

THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE
Modern Islamic World

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VOLUME I

New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1995

gisid khan and his replacement by Muḥammad Raḥīm, chief of the Uzbek Manghīt tribe. The Manghīt dynasty ruled Bukhara until the khanate's transformation into a Soviet puppet state in 1920.

The founder's grandson Shāh Murād (r. 1785–1800) expanded his realm at the expense of Iran and Afghanistan; internally his reign brought a restructuring of the khanate's central bureaucracy and provincial administration. Preferring the title *amīr* over that of *khan*, he and his son Ḥaydar (1800–1826) cultivated the support of the urban population and the '*ulamā*' in an effort to curtail the power of the Uzbek tribal aristocracy and forge a centralized state; it was left to Ḥaydar's son Naṣr Allāh (1827–1860) to crush virtually all potential challenges to his authoritarian rule. Naṣr Allāh also reorganized the Bukharan army to reduce his dependence on tribal levies, but his attempts at military expansion were generally unsuccessful, with virtually constant warfare against the khanate of Khoqand weakening both states on the eve of the Russian advance.

Under Naṣr Allāh's son and successor Muḥaffar (1860–1885), longstanding commercial and diplomatic ties with Russia gave way to armed conflict as Russian troops, soon after their conquest of Tashkent in 1865, engaged Bukharan forces. A string of defeats induced the Amīr to sign a treaty with Russia in June 1868, ceding the region of Samarkand to direct Russian rule but retaining formal sovereignty as a vassal of the Russian tsar within the remainder of the khanate. Russian domination brought few changes under Muḥaffar, but under his son 'Abd al-Aḥad (1885–1910) the completion of a rail line through the khanate in 1887 led to increased Russian influence in Bukhara's internal economic, social, and political development.

Both 'Abd al-Aḥad and his son Sayyid 'Ālim (1910–1920) effectively suppressed internal opposition in the form of liberal reformist circles inspired by Western political and social thought. Following the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, however, Bukharan reformists who had fled the khanate turned for support to Soviet officials in Tashkent, for whom the Bukharans provided the "internal" revolutionary legitimation for the seizure of Bukhara by Soviet troops in September 1920. The amīr fled, and from then until 1924 the former khanate existed as the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic; this was dissolved in the "national delimitation" of Central Asia in 1924, with most of its territory allotted to the new Soviet republic of Uzbekistan.

[See also Islam, article on Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus; Khan; and Uzbekistan.]

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DEVIN DEWESE

BUNYĀD. *Dehkhoda's Dictionary of Persian Vocabulary* defines the term *bunyād* as "base, root, origin, and foundation." In this article, *bunyād* refers to a certain type of grassroots, putatively nonprofit institutions that were organized for particular purposes after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. A few *bunyāds* antedated the revolution but never acquired the immense size or social significance that postrevolutionary *bunyāds* accumulated. Although all claim nonprofit status, some certainly make money. Most also engage in functions such as trade, manufacturing, banking, and social services. Some also function as vehicles for patronage, mass mobilization, ideological indoctrination, and even repression. Three types of *bunyād* exist in contemporary Iran: public, private and *waqf* (endowment). They are basically unregulated, exempt from taxes, and organized into an elaborate network of functional and spatial offices.

Endowment *bunyāds*, which were in fashion before the revolution, have hardly grown in number or importance since. *Bunyād-i Āstān-i Quds* (The Eighth Imam

Foundation), formed decades ago, is among the country's largest *bunyāds*; it owns and controls an immense amount and variety of properties, ranging from land, hotels, and trading companies to industries and social service delivery centers. It also employs several thousand people and sponsors many poor families. Although no definite figure exists for its annual budget, it may be close to \$2 billion. A significant part of the organization's financial resources is drawn from daily cash vows donated by pilgrims to the tomb of the Eighth Imam.

The other two important *bunyāds* of the endowment type are *Bunyād-i Pānzdah-i Khurdād* (The Fifteenth of Khurdad Foundation) and the *Mu'assasah-yi Nashr-i Āṣār-i Hazrat-i Imām Khumaynī* (Institute for Publication and Distribution of the Grand Imam Khomeini's Writings). Both these institutions were established after the revolution, the first immediately following it in memory of the 1963 uprising led by the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989), and the second after Khomeini's death to propagate his teachings. They also supervise Khomeini's mausoleum in a Tehran suburb. *Bunyād-i Pānzdah-i Khurdād* has offered more than \$2 million in bounty to anyone who kills Salman Rushdie, the author of *The Satanic Verses* [see Rushdie Affair]. It had 805,722 families under its tutelage in 1991, including the poor and the households of martyrs, the disabled, POWs, and MIAs.

Private *bunyāds* were established by various factions within or outside the Islamic ruling elite. Allegedly they are nonprofit organizations, but they make money. Some have become major economic institutions, such as *Sāzman-i Iqtisād-i Islāmī* (Islamic Economic Organization), *Bunyād-i Jāvid* (Eternal Foundation), *Bunyād-i Rajā'* (Foundation for Growth of Islamic Republic), *Bunyād-i Rafāh* (Welfare Foundation), *Bunyād-i Ta'āvun* (Coop Foundation). To give an indication of their size, in 1987, the loanable fund of the *Sāzman-i Iqtisād-i Islāmī* stood at 50 billion Iranian rials, roughly equal to 5 percent of the country's total liquidity.

