realization of this dream. Even with the victory in the Persian Gulf and the Soviet cooperation, the U.S. has

ended up with many seemingly unmanageable problems in the Middle East, not the least of which is the very defeated Iraq which continues to remain rebellious regarding its weapons of mass destruction.

The ongoing global restructuring process places additional new obstacles on the U.S. drive for a hegemonic role in world politics. In particular, the global community is moving away from a bipolar toward a multipolar world system, caught between two diametrically opposing tendencies of integration and disintegration. While the world-integrating forces have brought nation-states ever closer to each other, making them more interdependent than ever before, world-disintegrating forces have created many smaller poles of power, reducing the power of the main hegemons and thus creating a crisis of leadership. Consequently, a global multi-centric balance of power is coming into existence and world political stability is becoming increasingly more sensitive to any balance-altering offensive force as was indicated by the world's decisive response to Iraq's annexation of Kuwait in August of 1990.

The new situation has led to several important changes in world politics and insinuates significant implications for world peace and development. First of all, utility of offensive force has diminished and under this condition, undesirable status quo wherever it may exist, cannot be sustained. Dictators would also have to change their strategies as they did in the 1980s. Nor could civil or international wars be considered means for gaining dominance over the others as in the past. Thus, it can be expected that the current competition among nations to build offensive forces will be replaced by technological competition for building means for show of force and deterrence.

Since the military cost of force projection and deterrence is significantly lower than the military cost of building an offensive force apparatus or waging wars, less money will and should go into the military and warfare in the future. Indeed, the idea of "disarmament for development" will gain increasing global acceptability and, as international tension and militarism decreases, the "peace dividend" will grow in size in many parts of the world. Whereas military (offensive) force is diminishing in terms of its acceptability and effectiveness, economic force has become the most popular

means of influence and domination. Japan and Germany have grown into powerful international forces almost solely by means of their economic strength. On the contrary, the United States and the Soviet Union have been increasingly weakened in international politics despite their growing military might. If it is understood that economics is emerging as a field of force, then economic development could become a part of the national defence strategy. This would, in turn, lead to a shift of more resources to non-military sectors. In the meantime, increasing global awareness about environment and resource exhaustibility is expected to cause a change of policy from spending more of such resources on intensive, as oppose to extensive, projects.

Equally growing is the utility of defensive force which is used to resist offensive force or domination and neutralize their impacts. This particular trend implies that a more democratic and interdependent (domestically and internationally) course of development is becoming possible for smaller, less powerful countries. It also implies that the third world will enjoy an increased negotiating power vis-a-vis the developed world in the coming years. The interdependency of the world, however, makes it impossible for the third world to use that power negatively as it needs to also pursue a policy of integration in order to realize the full potential of the world-integrating forces. This trend toward a growing utility of defensive force is assisted by the increasing utility of multilateral negotiation and the growing effectiveness of the United Nations in resolving many stalemated international and national conflicts over the past several years.

Indeed, the more military force becomes useless in resolving international disputes and national discords, the more nations have-reverted to negotiations through such mediating forces as the United Nations. Examples of "negotiated settlements" include some 22 conflicts throughout the world since 1988. The most notable ones are: the Iran-Iraq war, the Angola-South Africa-Cuba war over Namibia, and the U.S.-USSR-Afghanistan-Pakistan war or hostility over the Afghan question. Most these disputes have been supervised or mediated by the United Nations which has been activated in recent years as never before, reaching a new peak during the Kuwaiti crisis. The agency is also being supported by almost all member states, a rather unprecedented

phenomenon. Even the United States, its main antagonist in the Cold War period, has been gradually moving in the direction of strengthening the agency. After years of refusing to pay its share of the U.N. budget, the U.S. paid its debt of about a billion dollars in 1990.<sup>151</sup> It must be noted, however, that the U.S. is now attempting to use the U.N. to legitimize its "go-it-alone tendency" in international politics as was demonstrated during the Kuwaiti crisis.<sup>152</sup>