Other private *bunyāds* are involved in controlling cultural matters such as cinemas. Examples include *Bunyād-i Fārābī* (Farabi Foundation) and *Sāzman-i Tablighāt-i Islāmī* (Organization for Islamic Propagation). Many also support electoral candidates with money and propaganda, control important economic and extraeconomic institutions, and publish newspapers, magazines, books, and occasional reports. Principal among these is *Bunyād-i Risālat* (Foundation for

Prophetic Mission), which publishes the economically conservative daily *Risālat*. Relationships between these private institutions and the government has not always been easy, and some, including the *Sāzman-i Iqtisād-i Islāmī* and the now defunct *Nubūvat Foundation* (Prophetic Foundation), have been charged with corruption, misuse of public funds, and interference with government policies.

Public *bunyāds* were established by the Islamic Republic in the first few years of its existence. In theory, these are separate and independent entities; in reality, however, they are mainly dependent on the government, and this dependency has increased over time as popular material support for them has declined. They were allocated some 20,000 million rials from the public budget in 1980, the figure increased to 230,000 million rials by 1987. A few *bunyāds* came into being to replace institutions of the previous regime or to honor certain individuals. Examples include *Bunyād-i 'Alavī*, which replaced *Bunyād-i Pahlavī* (Pahlavi Foundation), and *Bunyād-i Shahīd Chamrān* (Martyr Chamran's Foundation).

Most public *bunyāds*, however, were established to act as executive arms of the new regime in areas of special social and economic concern to the Islamic government. Sometimes, however, they have duplicated the work of the more traditional ministries or institutions. These include *Bunyād-i Shahīd* (Martyr's Foundation), originally established to look after the families of the martyrs of the revolution, and *Bunyād-i Mustaz'afān* (Foundation for the Oppressed), formed to assist the poor. More will be said about these two very important *bunyāds* below. The *Bunyād-i Maskan-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī* (Housing Foundation of the Islamic Revolution) was established on 26 May 1979 to provide housing for the poor, particularly in rural areas; its initial funding came from the previously established Account Number 100 of Imam (Khomeini), among other private donations.

Jihād-i Sāzandigī (Reconstruction Crusade), which is now a ministry, was originally established by a group of Muslim university students on 17 June 1979 to undertake grassroots development projects in rural areas. *Bunyād-i Umūr Muhājirīn-i Jang-e Tahmīlī* (Foundation for the Affairs of the Imposed War Migrants) was organized on 4 June 1979 to assist war-afflicted families and areas damaged in Iran-Iraq war. In 1982, some 120,162 families, or about 40 percent of all war-afflicted households, were under the care of this *bunyād*. Finally,

Kūmītah-i Imdād-i Imām Khumaynī (Imam Khomeini's Relief Committee) was formed immediately following the revolution to help disadvantaged people. By 1991, this organization had brought some 994,000 needy people and 309,300 students under its care.

Public *bunyāds* have been established using primarily the expropriated properties of wealthy Iranians who had supposedly acquired their wealth illegitimately by cooperating with the shah. Although they were initially organized as nonprofit public institutions, over time some have become profit-oriented and are becoming increasingly removed from government control. Nevertheless, they continue to receive funds from the public budget, and their leadership is appointed by the president and confirmed by the spiritual leader of the Islamic regime.

As governmental organizations have become institutionalized, some *bunyāds* have also changed their form and structure. More specifically, a process of "ministerialization" and integration has gradually occurred. Thus, the Revolutionary Guards Corp and the Reconstruction Crusade have both become ministries; Bunyād-i Umūr-i Muhājirīn-i Jang-i Tahmīlī has joined the Ministry of Labor; the Jihād-i Savād Āmūzī (Mobilization for Literacy) has become part of the Ministry of Education; and the Kūmītah-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī (Islamic Revolution Committee) has been integrated with the regular police force. Meanwhile, a process of "fiefdomization" has brought certain *bunyāds* under control of given families, restricting their effectiveness.

To provide a more focused analysis of postrevolutionary *bunyāds* the remainder of this article will focus on Bunyād-i Mustaz'afān and Bunyād-i Shahīd. On 1 March 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a decree confiscating properties of the shah, his family, and their associates. Two days later the Bunyād-i Mustaz'afān was formed to consolidate, control, and manage the confiscated wealth in the interests of the poor, especially their housing conditions. The magnitude and value of the confiscated assets are not precisely known. In 1982, the organization controlled a total of 3,423 economic units, of which 1,049 were industrial, mineral, agricultural, commercial, development and construction related, and cultural; and 2,786 were real estate and housing units. Only a year later, during an interview with the daily newspaper *Kayhān* on 21 November 1983, the organization's director claimed that "the organization is one of the largest conglomerates in the world and the largest Islamic entity in Iran."