Negotiated transitions are also promoting political democracy in many parts of the world. Examples include the countries of Eastern Europe, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Burma, Algeria, and Nicaragua. As a result, more people have been brought into national political administration and development process, partly satisfying the current thirst for participation and decentralization. In short, a new political culture seems to be emerging in the world. Whatever the nature of the emerging ideologies, it is almost certain that the Cold War ideological rigidity concerning the public, private, and cooperative sectors is waning, while the idea of a pluralistic economy along with emerging political pluralism is gaining increasing acceptability. The various sectors, rather than being considered in antagonistic terms, will be viewed in terms of their intense cooperation. The present gap between planning and market forces will also be bridged in the new approach.

To be sure, the old trends continue and the new trends have yet to become material forces to significantly reshape our planet. Yet, even at their emerging stage, the new trends have had noticeable positive impacts on intersocietal relationships at international and national levels. Democracy is spreading with an unprecedented speed across the globe and there has already emerged a growing sense of optimism for world peace and development and for a more sensible and flexible world order. To appreciate the new age, one only needs to take note of the tremendous changes that have occurred in the U.S.-USSR relations in the last few years. The Kuwaiti crisis was an aberration, something that can happen again, but only if another attempt is made to change the status quo.

If these trends are of any serious indications, then having ambition

alone can not guarantee the U.S. a leadership position in the world; rather it needs to develop a new paradigm of social change and leadership in line with the emerging political culture. That paradigm should take account of both domestic problems and global issues and abandon the old myths and modes of operations in favor of new realities and alternative perspectives. A paradigm that assumes the liberal democracy is the only surviving alternative, offensive force can be used effectively, the world is unipolar, and the status quo could be maintained or altered in favor of a "pax-Americana" is simply irrelevant to the present multipolar world where a wide range of possibilities and constraints are emerging. The real challenge for American intellectuals and policy makers, the "isolationists" in particular, is to theorize and put to practice this new paradigm.

Concerning the Middle East, a more prudent policy should encourage a better understanding of the region, utilize the U.N. more fully and emphasize negotiation principle. The U.S.' interests are best served by promoting peace, democracy and reform in the Middle East. Instead of relying on an Al-Saud or an Al-Sabah family for protection of its interests, the U.S. should build a lasting alliance with the aspiring middle-class intelligentsia and help it transform the region along more democratic lines. This is a more credible policy than reverting to the obsolete Nixon doctrine or questing for the world leadership in abstract terms. The Kuwaiti crisis also indicated that a better approach to countering a balance-altering offensive force is the collective will and conscience of the world, the United Nations, rather than separate action by individual states. The U.S. should make every attempt to strengthen the U.N. role in mediating international and regional conflicts. The U.S. must also apply the same standards to all outstanding Middle East conflicts. Application of a double standard will not be acceptable to the international community in the newly emerging world.

American interests would also be served best if the U.S. improves its image in the Middle East and the image of the Middle East in the U.S. It is unfortunate that the Middle East, one of the oldest world civilization, home of the three major world religions, and an ethnically rich community, should be seen in terms of the worst possible stereotypes: in terms of its oil

wealth, geopolitical importance to the West, internal conflict, and, above all, terrorism. The number of Westerners who think all Middle Easterners are Arabs, all Arabs are Muslim, and all Muslims are terrorist, is by no means insignificant. Only by changing this image can Americans assist in resolving the region's ever-increasing and potentially explosive demographic, social, economic and political problems.

Improving the Middle East's image in the U.S. will demand increased cross-cultural understanding and a more realistic and better treatment of Middle Eastern content education in the U.S. high schools and colleges. Such an education should advocate internationalization of the curriculum as well as incorporation of national-specific perceptions and experiences. As Professor Ali Mazrui has shown a more cultural approach to courses on world politics is particularly critical for a genuine international education.<sup>153</sup> The primary aim of such an education should be to promote negotiation and cross-cultural communication to foster better global relations and understandings. But it should also promote the new understanding that the use of offensive force will not be plausible in the emerging world community. Such an education should, wrote David Boren, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "raise the international sensitivity of the next generation and build strong ties with nations that we had neglected because of our past focus on large bloc and superpower relationships."<sup>154</sup> A major condition for such a learning process involves a pedagogy that combines into a common format what is shared between nations and what divides them, and increases international consciousness through contrasts, comparisons, and mutual influence.<sup>155</sup> The American policy makers, media and the intellectual community have a special responsibility to make this happen. Disappearing ideas usually tend to give rise to restorationist ideologies in the same way that declining empires tend to resist change. Can the U.S. prove an exception to the rule?

## References

1. See New York Times, November 30, 1990, p. A10; October 14, 1990, p. A10; October 9, 1990, p. A12; September 17, 1990, p. A11; and August 26, 1990, p. A15.
2. New York Times, March 7, 1991, p. A8.
3. New York Times, December 1, 1990.
4. James Baker, "Why America Is in the Gulf," Dispatch, vol. 1, no. 10 (November 5, 1990). This is a publication of U.S. Department of State.
5. New York Times, November 14, 1990, p. A14.
6. New York Times, March 7, 1991, p. A8.
7. New York Times, March 7, 1991, p. A8.
8. New York Times, February 7, 1990, p. A13.
9. New York Times, May 13, 1989, p. A6.
10. New York Times, July 28, 1991, p. A14 (editorial).
11. New York Times, February 24, 1990, P. A1.
12. Business Week, August 20, 1990; New York Times, January 4, 1989, p. A21; February 16, 1989, p. D1; and September 30, 1990, p. A1.
13. In an editorial, New York Times wrote that "Before the war, the administration had vacillated between reassuring and provoking Saddam Hussein. Having unwisely doubted an invasion, the President and people closest to him reacted angrily once it occurred." See May 5, 1991.
14. Doug Bandow, "The Myth of Iraq's Oil Stranglehold," New York Times, September 17, 1990, p. A23.
15. New York Times, July 25, 1990, p. A8. See also July 26, 1990, p. A1; July 18, 1990, p. D1; June 28, 1990, p. D1; and June 5, 1989, p. D2.
16. In 1986 when OPEC oil prices sharply declined, George Bush, then Vice President, went to Saudi Arabia to plead for a halt on the Saudi overproduction. "Mr. Bush told the Saudis that their overproduction, by driving down the price, was jeopardizing the American oil industry, in turn undermining the nation's economic strength and security." See New York Times, August 18, 1990, p. A1.
17. New York Times, October 21, 1990, p. 1 (sec. 4). See also New York Times, December 15, 1988, p. A1 and May 23, 1989, p. A1.
18. New York Times, October 25, 1990, p. A1 and December 18, 1990, p. A1.
19. Joel Brinkley, "Israel Asks U.S. for Extra \$13 Billion," New York Times, January 23, 1991, p. A7.
20. New York Times, July 19, 1991, p. A1; July 17, 1991, p. A6; and July 21, 1991, p. E2.