According to its 1986 annual report the foundation employed 42,095 people and produced 136.7 billion rials worth of goods and services, equal to 14.1 percent of total production by large industrial units in the country. At the time, the *bunyād* also controlled 113 large industrial units. By 1990, its activities and economic capabilities had significantly grown. In an interview with *Kayhān*, Mohsen Rafiqdust, the present director of the foundation, revealed that it was planning to build an oil refinery, construct 5,000 low-cost houses for the urban poor in Tehran, and import large quantities of steel. Currently, the *bunyād* is the sole official representative of Mercedes, BMW, Volkswagen, and Toyota cars in the country. In 1992, the *New York Times* reported that the total annual budget for the foundation was about \$10 billion.

Bunyād-i Shahīd was established in March 1980, following a decree from Khomeini on 12 March 1980 calling for care for veterans of the revolution and the dependents of those who had died in it. After September 1980, responsibilities of the *bunyād* were expanded to care for disabled Iran-Iraq war veterans and the families of war martyrs, POWs, and MIAs. Currently the organization is under the supervision of Iran's president, but its director is confirmed in office by Khomeini's successor. In 1985, it had an income of 50 billion rials and an expenditure of 56 billion rials (about \$3.8 billion at the current market rate of 1,580 rials to a dollar).

The *bunyād's* major functions include: giving priority to student admission to all educational institutions and to obtaining basic needs and provision of employment through establishment or acquisition of factories; reduced fares on state-owned transport; medical insurance, hospitalization, prescription drugs, and provision of prostheses; provision of housing at subsidized prices or rentals; and assistance in marriage and purchase of startup household appliances.

By March 1987, some 1,382 families had reportedly received housing in 19 housing complexes. The *bunyād* also assigns land to families able to build their own houses and assists them in obtaining mortgages. By 1989 more than a thousand families had been aided in this way. The Marriage Unit facilitates the marriage of war widows and veterans by providing loans, cash grants, and household goods gratis or at a reduced price. By 1987, the number of marriages arranged by the *bunyād* had reached 420.

Like Bunyād-i Mustaz'afān, the Bunyād-i Shahīd is funded by confiscated properties. Additionally, it has

established a number of new companies. In early 1985, the total number of firms and factories under its control included 68 industrial units, 75 commercial companies and agencies, 21 construction companies, and 17 agricultural units. The *bunyād* also owns more than 6,000 units of real estate in Tehran, including villas, apartments, shops, malls, schools, hospitals, and hotels, the majority of which it uses to house the families of war dead. It also has 140 orchards and plots of land at its disposal.

Postrevolutionary *bunyāds* have become powerful organizations. They have very large sums at their disposal and represent major vehicles for extending patronage in ways that rival the state bureaucracy. Although it is difficult to tell what the future has in store, there is reason to believe that *bunyāds* will continue to be salient features of the national landscape in the Islamic Republic of Iran for some time to come.

[See also Iran.]

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HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI

BURHĀNUDDĪN, SAYYIDNĀ MUḤAMMAD

(b. AH 1333/1915 CE), head of the Dā'ūdī Bohrā Ismā'īlī community and fifty-second occupant of the office of *dā'ī muḥlaq* ("absolute summoner"). The office held by Burhānuddīn originated in Yemen in AH 532/1138 CE when the heir to the Fāṭimid caliphate, the twenty-first imam al-Ṭayyib, chose seclusion. The Ismā'īlī community believes that since then the imamate has continued in seclusion in the progeny of al-Ṭayyib and that prior preparations had been made by his predecessors to ensure that the Fāṭimid Ismā'īlī mission would continue through the *dā'ī muḥlaq*. The *dā'ī* thus represents the secluded imam and operates with the imam's authority. He carries out virtually all the imam's religious and juridical functions and sustains the social structure of the community of believers. The present *dā'ī* resides in Bombay, the headquarters of the mission having been transferred to India from Yemen in 974/1567. Like his predecessors, he is greatly revered by his followers.

Burhānuddīn received his religious and administrative training during the leadership of his renowned father and predecessor, Ṭāhir Sayf al-Dīn (1915–1965) and succeeded him in 1965. He has led his community into an era of fresh vibrancy and renewed zeal by devoting his efforts to the preservation of the Fāṭimid Ismā'īlī heritage in a number of ways: he has ushered in a spiritual reawakening by requiring his followers to adhere closely to Qur'ānic injunctions in their everyday lives. He has emphasized adherence to Islamic business ethics that include the prohibition of interest and institutionalized interest-free loan schemes to cater for the community's borrowing needs. He has strengthened the age-old Shī'ī practice of lamenting the martyrdom of Imam al-Ḥusayn; the annual gatherings to mourn the martyrdom during the first ten day of Muḥarram ('Āshūrā') has become the major spiritual expression of the community, with thousands of Bohrās attending the sermons of the *dā'ī*, which are relayed live to Bohrā centers all over the world. He has promoted the blending of secular and religious studies by initiating Islam-oriented schools which attempt to provide an integrated education in an Islamic atmosphere. Finally, he has undertaken the restoration of Fāṭimid relics and has promoted Fāṭimid architecture and design in the construction of a large