21. Harold H. Saunders, "For Israel, the Danger Is Within," New York Times, December 7, 1990 (op. ed.).
22. William B. Quandt, "Egypt: Now a Strategic Asset," New York Times, August 30, 1990, p. A23.
23. "Autocracy and Democracy in the Sand", New York Times, August 13, 1990, p. A14 (editorial).
24. New York Times, May 21, 1991, p.A20 (editorial). See also Andrew Whitley, "The Dirty War in Kuwait," New York Times (op. ed.).
25. New York Times, September 5, 1990, p. A14.
26. New York Times, September 23, 1990, p. 1E.
27. See also Efraim Karsh, "Myths About Hussein and Iraq," New York Times, August 13, 1990, p. A15.
28. David A. Korn, "Iraq's Criminal Credit Line," New York Times, October 26, 1989, p. A27; and Michael Wines, "U.S. Aid Helped Hussein's Climb; Now, Critics Say, the Bill Is Due," New York Times, August 13, 1990, p. A1.
29. See Flora Lewis, "Cut the Saudis Down to Size," New York Times, July 19, 1991, p. A27. See also New York Times March 27, 1991, p. A1; April 7, 1991, p. 1 (sec. 4); and A. M. Rosenthal, "Why the Betrayal?" New York Times, p. A19.
30. See Newsweek, April 23, 1990, p.45 and April 9, 1990, p. 26; Time, April 9, 1990, p. 44 and April 16, 1990, p. 30; New York Times Magazine, December 8, 1989, p. D1; March 30, 1990; April 3, 1990 (editorial); April 30, 1990, p. A1; August 31, 1990, p. A1; and July 29, 1990, p. E1.
31. New York Times, March 15, 1990, p. A22 (editorial); August 17, 1989, p. A1; February 24, 1990, p. A4; Thomas A. Dine, "Bush's Assault on Israel," New York Times, March 15, 1990, p. A23; and William Safire, "Bush Versus Israel," New York Times, March 26, 1990 (op. ed.).
32. New York Times, September 23, 1990, p. A1. See also March 21, 1991, p. A15; March 23, 1991, p. A22 (editorial); and July 31, 1991. For the text of the July 25, 1990 meeting between Hussein and Glaspie, see New York Times, September 23, 1990, p. A19.
33. New York Times, December 19, 1990, p. A16.
34. New York Times, August 5, 1990, p. 12. See also February 20, 1991, p. A27.
35. New York Times, November 22, 1990, p. A20
36. George Bush, "State of the Union 1991," Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. LXII, no. 9 (February 15, 1991), p. 261.
37. New York Times, December 26, 1990, p. A10; May 28, 1991; and January 25, 1991, p. A11.
38. New York Times, August 20, 1990, p. A6.
39. New York Times, May 1, 1989, p. A11; March 7, 1989, p. A1; and April 28, 1989, p. A1.
40. New York Times, April 19, 1989, p. A8; June 8, 1990; and December 20, 1990, p. A14.

40. New York Times, April 19, 1989, p. A8; June 8, 1990; and December 20, 1990, p. A14.
41. New York Times, August 21, 1990, p. A12.
42. New York Times, November 18, 1990.
43. See William G. Hyland, "Bush's Foreign Policy: Pragmatism or Indecision?," New York Times, April 26, 1989, p. A27; Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1 (1991), p. 6.
44. Flora Lewis, "On or Off the World?" New York Times, February 20, 1990, p. A21.
45. Martin Walker, "The U.S. and the Persian Gulf Crisis," World Policy Journal, vol. 7, no. 4, Fall 1990, p. 796.
46. Quoted in Insight, December 24, 1990-January 7, 1991, p. 14.
47. New York Times, July 28, 1991, p. 12.
48. New York Times, March 31, 1991, p. 1 (section 4).
49. Flora Lewis, "Here We Go Again Arming the Middle East," New York Times, March 21, 1991, p. A23. See also New York Times, September 19, 1990, p. A5 and August 11, 1991, p. 9.
50. Patrick E. Tyler, "Iraq's War Toll Estimated by U.S.," in New York Times, June 5, 1991, p. A5.
51. New York Times, April 25, 1991, p. A12; April 5, 1991, p. A8; and May 1, 1991, p. A24.
52. New York Times, June 16, 1991, p. 3.
53. Anex: Report of the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the immediate post-crisis environment by a mission to the area led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, dated 20 March 1991.
54. New York Times, February 21, 1991, p. A12. See also New York Times, February 9, 1991, p. A7 and Village Voice, July 30, 1991, p. 17.
55. New York Times, April 22, 1991, p. A10.
56. New York Times, July 7, 1991, p. 4.
57. New York Times, August 14, 1991, p. A7.
58. New York Times, October 8, 1990 (editorial); December 10, 1990, p. A1; and February 22, 1991, p. A8.
59. Noam Chomsky, The New World Order, Open Magazine Pamphlet Series, 1991, p. 24.
60. New York Times, November 6, 1990, p. A14 and April 10, 1990, p. D1.
61. Anex: Report of the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq, op.cit., p. 5

62. Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Officials Believe Iraq Will Take Years to Rebuild," in New York Times, June 3, 1991, pp. A1, A8.
63. See also New York Times, June 24, 1991, p. A1.
64. New York Times, July 7, 1991, p. A4.
65. New York Times, April 22, 1991, p. A10.
66. New York Times, August 16, 1991, pp. A1, A12, and D2.
67. See the Democratic Response to the 1991 State of the Union address by Senator George Mitchell. Printed in Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. LXII, no. 9 (February 1991), p. 263. See also New York Times, November 26, 1990 and The Persian Gulf war, Iraq under Fire. DATACENTER, February 1991, p. 22.
68. Flora Lewis, "Cut the Saudis Down to Size", New York Times, July 19, 1991, p. A27.
69. New York Times, October 12, 1990, p. A1 and November 16, 1990, p. A13.
70. See New York Times, February 22, 1991, p. D5.
71. "The Arab sheikh who lost a billion in the cocaine bank," The Sunday Times, July 7, 1991, pp. 1, 20.
72. New York Times, August 2, 1991, p. A1.
73. New York Times, February 7, 1991, p. A1, 17.
74. New York Times, March 25, 1991, p. A9.
75. New York Times, March 7, 1991, p. A8.
76. New York Times, August 27, 1990, p. D1.
77. New York Times, February 28, 1991, p. A11, and February 27, 1991, p. A22.
78. George Bush, "State of the Union 1991," op. cit. p. 261.
79. Theodore Geiger, The Future of the International System: The United States and the World Political Economy, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988; Noam Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War: Essays on Current Crisis and How We Got There, New York: Pantheon Books, 1982; and Robert O. Keohane (ed), Neorealism and Its Critics, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986.
80. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987; Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988; Hague Radice (Ed), International Firms and Modern Imperialism, Penguin, 1975; Immanuel Wallerstein, "Patterns and Perspectives of the Capitalist World-Economy," Comparative Marxism, no 9, 1984, pp. 59-70; and Rhys Jenkins, Transnational Corporations and Uneven Development, NY: Methuen, 1988.
81. Socialist Integration, Moscow: Progress Publishers,
82. Edwin P. Reuben (Ed), The Challenge of the New International Economic Order, Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.

83. Noam Chomsky, The New World Order, op. cit.
84. Stuart Corbridge, "The Asymmetry of Interdependence," Comparative International Development, (Spring), 1988, pp. 3-29; Louis Emmerij (Ed) One World or Several?, Paris: OECD, 1989; and Michael Stewart, The Age of Interdependence; Economic Policy in a Shrinking World, Boston: MIT Press, 1984.
85. WIDER, Debt Reduction, Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University, Study Group Series no. 3, 1989.
86. James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
87. New York Times, July 31, 1991, p. A1.
88. O. Blanchard, et al., World Imbalances: WIDER World Economy Group 1989 Report, Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University, 1989; Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, London: Fontana, 1987; Janos Kornai, The Road to a Free Economy, Shifting from a Socialist System: The Case of Hungary, N.Y.: W. W. Horton & Company, 1990; and John Naisbitt & Patricia Aburdene, Megatrends 2000: Ten New Directions for the 1990s, N. Y.: William Morrow and Company, 1990.
89. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and fall of the Great Powers, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, pp. 536-540.
90. Max W. Corden, "American Decline and the End of Hegemony," in SAIS Review, vol 10, no. 2 (Summer-Fall, 1990), pp. 13-26; and Michael H. Hunt, "American Decline and the Great Debate: A Historical Perspective," in SAIS Review, vol 10, no. 2 (Summer-Fall, 1990), pp. 27-40.
91. New York Times, October 27, 1989, p. A1.
92. Stephen Cohen & John Zysman, Manufacturing Matters: The Myths of the Post Industrial Economy, N.Y.: Basic Books, 1987.
93. New York Times, August 11, 1991, p. E5.
94. New York Times, November 24, 1989 (editorial).
95. New York Times, August 16, 1991, p. A1.
96. O. Blanchard, et al., World Imbalances: WIDER World Economy Group 1989 Report. op. cit.
97. New York Times, July 17, 1990, p. D2.
98. Manuel Castells, "High Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban-Regional Process in the United States," M. Castells (ed), High Technology, Space and Society, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985.
99. New York Times, July 16, 1989, p. A1.
100. New York Times, June 27, 1990.
101. Tom Wicker, "Violence and Hypocrisy," New York Times, July 9, 1990, p. A17.

102. Henry Kaufman, "Wall Street Heads for Darker Days," New York Times, February 23, 1990, p. A31 (on Drexel Burnham's collapse); New York Times, August 13, 1989, p. 1 (sec. 4) (on "H.U.D. Mess"); and August 16, 1991, A1 (Salomon Brothers' illegal bidding in the government securities).
103. Anthony Lewis, "The Cost of Reagan," New York Times, September 7, 1989, p. A27. See also New York Times, July 31, 1990, p. A1 and March 13, 1990, p. D1.
104. New York Times, March 20, 1990, p. A1.
105. New York Times, March 18, 1990, p. A1.
106. "Showdown for Democracy in the House," New York Times, February 6, 1990, p. A28 (editorial).
107. Paul Krugman, The Age of Diminished Expectations, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990.
108. R. B. Cohen, "The New International Division of Labor, Multinational Corporations and Urban Hierarchy," Michael Dear and Allen Scott (eds), Urbanization and Planning in Capitalist Society, N.Y. Methuen, 1981.
109. World Press Review, October 1986, pp. 17-19 and New York Times, January 9, 1989, p. A16.
110. WIDER, Mobilizing International Surpluses for World Development: A WIDER Plan for a Japanese Initiative, Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University. Study Group Series no. 2, and Supplement: A Collection of Comments from the International Press, 1987. See also New York Times, Jan. 19, 1989, p. D26.
111. New York Times, July 21, 1991.
112. New York Times, January 20, 1989, p. A4.
113. "Bra" refers to Nicholas F. Brady, the U.S. Treasury Secretary and "Zawa" to his former Japanese counterpart, Kiichi Miyazawa. See New York Times, April 17, 1989, p. A1.
114. New York Times, March 7, 1989, p. A1.
115. Dov S. Zakheim, "Japan's Emerging Military-Industrial Machine," New York Times, June 27, 1990, p. A23.
116. New York Times, April 3, 1990.
117. New York Times, August 4, 1990, p. L 32.
118. New York Times, April 28, 1989, p. A1.
119. James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, op. cit.
120. O. Blanchard, et al., World Imbalances, op. cit.
45. Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today. N.Y.: Vintage Books (A Carnegie Endowment Book), 1984.
122. New York times, December 27, 1988; December 8, 1990; and July 25, 1989.
123. Theodore Geiger, The Future of the International System, op. cit.

126. Heldley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1977.
127. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, op. cit.; Mikhael Gorbachev, "The October Revolution and Today's World," Soviet Life, January 1987; and Francis Fukuyama, Gorbachev and the New Soviet Agenda in the Third World, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1989.
128. David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," in Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 1 (1988/1989), p. 73.
129. David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," in Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 1 (1988/1989), pp. 66-81; Hooshang Amirahmadi, "The Non-Capitalist Way of Development," Review of Radical Political Economics, vol. 19, no. 1 (Spring 1987), pp. 22-46; and Yedgeniy Primakov, "A New Philosophy of Foreign Policy," The Current Digests of the Soviet Press, June 1988.
130. David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," op. cit.
131. John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene, Megatrends 2000: Ten New Directions for the 1990s, op. cit.
132. Francis Fukuyama, "Are We at the End of history," Fortune, January 15, 1990, pp. 75-78.
133. New York Times, August 5, 1991, p. A1.
134. New York Times, July 30, 1991, p. A7; August 4, 1991, p. 1 (sec. 4); March 7, 1990, p. A13; March 13, 1990, p. A15; and August 12, 1991, p. A14 (editorial): "The Senate found a strange way to celebrate the recent signing of a landmark treaty [START] with the Soviet Union to cut nuclear arms. Within days it voted to deploy anti-missile defenses that could now spur the Soviets to reverse course and build additional arms."
135. Dimitri K. Simes, "If the Cold War is Over, Then What?," New York Times, December 27, 1988.
136. Michael H. Hunt, "American Decline and the Great Debate: A Historical Perspective," in SAIS Review, vol. 10, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 1990), pp. 27-40.
137. Randall Rothenberg, "The Battle of the Columnists: Telling Leaders How to Think," New York Times, Sept. 23, 1990, p. E4.
138. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," in Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1, 1991, pp. 23-33; Richard Spielman, "The Emerging Unipolar World," New York Times, August 21, 1990, p. A27; and Joshua Muravchik, "At Last, Pax Americana," New York Times, January 24, 1991, p. A23.
139. New York Times, August 2, 1991, p. A26 (editorial).
140. Leslie H. Gelb, "Look Homeward," New York Times, April 29, 1991 (op. ed.); and William G. Hyland, "Downgrade Foreign Policy," New York Times, May 20, 1991, p. A15 (op. ed.).
141. Flora Lewis, "On or Off the World?" New York Times, February 20, 1990, p. A21.
142. Robert W. Tucker, "Reagan's Foreign Policy," in Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 1 (1988), pp. 1-27.
143. Robert W. Tucker, "Reagan's Foreign Policy," op. cit.

142. Robert W. Tucker, "Reagan's Foreign Policy," in Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 1 (1988), pp. 1-27.
143. Robert W. Tucker, "Reagan's Foreign Policy," op. cit.
144. Herber Bix, "The INF Treaty", Monthly Review, vol. 40, no. 2 (1988), p. 1-17.
145. Soul Landau, "Imperialism, Bush-Style," New York Times, December 22, 1989, p. A39; and Walter Lafeber, "From Roosevelt, to Wilson, to Bush," New York Times, December 27, 1989, p. A23.
146. George Bush, "State of the Union 1991," op. cit.
147. "Lunging for War?" New York Times, May 5, 1991 (editorial).
148. New York Times, March 24, 1991 (op. ed.).
149. Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy," op. cit.
150. David Boren, "New Decade, New World, New Strategy," New York Times, January 2, 1990, p. A19.
151. New York Times, July 28, 1988, p. A30; April 8, 1990; September 13, 1990, p. A10; and September 24, 1990, p. A18 (editorial).
152. R. K. Ramazani, Future Security in the Persian Gulf: America's Role, Policy Review No. 2, Middle East Insight, Washington, D.C., 1991, pp. 9-10.
153. Ali Mazrui, Cultural Forces in World Politics, London: James Currey, 1990.
154. David Boren, "New Decade, New World, New Strategy," New York Times, January 2, 1990, p. A19.
155. Hooshang Amirahmadi, "From Diversity to Universalism in Planning Education: Toward an Interactive Pedagogy," Ekistics, vol. 55 (1988), pp. 69-76.